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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to reflect on oneself is an important human 
capacity that has received considerable attention from philosophical 
and psychological theorists (Bugenthal, 1965; Mead, 1934; Sartre, 
1956). In the last decade, self-awareness theory (Buss, 1980; Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Wicklund, 1975b) 
has provided a basis for empirical research on self-consciousness. 
Self-focused attention fosters a comparison between performance and 
salient personal standards and feelings. The usual result of such a 
comparison - the experience of dissonance - leads to one of two 
resolutions to this internal conflict: either behavior or standards 
are altered to minimize the discrepancy or attempts are made to avoid 
focal self-awareness. Performance in simple tasks is improved in 
the presence of mirrors, audiences, and video recordings of the 
subject (Wicklund & Duval, 1971/1972). But there are negative 
sequellae as well, since self-consciousness arouses a state similar 
to evaluative anxiety. If the personal importance of the task 
passes an optimal point, self-focused attention is associated with 
decrements in performance (Liebling & Shaver, 1973) and in self-
esteem (Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973). Especially if the disso-
nance cannot be eliminated quickly, stimuli to self-focused attention 
may cause escape behavior (Cummings, 1976; Duval, Wicklund & Fine, 
1 
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1971/1972; Wicklund, 1975b). 
To date, the primary application of self-awareness theory 
has been in social psychology. Duval & Wicklund (1972) have used it 
in discussions of such traditional topics as attribution, conformity, 
social facilitation, and self-esteem. There has been no systematic 
attempt to generalize the theory to phenomena of interest in clinical 
psychology, although Duval and Wicklund and subsequent researchers 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) have suggested that such an application 
would be fruitful. This dissertation will attempt to extend self-
awareness theory to three issues of practical and theoretical impor-
tance in clinical psychology. 
Of primary concern is the level and structure of self-
consciousness in a psychopathological sample. Fenigstein et al. 
(1975) have administered a Self-Consciousness Scale to samples of 
normal college students, validating it as a measure of the disposi-
tional tendency to focus attention on oneself. They report three 
components: attention to private aspects of the self, attention 
to the self as social object, and social anxiety in anticipation of 
negative evaluation. It may be that a clinical sample deviates from 
the norms in overall self-consciousness or in subscale scores. 
Certainly, the generalized anxiety that typifies many diagnostic 
groups might well be expressed in the Social Anxiety subscale. 
Similarly, the disruptions in intra- and interpersonal functioning 
found among those seeking psychotherapy may represent disturbances 
in the ability to reflect on their internal feelings and motivation, 
or on their impact on others. Recent theorizing about self-
consciousness has stressed the importance of the distinction between 
awareness of public and private aspects of the self (Buss, 1980). 
3 
A more relevant distinction for a psychopathological sample may well 
be between the evaluative and nonevaluative aspects of self-awareness. 
For this reason the factor structure of the scale will be reexamined. 
Lastly, since the clinical population is certainly not homogeneous, 
self-consciousness will be examined as a function of ego strength 
or degree of pathology. The first goal of this research will be to 
examine the responses of a psychopathological sample to evaluate the 
degree to which self-awareness theory, as developed for a normal 
population, can be generalized to clinical situations. 
The second goal of this dissertation will be to examine the 
hypothesis that deviant levels of self-consciousness correspond with 
a tendency to prematurely terminate psychotherapy. Duval & Wicklund 
(1972) indicate that escape behavior is especially likely when there 
is a large discrepancy between behavior or attributes and relevant 
personal standards, when discrepancy reducing behavior is difficult, 
and stimuli to self-awareness are salient. The early stages of 
psychotherapy closely approximate this situation. The presence of 
an expert observer and the all but exclusive focus on the patient's 
life guarantee sustained self-consciousness. The topic of discussion 
is generally on problems of such severity, duration, and intracta-
bility that the patient is in considerable distress. The required 
changes are usually characterological or otherwise involve a major 
shift in lifestyle, changes that can take place only after extended 
time or effort. This situation is closely analogical to the one 
Duval and Wicklund suggest will motivate avoidance behavior, in 
this case, failing to continue in treatment. 
Surveys show that up to 65% of those beginning psychotherapy 
terminate unilaterally (Malzer, 1980). A great deal of research 
has investigated the reasons for this high rate of dropping out. 
Relatively few patient characteristics have been identified as 
related to premature termination (Garfield, Affleck, & Muffly, 
4 
1963). Instead, research has increasingly shifted to situational 
factors, and specifically to the interaction of patient and therapist 
(Frank, Gliedman, Imber, Nash, & Stone, 1957). Surveys of terminators 
repeatedly find complaints about the quality of the relationship 
(Hiler, 1958; Kamin & Coughlin, 1963; Saltzman, Luetgert, Roth, 
Creaser, & Howard, 1976). Therapists were accused of being cold 
and aloof, lacking understanding or interest, and showing too little 
respect. These complaints less likely point to real shortcomings 
in the therapist than to an interaction pattern that fails to assuage 
the patient's initial doubts, anxieties, and self-criticism. What 
are perceived as therapist failures may instead be signs of excessive 
self-consciousness. Premature termination is, then, a major problem 
for which the existing explanations are consistent with an account 
based on the avoidance of excessive self-focused attention. The 
second study reported will evaluate the applicability of a specific 
hypothesis from self-awareness theory to the clinically important 
5 
issue of therapy drop outs. 
The third goal of the research will be to examine differences 
in self-consciousness levels among distinct personality types. While 
the first two studies consider patients as a group, this experiment 
pursues the difference among subgroups of the clinic sample. Self-
consciousness may constitute an important treatment issue for partic-
ular types. The self-preoccupation of obsessive or passive patients 
may make them particularly vulnerable to paralyzing self-criticism 
if the therapist fails to carefully limit the amount of self-focused 
attention. Conversely, the lack of insight displayed by sociopaths 
or paranoid patients is likely attributable to a lack of self-
monitoring. This research expands on the second goal. Some types 
may drop out of treatment because therapy exaccerbates a preexisting 
excessive self-consciousness (e.g., passive types) while others may 
lack the requisite ability to reflect on their internal motivation 
that is necessary for insight oriented therapy (e.g., paranoid 
patients). If either of the first two experiments find self-
consciousness to have important clinical implications, this more 
microscopic examination of differences between psychopathological 
subgroups should help to clarify the results. 
This dissertation is an initial attempt to extend self-
awareness theory to a new area: clinical psychology. From this 
point of view, it is an attempt to generalize a well established 
body of findings to a new population. Clinicians have, of course, 
previously considered the importance of self-focused attention. 
Verbal therapies have historically considered insight to be a 
critical element in treatment (Greenson, 1967; Yalom, 1975). But 
much of this data has been presented in terms of anecdotal case 
studies, meta-psychological theorizing, or technical directives. 
6 
From the point of view of clinical psychology, this research attempts 
to add an empirical perspective on the importance of self-conscious-
ness to the understanding and treatment of psychopathology. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This research applies self-awareness theory to several areas 
of clinical psychology. The literature review will be extensive. 
It will begin with a conceptual overview which samples the theoretical 
perspectives on self-consciousness influencing current approaches 
to human relations and psychotherapy. This section provides the con-
text for the following one, which reviews self-awareness theory in 
some detail. Successive sections will cover the literature related 
to each of the clinical issues hypothesized to be related to self-
consciousness levels. In order, these include discussions of the 
Ego Strength Scale (Barron, 1953) as an index of degree of pathology, 
variables related to premature termination from psychotherapy, and 
personality types in a psychopathological population. The chapter 
will conclude with a restatement of the central hypotheses tested in 
this dissertation. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Overview 
Socrates dictum, "Know Thyself", is oft-cited and time honored. 
It serves not only as an epistemological tool and ethical directive; 
it also takes on the force of an ontological description of the human 
condition. The capacity to reflect on ones acts, attributes, and 
thought processes is uniquely connected to what we think of as human. 
7 
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It is the defining feature conventionally used to distinguish man 
from animal. It is intimately connected to the capacity for abstract 
thought and evolution through culture. 
With this general cultural attitude as background, it is not 
surprising that the social sciences have treated self-awareness 
reverently. Mead (1934) and Piaget (1954) make the ability to 
"decenter" and examine oneself as an object a developmental hallmark. 
For both, self-objectification is a necessary preliminary to effective 
social relations. Some self-understanding is requisite for the funda-
mental interpersonal skill of empathy, which in turn has been defined 
as a basis of therapeutic interaction (Kohut, 1971, 1977; Rogers, 
1961). And self-awareness is just as important for the client as 
for the helper in the therapeutic dyad. Since Freud (Greenson, 1967) 
a dominant thrust of dynamic theorizing has been on the importance 
of insight to healing. 
But there is a problematic side to self-awareness which is 
best captured in the word "self-consciousness". If the hyphen is 
removed or exaggerated, the word shatters into two components, "self" 
and "consciousness", which jointly represent the crucial capacity for 
self-focused attention. The connotation is positive. But as a single 
unit, "self-consciousness", the implication is very different. The 
associations are with anxiety, paralysis of action, exposure to harsh 
scrutiny, and shame. It is more than a semantic accident that the 
word can be defined as either "the state of being intensely aware of 
oneself" or "ill at ease" (Webster, 1977, p. 1048). There is a 
fundamental ambivalence with which we approach the concept, belying 
the esteem held by the previously mentioned theorists. 
Various writers have described the potential problems asso-
ciated with self-focused attention. One perspective examines the 
advantages of unselfconscious action (Csikszentmihalyi, 1979; 
Ornstein, 1972). The resulting "flow experience" (Furlong, 1976) 
is described glowingly as characterized by heightened concentration, 
merging of awareness with action, enhanced mastery, loss of doubts, 
and an ecstatic joy in action for its own sake. This description 
provides a counterpoint to the overcontrolled and unnatural busyness 
attributed to reflective states of consciousness (Bassos, 1976). 
But the main critique of self-awareness is frontal and best 
epitomized in the writings of Sartre (1956). For him, the basic 
ontological structure of human beings is tripartite. First, as 
being-for-itself, we are the freedom and limitless possibilities of 
our consciousness. Second, as being-in-itself, we are paradoxically 
rooted in facticity by our bodies. Lastly, as being-for-others, we 
are objects and tools in other people's projects. As such, being-
for-others represents the intolerable crystalization of the first 
two states which gives rise to the famous phrase "Hell is other 
people" (Sartre, 1946). The look of "the Other" reminds us that our 
freedom is limited: 
I grasp the Other's look at the very center of my act as the 
solidification and alienation of my own possibilities. In fear 
or in anxious or prudent anticipation, I perceive that these 
possibilities which I am and which are the condition of my 
transcendence are given also to another, given as about to be 
transcended in turn by his own possibilities. The Other as a 
9 
look is only that -my transcendence transcended. (Cumming, 
1965, p. 201) 
The presence of the Other is not only the occasion for fear, but 
for shame: 
Shame .•• is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact 
that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and 
judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in 
order to become a given object • • • The world flows out of 
the world and I flow outside myself. The Other's look makes me 
be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of 
the world which is at once this world and beyond this world. 
(p. 199) 
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The Other's ability to reconstitute the world from an alien perspec-
tive changes the relation of self to itself: 
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I 
have just glued my ear to the door and am looking through a 
keyhole. I am alone and on the level of non-thetic self-
consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self 
to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can 
refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way 
known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their 
whole justification ••• My consciousness clings to my acts, 
it is my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to 
be attained and by the instruments to be employed . • . • 
Jealousy, as the possibility which I am, organizes this instru-
mental complex by transcending the complex towards itself. 
But I am this jealousy; I do not know it ••. Moreover, I 
cannot truly define myself as being in a situation; first 
because I am not a positional consciousness of myself; second 
because I am my own nothingness • • • • 
But suddenly I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking 
at me. What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly 
affected in my being and that essential modifications appear 
in my structure - modifications which I can apprehand and fix 
conceptually by means of the reflective cogito. 
First of all, I now exist as myself for my unreflected con-
sciousness • • • • I see myself because someone sees me • • 
The unreflected consciousness does not apprehend the person 
directly as an object; the person is presented to consciousness 
insofar as the person is an object for the Other. (pp. 196-198) 
In apprehending oneself as an object, the possibility of 
self-evaluation appears. So, while the Other's presence may be 
the occasion, the experience is internal and basic to a person who 
11 
is at once a being and a consciousness. This embarassment is univer-
sal. At a party, people are dancing. Low lights buffer against 
self-consciousness. The music and the rhythm of the movement 
totally occupy each dancer's awareness. There is no self and so no 
self-judgment, only the kinesthetic awareness of flexing muscles 
and the sound of the music. A dancer may even close his eyes or 
defocus his gaze to enhance the awareness of these stimuli. Yet, 
suddenly, the gaze takes in an attentive bystander. Eyes focus. 
Just as instantly, the dancer transposes himself into the perspec-
tive of the observer. Awareness of music and movement recede. And 
the dancer sees himself: the silly step, the harsh asymmetry of 
the movements, the awkwardness, the vacuous look. With this outside 
perspective, this "objective" and objectifying distance, opportunity 
for self-criticism abounds. The stimulus need not even be Sartre's 
"Other". The reflection from a strategically placed mirror or the 
memory of other dances or occasions of criticism may be sufficient 
to begin the avalanche of self-evaluative internal dialogue. This is 
the anxiety and disruption that makes self-awareness problematic. 
Psychotherapy presents a prototypical environment in which 
such harsh self-scrutiny is likely. The Other is ever-present and 
ever-attentive. Even more than in typical social interaction, the 
focus is kept on the patient. The distractions and pleasantries 
that punctuate normal conversation are minimized. The therapist, 
to the extent that he or she approximates the analytic ideal of the 
"blank screen", provides few clues as to course or satisfactory 
progress of the relationship. In the absense of clear signals from 
the attentive expert, the patient is even more likely to obsess 
about the adequacy of himself and his self-presentation. All of 
these conventional features of the therapy relationship compound 
the tendency toward self-consciousness that follows naturally from 
the discussion of sensitive and problematic areas in the patient's 
life. It is no wonder that patients demonstrate an amazingly crea-
tive and broad range of resistances to the therapeutic task, or 
that-- with great frequency-- the therapy ends with the early and 
unilateral termination of treatment by the patient. 
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This is, intentionally, a one-sided portrait of the therapy 
relationship. But its purpose is to highlight the likelihood that 
shame and anxiety will be important issues in the early phases of 
psychological treatment. To the extent that insight is a basic 
feature of verbal psychotherapy, self-consciousness, with attendant 
self-criticism and shame, will be present. Indeed, a wide range of 
therapeutic manuevers may be interpreted as vehicles to manage 
anxiety. Yalom (1975) stresses the curative power of discovering 
that a private pain is shared in common with other group members. 
This experience of universality deflates shame by recasting a private 
problem as common. Likewise, an empathic response indicates that 
an experience is understandable and acceptable. There is the clear 
implication that the problem expressed is neither so repugnant nor 
so important as the patient's fantasy had likely made it seem. The 
therapeutic use of humor and anecdotes distract the patient and 
disrupt the chain of self-evaluation as much as they imply alterna-
tive perspectives for analyzing a problem. Perhaps most directly, 
paradox and reinterpretation suggest socially valued motivations 
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that can replace the patient's self-critical explanations of behavior. 
Diverse techniques, even from incompatible approaches to personality 
change, share in common their efficacy at disrupting self-scrutiny 
or neutralizing its troublesome consequences. 
While therapists seldom address the issue of self-conscious-
ness, there is discussion of the ways in which focal self-awareness 
changes over time. Greenson (1967) pegs the development of a working 
relationship between patient and analyst to the capacity of the 
observing ego to split off from the experiencing ego. As this split 
develops, the observing function, called the reasonable ego, operates 
as the analyst's ally in making and applying interpretations. What 
Greenson is describing is a gradual process by which the anxiety and 
shame attending self-scrutiny are neutralized and self-observation 
becomes a useful tool rather than a threat. But the development of 
the reasonable ego is not regarded as the culmination of successful 
treatment. Rogers (1958) notes that as client-centered therapy 
proceeds there is movement on the part of the client from initial 
avoidance of reference to the self, through a period of focal self-
awareness, to a final stage in which reflective consciousness becomes 
less important as the organismic valuing process asserts itself 
without requiring focal attention. 
A similar conception is offered by Bugenthal (1965), who 
posits a two-stage therapy process: 
The analytic phase of our work is oriented to a conception of 
the person in which he is assumed to have both subject and 
object aspects. The ontologie phase calls for a recognition 
that this composite conception of the person is itself a part 
of the resistance to full authenticity of being. Instead, the 
ontologie phase insists on the necessity of freeing the I from 
its bondage to the Self in order to move toward true ontologie 
freedom. (P. 184) 
Here the "I-process" is "pure subject" (p. 194) or "feelingful 
awareness" (p. 204). In contrast, "the Self is an object in the 
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awareness of the I-process. Under the influence of cultural learnings, 
we often regard the Self as synonomous with the I-process, but it is 
not" (p. 203). Rather the Self serves as a cognitive map permitting 
consistency of behavior with minimal awareness. Both excessive con-
sistency and minimization of awareness are threats to authentic 
living. In addition, the Self is constantly checked against an 
idealized version, promoting a tyranny of the ideal over the actual. 
Therapy then becomes a reworking of the Self which allows maximum 
awareness and culminates in the liberation of the I-process from the 
Self. To Bugenthal, peak experiences occur at "moments in which the 
I-process breaks free from the Self" (p. 252). 
Bugenthal and Rogers agree that therapy must include a 
phase in which the self-as-object is carefully examined, but that 
such examination cannot be the end point of treatment. Fully human 
living requires a more spontaneous responsiveness than can be 
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possible with a self-scrutinizing posture toward life. In adopting 
this stance, they are in line with those who question the absolute 
value of self-awareness. Yet, they clearly reject the Sartrean 
notion that self-apprehension, or the presence of other people which 
stimulate it, is undesirable or intolerable. There seem to be two 
reasons for their lack of emphasis on the shame and anxiety accom-
panying self-consciousness. One reason is legitimate, while the 
other is nat. 
Sartre is wrong in contending that social relationships are 
inevitably fraught with shame and violated freedom. As Mead and 
others have demonstrated, all thought is fundamentally social 
(Pfuetze, 1954). The internal dialogue of thinking is modeled on 
social dialogue. Our freedom is not contravened by the Other, but 
is made possible by him. Shame, then, is not an ontologically pri-
mary experience, but one among a number of potential responses to the 
presence of an observer. Similarly, self-evaluation is but one of a 
range of ways of responding to the objectified self. To return to 
a previous example, once again picture our dancer. Instead of disrup-
tive shame, the awareness of an observer may motivate greater effort 
and concentration on the dancer's part. Whether for vanity or in 
appreciation of imagined approbation, the dancer may excell himself. 
Especially if he is experienced and competent, the dancer may be able 
to use the other's reactions as a type of mirror to inform his efforts. 
Here the Other becomes a source of information or support for the 
enhancement of the dancer's project. This capacity to productively 
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use the presence of another, and the entire process of self-observa-
tion, is what makes psychotherapy possible. Greenson (1967), 
Bugenthal (1965), and Rogers (1958) are correct in stressing the 
potentially beneficial consequences of self-examination. What 
becomes important is to discriminate the conditions or situations in 
which self-consciousness will support insight and change, in contrast 
to those times when it will erupt into paralyzing shame. 
Where all three therapists underestimate the importance of 
shame is in the first few sessions of psychotherapy. Clearly with 
Greenson, and to a lesser extent with Bugenthal and Rogers, the 
emphasis is on the course of treatment once a therapeutic alliance 
has developed. It is then that interpretation is most useful, that 
the I-process can be nurtured, or that the organismic valuing process 
becomes evident. But the working relationship develops slowly. It 
is during the beginning sessions, when the patient makes the first 
tentative attempts at self-disclosure, that the vulnerability to 
anxiety is greatest. The developed transference, if positive, is a 
bond which enables the patient to withstand periods of self-conscious-
ness. Before it has arisen the patient can tolerate considerably less 
self-scrutiny and the therapist must sensitively administer corrective 
doses from his or her anxiety-management techniques. Premature 
pressure for self-examination can easily result in the experience of 
shame and coercion that Sartre so eloquently describes. It is during 
this early phase in treatment, a phase with varying duration for 
different patients, that the Sartrean paradigm is most applicable. 
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Self-focused attention is a double-edged sword. That it can 
cut for good has been amply demonstrated. It is the vehicle for 
conscience and social cooperation. It is a necessary condition for 
the crucial internal dialogue between the "I" and the "me" (Mead, 
1934). It is one--if not the--critical ingredient in verbal psycho-
therapy. It is this role that has received most attention by psycho-
logical theorists. But self-consciousness can have ill effects as 
well. Influential observers like Bugenthal and Rogers stress that 
treatment is not finished so long as the self-as-object is the primary 
focus. Perhaps even more important, according to the argument in this 
section, are the potentially disruptive effects of self-consciousness 
in the early stages of treatment before the therapeutic alliance is 
robust. Research bearing on these affects, both positive and negative, 
will be presented next. 
Self-Awareness Theory 
Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness 
purports to have general application across the field of social psycho-
logy. The authors treat such classic subjects as conformity, social 
facilitation, attribution and self-esteem. This range is achieved 
because the authors conceptually link motivational consequences to 
the cognitive processes controlling direction of attention. 
Their contention is that consciousness is intrinsically bidi-
rectional. During periods of action or sensory stimulation the person 
will be subjectively self-aware (SSA): attention will be directed 
toward the external environment and there will be only a minimal, 
nonfocal self-awareness. However, any stimuli reminding the person 
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of himself will prompt the uniquely human self-consciousness in which 
the person treats himself as an object. This latter state is what 
is called objective self-awareness (OSA). Consciousness is held to 
oscillate between these two points. While there are undoubtedly 
individual differences in the proportion of time spent in OSA, Duval 
and Wicklund contend that the direction of attention is primarily 
determined by environmental stimuli. They use such stimuli as mirrors, 
videotapes, and voice recordings in their experiments to manipulate 
attention toward the self. 
It is the motivational consequences of attentional direction 
that gives the theory its wide range of application. Duval and 
Wicklund theorize that people use internalized standards of action 
to regulate their behavior. It is while in the objective state, and 
only then, that actual behavior is compared with personal standards. 
Typically there is an awareness of discrepancy between behavior and 
ideal. Although Wicklund (1975b) notes that a success may lead to a 
pleasurable discrepancy when behavior supersedes the relevant stan-
dard, the usual experience is one of failing to live up to the 
standard. In such cases objective self-awareness would lead to self-
derogation. The drop in self-esteem can be handled in various ways: 
attempts to avoid OSA may include withdrawal or distraction through 
involvement in other activities, or dissonance may be reduced by 
altering standards or changing behavior to bring it in line with ideals. 
Whichever of the options is chosen, the motivational conse-
quences of objective self-awareness are clearly based on the desire 
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to avoid the experience of discrepancy between behavior and standards. 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggest that redirection of attention away 
from the self will be the initial response; it is the fastest means 
of avoiding awareness of discrepancy. So the embarrassed partygoer 
will try to escape from the social setting. Or, failing that, he 
will become engrossed in other activities (any other) such as mixing 
a drink or admiring the host's preparations. Anything that shifts 
the attentional focus away from the self restores OSA and provides 
immediate relief from self-derogation. Only when such escape is 
impossible would behavior or attitude change be expected. So persis-
tent confrontation from a friend may well prove effective, since the 
subject of the discrepancy cannot be avoided and the valued friendship 
will prevent fleeing the situation. 
Such a formulation implies a preference for subjective self-
awareness, with its freedom from self-evaluation. This raises two 
crucial questions. First, what is to prevent a constant attentional 
focus on external events? Duval and Wicklund respond the stimuli 
to OSA are unavoidable. Anything that reminds the person of himself 
will elicit self-focused attention. Environmental stimuli such as 
mirrors, monitors, or personal writings raise the self to consciousness. 
The very actions sought to avoid OSA may require the focus on one's 
hands or kinesthetic cues that trigger self-consciousness. But, the 
most obvious and unavoidable stimuli to OSA are social. Awareness 
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of self as a separate object arises in interaction with other people 
(Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1966; Smith, 1979). The experience or anticipa-
tion of evaluation by others remains the most common and surefire way 
to elicit OSA. Given our constant exposure to a social network, and 
our dependence on it to meet so many of our goals, OSA is unavoidable. 
The second crucial question might be: if OSA is unpleasant, 
why do people seem to seek it? People are constantly and voluntarily 
performing before audiences. They decorate their dwellings with 
mirrors and their offices with certificates enblazened with their 
names. They seek introspective activities, even to the extreme of 
paying for interminable courses of psychoanalysis. Here the answer 
is vaguer. Wicklund (1975b) suggests that the motivation for self-
improvement may overcome the tendency to avoid OSA. The research to 
be discussed below also suggests that people may rapidly habituate 
to the experience of self-focused attention and thus sustain it 
without adverse reactions. 
There is a further explanation of why OSA is not always 
avoided. While Duval and Wicklund (1972) never explicitly discuss 
the possibility, it is clear that self-evaluation need not be the 
inevitable result of self-focused attention. The dancer described 
above may very attentively consider how he appears to his audience, 
and use this awareness to enhance his performance without engaging 
in self-criticism. Self-consciousness may be necessary for self-
evaluation without inevitably causing it. 
Having attempted to outline the scope and central tenants of 
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Duval and Wicklund's theory of objective self-awareness, and having 
just suggested a qualification to it, we will review a cross-section 
of the research cited in its support. Because of the realization that 
OSA need not be inevitably or constantly aversive, we will monitor 
the magnitude and duration of the OSA effect whenever possible. 
Demonstrations of objective self-awareness. Self-awareness 
research manipulates the salience of stimuli reminding the subject 
of the self. Most often the manipulation uses a mirror, a video 
camera, or an audience. Davis and Brock (1975) demonstrated the 
validity of the camera in stimulating objective self-awareness (OSA). 
The 48 subjects were told to translate pronouns from a passage in 
a foreign language, with the expectation that self-awareness would be 
evident in increased use of first person pronouns. Some subjects 
were given spurious feedback about their level of creativity to induce 
either positive or negative discrepancy from standards. But even 
when there was no feedback and no induction of self-evaluative posture, 
exposure to the camera led to a significant increase in the use of 
first person pronouns. Of a total of 49 pronouns, the control group 
translated 9.5 to the first person compared to the 14.2 used with 
exposure to the camera. Gellerand Shaver (1976) used a more projec-
tive approach, the Stroop color-naming technique. Previous research 
indicates a reliable tendency for it to take longer to name the color 
of a stimulus card if a word printed on the card has important personal 
meaning. Any OSA induction should increase the self-relevance of 
stimulus words, making the procedure a good indirect test of the 
presence of OSA. Half of the 57 female undergraduates were admin-
istered the procedure in the presence of a mirror and camera. Ad-
ditionally, half the group was exposed to neutral words while the 
other half saw self-evaluative and self-referrent words on the 
stimulus cards. Table 1 shows the seconds required to name the 
colors. There were significant main effects for type of word and 
for OSA stimuli, with exposure to either causing greater latencies 
in naming colors. In line with self-awareness theory, the results 
validate the OSA-inducing properties of mirrors and cameras, speci-
fically, and of self-referrent stimuli in general. 
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Carver and Scheier (1978) validated the OSA-inducing proper-
ties of a mirror or an observer. Female subjects filled out Exner's 
(1970) Self-Focus Sentence Completion blank, which can be scored for 
reference to self, to the environment, to both, or to neither. For 
each subject a ratio was created with references to self or self 
plus environment divided by total responses. With exposure to a 
mirror, 41 undergraduates generated a ratio of .57, significnatly 
higher than the .50 for 38 students not exposed to the mirror. 
Similar results were obtained when OSA was manipulated by the presence 
of an observer: a ratio of .58 for the 41 observed subjects differing 
to a statistically significant degree from the .51 obtained by stu-
dents who had no audience. In summary, a variety of approaches have 
shown that the self becomes more salient with exposure to any of the 
most commonly used stimuli to OSA: the camera, mirror, or observer. 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) demonstrate that the responses to 
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Table 1 
Response Latencies Under 
High and Low Self-Awareness Conditions 
Word type Mirror and camera No mirror or camera 
Neutral 
Self-referrent 
Note. From Geller and Shaver, 1976. 
8.91 6.25 
13.36 8.57 
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their manipulations of self-awareness have implications in a number 
of important areas. Examples will be drawn from studies on attribu-
tion of responsibility, social facilitation, and self-esteem change. 
Duval and Wicklund (1973) had female undergraduates read 
five short passages in which a positive outcome could be plausibly 
attributed to oneself or to another. The subjects were asked to 
apportion responsibility. The self-awareness manipulation consisted 
of exposure to the reflecting (OSA) or nonreflecting surface of the 
mirror. As hypothesized, the OSA condition lead to greater self-
attribution. With exposure to the mirror, the subjects ascribed 
60% of the responsibility to self, while only 49.9% was self-
attributed by subjects not exposed to the mirror. These results 
cannot be explained as simple self-aggrandizement. Focus of attention 
was equally potent when outcomes were negative. Objective self-
awareness again increased self-attribution, with an average of 60.2% 
of the culpability assigned to the self by OSA subjects, as compared 
to 51.1% for the no-mirror subjects. 
Responsibility attributed to self can be diminished by stimuli 
directing attention away from the self. Duval and Wicklund (1973) 
used physical activity as a distraction. Under the guise of warming 
up for a manual dexterity task, 14 undergraduate subjects operated a 
pursuit-rotor device while apportioning responsibility for negative 
outcomes in 10 situations. Self-attribution was lower than that 
obtained from 16 control subjects in 8 of the 10 situations. Overall, 
distraction lead to a significant decrease in assigning responsibility 
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to self, from 57.63% for the controls to 48.65% for the OSA group. 
Duval and Hensey (1976) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) detail similar 
results in experiments using other types of competing activities to 
increase subjective self-awareness. 
These experiments indicate a consistent and statistically 
significant effect in which manipulations of self-awareness alter the 
degree of self-attribution. The fact that ratings of personal respon-
sibility were alternately increased and decreased in keeping with 
theoretical expectations and that these changes occurred for both 
positive and negative outcomes, suggest that the effect is pervasive. 
A second application of self-awareness theory is in the 
explanation of social facilitation effects. Zajonc (1965) and Cottrell 
(1968) observed that the presence of an audience could lead to greater 
efforts and increased productivity in certain types of activities. 
The effect was attributed to a nonspecific drive aroused in the social 
context. Duval and Wicklund (1972) reinterpreted these experiments 
as evidence of self-awareness effects. They argued that an audience, 
particularly if it is attentive and expert in the area of performance, 
serves to elicit OSA. Attempts to approximate standards of excellence 
in turn lead to improved performance. By this analysis, "social 
facilitation" effects should be found even with nonsocial stimuli, so 
long as they lead to self-focused attention. Wicklund and Duval 
(1971/1972) told 34 female undergraduates that they were participating 
in a study of the ease of copying unfamiliar passages. The OSA stim-
uli, a mirror, was justified with the explanation that a second phase 
of the session involved mirror-writing. All subjects then copied 
selections of German prose for successive, 5 minute sessions, with 
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the experimental group being exposed to the mirror during the second 
interval. As predicted, the OSA group showed more improvement in num-
ber of letters copied (43.33 letters more than during the first session) 
than did the control group (17.65). The group difference was statis-
tically significant at the .05 level. Again, self-awareness theory dem-
onstrates its explanatory value in another area of social psychological 
inquiry. 
Further research on social facilitation qualifies the OSA ex-
planation. In a partial replication of Wicklund and Duval's (1971) 
study, Pasternak (1978) had 80 undergraduates copy constant-vowel-con-
stant syllables with low association value. Half of the subjects were 
aware of being videotaped during the experiment. Yet no group differ-
ences were found. The performance facilitation effect may not be espe-
cially robust. Others question the range of application of the self-
awareness account. Citing Wine's (1971) argument that test anxiety 
causes performance decrements because it interferes with attending to 
the task, Liebling and Shaver (1973) hypothesized that OSA may interfere 
with performance if it raises evaluative apprehension beyond an optimal 
point. They replicated Wicklund and Duval's (1971) experiment closely 
(having subjects copy passages in Swedish) but added an additional 
group exposed to OSA under conditions intended to heighten evaluation. 
This group of subjects were told that the task reflected reaction time, 
verbal fluency and language ability and therefore "might reflect their 
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intelligence." A significant interaction was found as predicted. 
The replication condition resulted in more improvement with exposure 
to the mirror, but the high evaluation condition lead to less improve-
ment (7.26%) with the mirror than without it (13.69%). Such findings 
caused Wicklund (1975b) to revise self-awareness theory to say that: 
the relationship between self-focused attention and task per-
formance almost has to be curvilinear, and, further, the simpler 
the task • • . the more that attention can be turned to the self 
before reaching the point at which that attention comes to inter-
fere with performance. (p. 265) 
Self-awareness theory has demonstrated its utility in predicting 
facilitation with simple and nonstressful activities. With more com-
plex and self-evaluative tasks (self-exploration in psychotherapy for 
example), excessive OSA may prove counterproductive. 
One last area in which self-awareness effects have been demon-
strated is in the crucial area of self-esteem. Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris 
(1973) reported two similar experiments in which subjects rated them-
selves as they ideally and as they actually were on continuums between 
pairs of traits. Half of the subjects completed one of the scales 
while OSA was created through the use of audio tape recordings of the 
subject's voice. In both studies, OSA lead to nonsignificantly greater 
discrepancies overall and to significantly greater self-ideal differ-
ences over the first block of five items. For the first block in 
study I, the mean discrepancy on the 20 point Lickert-type scale was 
4.0 for the OSA condition as compared to 2.6 for the group listening 
to another student's voice. The differences were attributable to 
real-self ratings, as the ideals remained consistent across groups 
despite exposure to OSA. So subjects appear to respond to OSA by 
becoming temporarily more self-critical. The authors hypothesized 
28 
that the diminution of the initial effect can be attributed to habitua-
tion or to self-distraction from the stimulus to OSA. 
Crandell (Note 1) performed a study which partially replicated 
Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris' (1973) research on self-ideal discrepancies. 
Subjects selected by 26 student experimenters were told they were 
participating in a study of nonverbal behavior and nervous habits. 
With this rationale, 51 subjects were observed closely while they 
indicated their actual and ideal standing on one set of 48 items drawn 
from the Gough Adjective Checklist (Gough & Heilbrum, 1965). A second 
set was completed with no observation, thus permitting each subject to 
serve as his or her own control. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was also administered before 
debriefing. The manipulation had no effect on the discrepancies, which 
averaged 1.73 per item with OSA and 1.76 without it (on a 9-point scale). 
Even in the first block of 12 items, the OSA group was only minimally 
and nonsignificantly more discrepant, averaging 1.82 instead of 1.80 
per item. This study offered no support for self-awareness effects 
on self-ideal congruence. However, OSA did affect ratings of state 
anxiety. If the subject was observed while completing the first self-
concept scale, and accordingly had an intervening and unobserved ques-
tionnaire to complete before rating their anxiety, A-State averaged 
34.90. When anxiety ratings were immediately preceded by observation, 
A-State averaged 40.03. The difference is marginally significant, 
29 
! (1, 48) = 3.7~~< .10. There appears to have been OSA effects in 
this experiment, although they were not evident in the self-ratings. 
Perhaps the stimulus items (e.g., practical, adaptable, sociable) are 
too consistent in the subject's life to be greatly affected by OSA. 
In other words, trait ratings are less responsive than are state 
ratings (such as the anxiety measure). 
The link between OSA and self-concept or emotional states has 
been found only occasionally. Collins (1976) found no relationship 
between OSA and self-esteem among high school students. Brehm (1974) 
failed to elicit self-derogation among 9th graders with self-focused 
attention. Carver and Scheier (1978) found no increase in negative 
affect in sentence completion tests administered in the presence of 
a mirror. And Wolfe (1975) failed to find any link between OSA and 
ratings of mood among 120 female college students. 
However, Scheier and Carver (1977), alternately using mirror-
manipulated OSA and a measure of dispositional self-consciousness, 
reported consistent results across several experiments showing that 
OSA heightens awareness of emotions. It need not be inevitably nega-
tive. OSA led to greater appreciation and responsiveness to slides of 
nudes. But it also caused significantly greater response to statements 
eliciting depression. Scheier and Carver's conclusion reasserted the 
relationship of OSA and emotions, suggesting that attention may shift 
to emotions as easily as to standards during periods of self-focused 
attention. 
Studies that fail to replicate or discover expected results 
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suggest that OSA effects are elusive and seldom robust. Wicklund 
(1975b) explains that such effects are temporary and may be easily 
missed if the dependent measure is not properly timed. The theory 
predicts the discomfort of self-consciousness will motivate attempts 
at discrepancy reduction or distraction, resulting in rapid disappear-
ance of the usual sequelae to OSA. There is a further comment needed 
on the self-esteem findings. In the self-ratings on the dependent 
variables, subjects were typically asked to rate central traits: 
enduring and often important aspects of themselves. It is not sur-
prising that they show little change. Crandell's (Note 1) research 
provided a comparison between state and trait variables and found 
little change in Trait Anxiety (40.90 immediately after OSA as com-
pared with 38.15 when there was an intervening task, a finding with a 
chance probability of .36) despite a marginally significant increase in 
state anxiety. Trait ratings are a stern test. That they show any 
change in response to attentional state indicates that OSA causes 
powerful, if temporary, alterations in self-concept. 
The results obtained by Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris (1973) and 
Crandell (Note 1) confirm that OSA has its maximum effect at the time 
of initial stimulation and that its potency dissipates rapidly. 
While OSA effects are of moderate magnitude and transient, 
they have been demonstrated in a wide range of circumstances. The 
studies reviewed suggest that self-awareness theory is broadly appli-
cable within personality psychology. Selected research has shown its 
contribution to the understanding of self-attribution, social 
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facilitation, and the self-concept. Further discussion could docu-
ment its applicability to such central areas of social psychology as 
conformity ~uval, 1972; Wicklund & Duval, 1971/1972), cognitive dis-
sonance ~nsko, Worchel, Songer, & Arnold, 1973; Wicklund & Duval, 1971/ 
1972), and accuracy of self-reports (Carver, 1975; Pryor, Gibbons, 
Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977; Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978; Turner, 
1978). 
Importance of standards during objective self-awareness. It 
is the awareness of discrepancy from pre-existing standards which is 
assumed to cause the self-derogation, with the resulting attempts 
to escape objective self-awareness (OSA) or change. So it is worth 
digressing to examine our understanding of these standards. While 
they may be modeled on social norms, it is the individual's standards 
that are assumed to be the central referent for behavior during periods 
of OSA. Research by Carver (1975) supports this account. He selected 
subjects representing extremes in their belief in their use of punish-
ment to influence behavior. When instructed to use punishment in a 
"pseudo-teaching" task, the two groups varied in the intensity of 
shock delivered to the erring "student", with the punitive subjects 
delivering significantly more, as expected. However, this occurred 
only when the subjects observed themselves in a mirror. When there 
was no stimulus to OSA, the groups delivered punishment of very 
similar intensity. This research suggests that it is, indeed, the 
personal standards that are activated by OSA. 
Other researchers (Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977) 
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indicate that behavior may be guided by other aspects of the self than 
internal standards. They argue that most research highlights the sa-
lience of the standard through feedback on the dimension in question 
or demand characteristics of the experiment itself. The salience 
manipulation may be the crucial element. They have reported experi-
ments in which the salient dimension was the subjects' emotional 
state. Scheier (1976) examined aggression, in this case monitoring 
the intensity of shock administered to a "confederate-student" who 
first had taunted half of the subjects. There were no significant 
differences between the angered and not angered groups except when 
a mirror was introduced. With OSA, the angered subjects significantly 
increased the intensity of shock, while other subjects decreased it 
slightly. Scheier concluded: "when affect is strong, awareness is 
directed to the affect, not the standard, and discrepancy reduction 
does not occur" (pp. 637-638). Scheier and Carver (1977) showed that 
OSA can heighten responsiveness to a variety of emotions, including 
attraction, elation, and depression. In keeping with their findings, 
a revision in self-awareness theory is warranted. Objective self-
awareness appears to heighten consciousness of whatever dimension of 
the self is salient. Neither self-evaluation, nor self-derogation 
have been shown to be certain concommitants of OSA. So escape behavior 
or discrepancy reduction are to be expected only when the ideal is more 
salient than affective reactions. 
Clinical implications of research on self-awareness. Some of 
the effects suggest an important link with research areas and concepts 
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important to clinical psychology. The findings of the curvilinear 
relationship of OSA and self-evaluation with performance is highly 
similar to that found in research on Manifest Anxiety (Byrne, 1974). 
Indeed, the disruptive effects accompanying OSA are reminiscent of 
those accompanying high evaluative apprehension (Mandler & Sarason, 
1952; Wine, 1971). Objective self-awareness is a source of anxiety, 
and may prove a necessary condition for anxiety of high levels or 
long duration. 
Self-ideal discrepancies, such as those elicited by Ickes 
et al. (1973) have been accepted in clinical research as an opera-
tionalization of self-esteem and emotional adjustment (Block & Thomas, 
1955; Chase, 1957; Dymond, 1954). Self-ideal discrepancy reduction 
has been considered the primary criteria for improvement in client-
centered psychotherapy (Butler & Haigh, 1954; Rogers & Dymond, 1954). 
Now OSA has been shown to cause temporary increases in the self-ideal 
discrepancy. The implication of these lines of research are clear: 
self-focused attention may be a source of disruption in psychological 
functioning. 
Psychotherapy aims to decrease self-ideal discrepancy. Yet, 
the process entails the type of intensive and extended self-scrutiny 
on the part of the client that assures considerable OSA. Temporary 
sequelae of self-focused attention, such as anxiety and a drop in 
self-esteem, may well interfere with therapy. 
Avoidance of objective self-awareness. Another feature of 
self-awareness theory with important implications for psychotherapy 
, ~ ! .. 
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is the specification of responses expected after exposure to stimuli 
heightening objective self-awareness (OSA). Behavior change is the 
goal of psychotherapy. Yet, Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggest that 
this response is less likely than attempts at OSA avoidance. Research 
does show attempts to escape self-focused attention. Cummings (1976) 
found that exposure to an observer and a video camera was a noxious 
stimulus which could be used as a punisher to delay a contingent 
behavior or condition an escape response. Duval, Wicklund, and Fine 
(1971/1972) directly measured avoidance as a function of OSA versus 
non-OSA and high or low discrepancy from standards. Students were 
administered a personality test, which they were told was correlated 
with creativity and intelligence. The degree of discrepancy was 
manipulated by telling subjects their test results indicated they were 
in the top or bottom 10% on the dimensions. Then, under the guise of 
participating in a second experiment, they were led to another room. 
For subjects in the OSA condition, the room contained a mirror and a 
camera. Subjects were asked to wait for about 5 minutes and then seek 
the second researcher if he had not yet returned to administer the 
experiment. Table 2 shows the length of time before the subject left 
the room. Two findings are clear. First, OSA was tolerable for a 
shorter time if there was high rather than low intraself discrepancy, 
£< .05. Second, subjects made a quicker exit when exposed to GSA-
inducing stimuli (significantly so for the high discrepancy condition). 
Gibbons and Wicklund (reported in Wicklund, 1975b) observe the same 
pattern of results (with a significant overall interaction) when the 
Table 2 
Effect of Self-Awareness and Discrepancy 
from Standards on Minutes of Participation 
Discrepancy level 
Self-awareness stimuli 
Mirror 
No mirror 
High 
6.39 (_g_=13) 
8.12 (_g_=12) 
Note. From Duval, Wicklund, and Fine (1971/1972). 
Low 
7.80 (_g_=12) 
8. 20 (_g_=15) 
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dependent measure is the proportion of time spent listening to one's 
own versus anothers voice during a 12 minute period following OSA and 
discrepancy manipulation. These experiments indicate OSA will lead to 
avoidance or escape behaviors. 
There is less evidence on the relative priority given to 
discrepancy reduction versus GSA-avoidance when both options are 
available. Indirect evidence is provided in a report by McDonald 
(1977). Subjects were asked to write responses to a visual cue after 
having been given positive or negative feedback on their performance 
on a "creativity test." Half of the 96 female undergraduates were told 
their response was related to creativity. A mirror was used to create 
OSA for half of the subjects. Avoidance of objective self-awareness 
might appear in shorter responses, while discrepancy reduction would 
be expected to be evident in longer responses. In examining writing 
time, there was no main effect related to self-awareness, and so no 
support for an avoidance account. The author reported that among the 
OSA subjects, however, those with negative feedback wrote more than 
those given a high rating on creativity. While no significance testing 
was reported for this interaction, the implication is that discrepancy 
reduction is the prepotent response. 
A different result was obtained in a study by Liebling, Seiler 
and Shaver (1974). Sixteen subjects were observed during each of two 
30 minute sessions of listening to music. During one period, OSA was 
induced through the presence of a mirror. All subjects were smokers, 
including 14 who had indicated an ideal would be to decrease the 
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frequency of cigarettes smoked. Despite this goal, the stimulus to 
osA led to significant increases in the number of cigarettes lit, 
number of puffs, amount of time holding a cigarette, and the number 
of flicks. The authors discussed their findings as evidence of the 
drive inducing effects of OSA. But Wicklund (1975a) pointed out that 
behaviors also served as a distraction, and hence a means of avoiding 
OSA. 
The two experiments reviewed offer apparently conflicting 
results when discrepancy reduction and OSA-avoidance lead to opposing 
behavior. However, the studies differed in the salience attached to 
the discrepancy in question. In one, the dimension (creativity) was 
directly manipulated while the other downplayed it (by embedding the 
query about ideal smoking among a number of questions about attitudes). 
It may well be that the likelihood that OSA will be avoided is inversely 
related to the salience of the discrepancy. Avoidance may be more 
likely if the self versus ideal self dissonance is not focal. 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) outline three conditions that increase 
the likelihood that an individual will attempt to escape from a situa-
tion. First, there must be discrepancies between behavior and rele-
vant standards. Second, there must be OSA. Third, discrepancy reducing 
behavior must be difficult or impossible. This last condition was met 
in the Duval, Wicklund and Fine (1971/1972) experiment by focusing on 
enduring abilities and restricting the environment so that there were 
no discrepancy-reducing options available. 
The proposed experiment on premature termination from psycho-
therapy closely follows this outline, not because of experimental 
manipulation, but because the client's phenomenal situation at the 
beginning of therapy closely corresponds to that described above. 
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There is a real, important, and painful discrepancy between the clients 
actual and ideal level of emotional adjustment. It is usually a 
problem of chronic duration. Should the patient opt for a discrepancy-
reducing tact--such as denying the severity of the problem, attributing 
it to a temporary situation, or projecting responsibility ("if only my 
wife ••• ")--the therapist firmly confronts the patient with his 
central and continuing involvement with the problem. Lastly, there is 
intense and continuing self-focused attention. There is the expert 
observer, closely monitoring the patient's self-report and continuously 
redirecting the patient's focus to his own statements. All of these 
features of the beginning therapy relationship increase the likelihood 
that OSA will prove intolerably painful, and that the would be client 
will flee therapy. 
Clearly, not all clients terminate prematurely. Nor would self-
awareness theory lead to such a blanket prediction. Implicit in 
Wicklund's (1975a) comments on the salience of intra-self discrepancy, 
is the expectation that clear identification of an area of dissonance 
will lead to corrective action rather than flight. The research on 
performance facilitation effects of OSA suggests that some OSA (like 
some evaluation apprehension) may be productive rather than disruptive. 
The literature reviewed also indicates that the disruptive effects of 
OSA are likely moderate and transient. Clinicians have certainly 
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developed tactics for gradual exposure to OSA and for anxiety manage-
ment, all of which aid the novice patient in adjusting to a stressful 
role. 
The current extrapolations from the social psychology of self-
awareness theory to hypotheses about behavior in therapy is possible 
because of similarity between the experimental design used to study 
OSA avoidance and the situation facing the new client. Just as Duval, 
Wicklund, and Fine's (1971/1972) subjects were able to tolerate discrep-
ancy and OSA for some time, although it was less than the other group 
withstood, so the effects of OSA are less disruptive to some new 
patients than to others. Self-awareness theory does not predict 100% 
dropout. But it does offer a testable explanation of much of the 
early termination that is found: if the beginning of psychotherapy 
fosters excessive self-consciousness and if discrepancies addressed 
are not easily resolved, flight from therapy is likely to occur. 
Individual differences in self-consciousness. Duval and 
Wicklund (1972) examined situational variables effecting OSA levels. 
This choice was based, in part, on their belief that direction of 
attention is potently determined by environmental stimuli. It is 
also advantageous that these stimuli are easy to manipulate, allowing 
for the true experimentation so necessary for theory building. But 
the focus on situational variables also results from a hesitancy to 
tackle the problems associated with examining individual differences. 
To request a self-report on self-consciousness level would almost 
inevitably alter the variable of interest, confounding the answer. 
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And there are other "potential ambiguities": 
it is difficult to know whether the measures are relevant to 
actual differences in self-focused attention, differences in 
types of personal standards or styles of discrepancy reduction, 
differences in ability to avoid self-focusing stimuli, or even 
theoretically irrelevant differences. (Wicklund, 1975b, p. 268) 
These are impediments to the precise research needed to develop a 
comprehensive theory. But none of this implies that individual dif-
ferences in direction of consciousness are nonexistent or unimportant. 
Indeed, when the focus shifts from theory to application, the molar 
level of self-consciousness is more critical than which of the options 
suggested above accounts for it. 
Fenigstein et al. (1975) have developed a scale to measure 
dispositional self-awareness. In contrast to the situationally 
determined focus of attention, they investigated the trait of self-
consciousness and found it to be composed of three distinct, though 
related, factors. The first subscale measures private self-conscious-
ness (PR-SC): "attending to one's inner thoughts and feelings" 
(p. 523). The conceptually and factorially distinct second scale 
measures public self-consciousness (PU-SC): "a general awareness of 
the self as a social object that has an effect on others" (p. 523). 
A third subscale captures social anxiety (SA-SC), or "discomfort in 
the presence of others" (p. 523). The Self-Consciousness scale, with 
subscales identified, is found in Appendix A. 
Fenigstein et al. (1975) report that the subscales are reliable 
and consistent in internal structure when replicated with varying groups 
of normal undergraduates. There are significant, but low, correlations 
between PR-SC and PU-SC, and between PU-SC and SA-SC, while private 
self-consciousness and social anxiety are unrelated. Table 3 sum-
marizes the subscale means and intercorrelates reported in the pub-
lished literature. They generally confirm the initial findings. 
Other research also replicates the absence of sex differences noted 
by Fenigstein et al. (1975). Findings are interpreted to indicate 
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that self-consciousness is dichotomous, with private and public as-
pects. Social anxiety is a possible, but not inevitable, consequence 
of awareness of the self as social object. It is possible, then, that 
a mirror may elicit a different type of self-awareness than an audience, 
and that the latter may more readily lead to the negative consequences 
associated with the colloquial usage of "self-consciousness." 
Fenigstein et al. (1975) suggests two principle uses for the 
scale. Self-consciousness, as a dispositional expression of self-
awareness, can be expected to mediate accuracy of self-description; 
inaccurate self-reports may reflect a lack of attention to self as 
object. Second, the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) can supplement or 
replace the reactive manipulations used to create OSA. Rather than 
inducing OSA, among other types of arousal, by exposing subjects to 
cameras or audio feedback of their voices, it is possible to select 
subjects whose high score on PR-SC or PU-SC indicates a preexisting 
tendency to be attentive to themselves. The growing body of research 
on self-consciousness has tended to combine attempts to validate the 
scale with research in these two areas. 
Dispositional self-consciousness has been shown to effect 
Table 3 
Means ::md Jnter:corrclations of the Priv:.te (PR-SC), Public (PU-SC), and Social Anxiety (SA-SC) Subscales 
----------------------- ----------
Means Correlations 
PR-SC and PR-SC and 
Reference Population N PR-SC PU-SC SA-SC PU-SC SA-SC 
·---------
.Buss & Seheier n976> normal, UGS, F .23a 
C.<~ rver & Gtt;ss (19i6) normal, UGS, H 105 25.4 19.5 11.6 
C:lfVC'l' ~~ Scheier (1978) normal, UGS, E 68 .33 -.05 
I'E•ui~'>teln (l9i9) normal, UGS, F 92 .17 
Fe•tl~~·tcin, Scheler, normal, UGS, M 179 25.9 18.9 12.5 
r, Buss (197 3) 
normal, UGS, F 253 26.6 19.3 12.8 
normal, UGS 452 .23 .11 
n.ormal, UGS, H 152 .26 -.06 
Scl1eler ~.!976) normal, UG:J 5!0 28.0 .34b 
Scheier, Buss, & Buss (197 8) normal, ur_:s 100+ 24.2 
Schet,,r & Carver (1977) normal, UGS 26.0 
:,che if~r:, Carver, Schulz, normal, UGS 160 .27 
Gl:-1ss, F. Kat~ (l97o) 
Turn.-:!r (l<Jll) normal, l!GS 14?. 
TuntPl' 097il) normal, UGS 62 25. 7. 19.7 .56 
Turner & K{'y (1978)c neurotic. m.tjltB. 47 211.0 16.8 J3.6 .39 .13 
psychotic outpts. 51 22.1 18.5 13.3 .46 .17 
TurnPr f. P!~t erson (1977) nurmal 45 .57 
TurnPr, !'cht~ ter, Carv~r, normal, UGS 1395 • 31 • lit 
& J d<e!l (1978) 
No:· c. UGS reprC'scnt!! unrlcrgrurlu<'tes. 1~11ere appropriate, sex is de'Jignated by F for females and ~~ for males. 
avxtrPme scores on PR-SC. 
hrer 91 s;:bJects with extreme scores on PR. 
··~lNtrts anci corr('L<!tlons ''re from Tut:ner (Note 2). 
PU-SC and 
<;A-SC 
-.02 
.24 
.21 
.20 
.37 
.10 
.25 
• 21 
accuracy of self-report. Turner (1977) had subjects, preselected 
for extreme scores on PU-SC, write stories about their typical and 
maximal experiences of elation and anger. He then exposed them to 
laboratory experiences designed to elicit these feelings. Ratings 
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of these sessions were correlated with the previously obtained self-
reports. Low scorers in PU-SC, presumably because they are less sub-
ject to social desirability effects, had higher correlations. With 
somewhat less consistency the high PR-SC subjects were found to match 
report with action better than subjects low on PR. This experiment 
was flawed by the difficulty in operationalizing the emotions studied. 
In a follow-up study, Turner (1978) examined the correlations between 
observed and reported dominance of 62 undergraduates. Subjects were 
observed for 10 minutes of interaction with a male and female confed-
erate during which they had to engage in a problem solving discussion, 
respond to a period of silence, handle a tangential monologue, and 
intervene in a disagreement. Their dominance was then rated by the 
confederates and two judges, whose highly consistent ratings were 
combined and correlated with the subjects' previous self-ratings. 
Again, the correlations were higher for subjects above the mean in 
PR-SC (.47 versus .24) or below the mean in PU-SC (.46, as opposed 
to the correlation of .28 found among subjects high in public self-
consciousness). Self-reports were comparably accurate for all groups 
except those low in PR-SC and high in PU-SC. Scheier, Buss, and Buss 
(1978) compared validity of self-reports obtained from those represent-
ing the upper and lower thirds of the PR-SC distribution. All 63 
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undergraduates completed the overt aggression subscale of the Buss-
Durkee Hostility Inventory. Several weeks later,measures of the 
intensity of shock delivered to a "learner-confederate" were obtained 
for each subject. Overall, the self-report correlated only .34 with 
observed aggression. Those scoring high in private self-consciousness 
averaged .66, reporting with significantly more accuracy than low 
PR-SC subjects, whose correlation was only .09. There was no comparable 
effect when accuracy was tabulated for those above (.38) and below (.31) 
the mean in PU-SC. This last finding may have resulted because the 
lack of social interaction involved in the aggression experiment mini-
mized awareness of the self as social object. 
The three experiments reported indicates a clear relationship 
between self-consciousness and accuracy of self-report. Whenever 
groups representing the extremes on PR-SC are compared, significant 
differences are found. Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) reported that 
those high in PR-SC give significantly more statements than low PR-SC 
subjects when asked to describe themselves. "These data, taken together 
with Turner's findings argue strongly for the use of private self-
consciousness as a moderator variable in the relationship between self-
reports and observed behavior" (p. 139). These experiments indicate 
that the Self-Consciousness scale is a valid instrument in tapping 
the degree to which normal subjects are aware of their feelings and 
response tendencies. 
Other research correlates SC subscale scores with measures of 
related characteristics in an attempt to determine the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the instrument (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). 
Among the scales that should not correlate is social desirability 
(Marlowe and Crowne, 1964). Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes 
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(1978) report low to nonsignificant correlations for two undergraduate 
groups as indicated in Table 4. Self-consciousness is also relatively 
independent of intelligence, as measured by the Otis Quick-scoring 
Mental Ability Test (Otis, 1954). Carver and Glass (1976) find an 
overall correlation of -.06 in a study of 105 male undergraduates. 
Only SA-SC, for which£= -.21, ~ (.05, is related. The authors 
suggest that lower intelligence may lead to a lack of social competence 
and resulting anxiety. Alternatively, anxiety may have interfered 
with performance in the evaluative context of test-taking. 
Surprisingly, self-consciousness is minimally related to test 
anxiety (Mandler and Sarasen, 1952). Table 5 shows the low inter-
correlations reported in two published studies. The previous discus-
sion shows that the effects of OSA approximate those of evaluative 
apprehension. Yet, the lack of substantial covariation with test 
anxiety "suggests the scale is specific to social anxiety" (Carver 
and Glass, 1976, p. 172). 
Self-esteem and OSA are related (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 
1973), so the Self-Consciousness scale would be expected to correlate 
with the Self-Esteem scale (Morse & Gergen, 1970). Turner et al. 
(1978) report significant relationships of -.26, -.26, and -.35 
between self-esteem and PR-SC, PU-SC, and SA-SC respectively. For 
the 505 subjects involved, self-consciousness was associated with 
Scale 
Table 4 
Correlations between Social Desirability 
and Subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale 
Sample 1 
Private Self-Consciousness .02 
Public Self-Consciousness .06 
Social Anxiety -.03 
N 146 
Note. From Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978). 
*.E. (.05 
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Sample 2 
-.15 
.01 
-.23* 
122 
Table 5 
correlations between Test Anxiety and the Self-Consciousness Scale 
Scale 
Private Self-Consciousness 
Public Self-Consciousness 
Social Anxiety 
Self-Consciousness Scale 
N 
*p<.01 
Source 
Carver and Glass 
(1976) 
-.11 
-.01 
.14 
.00 
105 
Turner et al. 
(1978) 
-.02 
.20* 
258 
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lower self-esteem, again suggesting that self-awareness is a double-
edge sword. Fenigstein (1979) failed to find a relationship between 
PU-SC and three global self-esteem items. So it is inappropriate to 
assume an inevitable covariation. But a drop in self-esteem is a 
likely consequence of self-awareness induction, particularly if social 
anxiety is elicited. 
Other personality measures have been tested against the Self-
Consciousness scale. Turner et al. (1978) report PU-SC and SA-SC 
are moderately correlated with low masculinity and high femininity as 
measured on Berns' (1974) Sex Role Inventory. Despite this, other 
research (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1977; Turner et 
al., 1978) reports no significant sex differences in scores on the SC 
subscales. Achievement motivation might be hypothesized to underlie 
self-awareness, particularly sensitivity to one's social impact. Yet, 
no substantial relationship appears (Carver & Glass, 1976). Snyder's 
(1974) Self-Monitoring Scale also assesses sensitivity to cues of 
personal expressive behavior for social ends. Turner et al. (1978) 
report results on a substantial sample that indicate significant but 
low amounts of covariance. For 1094 undergraduates, self-monitoring 
correlates .15 with PR-SC, .24 with PU-SC, and -.20 with SA-SC. 
Fenigstein (1979) also reports a correlation of .24 for self-moni-
toring with PU-SC. While expected correlations with these partially 
related measures are obtained, the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) 
proves to be distinct. The efforts at discriminant validation, reported 
above, indicate the SC cannot be readily reinterpretted to be a sub-
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category of any of the other concepts investigated. 
Convergence with related concepts also suggests the validity 
of the SC subscales. Those high in private self-consciousness (PR-SC) 
should create and use mental imagery and should be temperamentally 
inclined toward reflectiveness and philosophical interests. Turner 
et al. (1978) report that PR-SC correlated .30 with the Pavio (1971) 
Imagery Scale and .48 with Guilford and Zimmerman's (1949) measure of 
Thoughtfulness. Public self-consciousness (PU-SC) also correlates 
with Thoughtfulness (.22), but with more emphasis on social self-
awareness. Carver and Glass (1976) report low but significant cor-
relations with Buss and Plomin's (1975) measures of emotionality (.20) 
and sociability (.22). Turner et al. (1978) were unable to replicate 
the relationship with sociability; it was positive but nonsignificant. 
Support for the validity of PU-SC is, accordingly, more tenuous. Of 
the subscales, Social Anxiety (SA-SC) is most strongly related to 
self-esteem (-.35) and test anxiety (.14 and .23). It is consistently 
associated with avoidance of social settings (~39 and -.46) and with 
inactivity (-.27). Such findings suggest an avoidant stance toward 
interaction in which anxiety interferes with optimal functioning (e.g., 
for IQ, £ = -.21). In sum, correlations with related measures offer 
at least moderate support for the validity of the subscales. 
Stronger support for the distinctiveness and validity of each 
of the subscales is reported when they are used in the course of self-
awareness studies. 
Of the subscales, PR-SC has been used most frequently. Buss 
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and Scheier (1976) replicated Duval and Wicklund's (1973) experiment 
in which the degree of self-attributed responsibility was assessed 
for scenarios with positive and negative outcomes. Subjects were 
selected from the highest and lowest thirds of the PR-SC continuum and 
randomly assigned to complete their ratings with a mirror either present 
or averted. The percent of self-attributed responsibility is presented 
in Table 6. A significant main effect was found for level of PR-SC 
and a marginally significant difference resulted from exposure to the 
mirror. The PR-SC performs in a manner similar to and yet more effec-
tive than GSA-induction. The PU-SC, which correlated .23 is PR-SC, did 
not prove significantly related to self-attribution, nor did its covar-
iance contribute to the power of PR-SC. Tangentially, it is worth not-
ing that the negativity bias reported with OSA also is evident in 
the ratings of high scorers on PR-SC. 
Carver and Scheier (1978), in their study of OSA and the pro-
portion of sentence completion items referring to the self, also exam-
ined the effects of PR-SC. They found a significant correlation 
between SC and the ratio of self-referent to total statements, ~ (35) 
= .29, £ < .05. For PU-SC, the correlation was .07. Table 7, again, 
indicates the power of dispositional relative to situational self-
awareness. It appears that PR-SC provides a ceiling such that OSA 
induction is effective only among those lacking the trait of self-
consciousness. Scheier and his associates (Scheier, 1976; Scheier 
and Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver, Schutz, Glass, & Katz, 1978) also 
found that PR-SC can be used as an index of sensitivity to affect. 
Table 6 
Percent of Self-Attributed Responsibility with 
High and Low Self-Awareness and Private Self-Consciousness 
Level of private self-consciousness 
High Low 
Self-awareness stimuli Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Mirror 53 66 50 54 
No mirror 56 55 46 53 
Note. From Buss and Sceier (1976). 
Table 7 
Percent of Self-Reference with High and Low 
Self-Awareness and Self-Consciousness 
Stimuli to self-awareness 
Private self-consciousness level 
High 
Low 
Note. From Carver and Scheier (1978). 
Mirror 
.60 
.55 
No mirror 
.61 
.44 
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In parallel experiments, OSA induction or high private self-con-
sciousness proved effective in heightening ratings of anger, attrac-
tion, repulsion, and depression. They summarize the validity of 
PR-SC as a measure of self-awareness: 
The parallel between the mirror manipulation and private self-
consciousness is not limited to the present research. For 
example, it has been shown that exposure to a mirror increases 
the proportion of self-focused responses given on a projective 
test; private self-consciousness does the same. The mirror 
increases attributions to self; so does private self-conscious-
ness. The mirror facilitates angry aggression; private self-
consciousness does the same. And the mirror enhances the validity 
of self-reports, and likewise for private self-consciousness. 
(Scheier & Carver, 1977, p. 634) 
There has been less research on Public Self-Consciousness 
(PU-SC). Fenigstein (1979) notes that most experiments, even those 
ostensibly involving interpersonal behaviors such as aggression, are 
structured so as to be impersonal. Accordingly, the absence of 
effects attributable to PU-SC is not surprising. Fenigstein's research 
directly exposed subjects to a group setting in which their comments 
were either responded to or ignored. Subjects then rated their attrac-
tion to the group, their desire to continue working with it, and the 
amount of self-attributed responsibility for the group's reaction to 
them. As expected, 40 female undergraduates scoring in the top third 
of the PU-SC continuum denigrated the group and personalized its 
behavior significantly more than 40 subjects in the lower third of the 
distribution. Private self-consciousness had a negligible effect on 
this pattern in an analysis of covariance, providing "further evidence 
of the discriminant validity of the two self-consciousness dimensions" 
(p. 80). Fenigstein also included a direct query as to the amount of 
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time spent attending to oneself during the group session. There 
were small (18.5% versus 15%) differences attributable to the accept-
ance versus rejection condition. But high PU-SC subjects reported 
significantly more self-focused attention (24% of the time) than did 
low scorers (9%). So the experiment validates the subscale leading 
to the conclusion: 
When we attend to ourselves in social situations, it is the 
social self that is focused ••.• In this respect, it has 
been shown that public self-consciousness (awareness of ourselves 
as social objects), rather than private self-consciousness 
(awareness of our internal selves) is the crucial determinant 
of how much the evaluation of others affect us. (Fenigstein, 
1979, p. 85) 
Results also paralleled simultaneously reported findings that mirror-
stimulated OSA lead to heightened reactiveness to positive or negative 
evaluation in an interview. 
Turner (1977) examined the contribution of self-consciousness 
differences to the finding that subjects will shift their attitudes in 
the direction of an announced but not delivered persuasive communica-
tion by another. High PR-SC should limit the shift, because the subject 
focuses on personal standards. But anticipatory belief changes were 
expected for subjects high in PU-SC, out of a desire to maintain a 
socially correct appearance, and SA-SC, to avoid attracting attention. 
Those above and below the mean in PR-SC and PU-SC failed to differ 
significantly. The PU-SC dimension appears unrelated to experiencing 
social attention as aversive. In contrast, those high in SA-SC showed 
the greatest change in the direction of the other's expected position. 
This experiment represents a preliminary step toward validation of 
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SA-SC as an index of fear of social attention. 
The preceding review leads to two clear conclusions. The 
subscales of the Self-Consciousness scale are valid measures of dis-
tinct components of self-awareness. While all are related to a cogni-
zance of self, they represent distinct features of personality. 
Using them, populations can be identified which are responsive in 
different situations and have characteristic expressions of their 
self-awareness. Secondly, many of the phenomena surfaced using the 
situational tact of stimulating OSA can be reproduced successfully 
by selecting individuals dispositionally inclined to particular types 
of self-consciousness. Those high in PR-SC parallel those exposed 
to mirrors or cameras in becoming attentive to internal affective 
states and cognitions. Those high in PU-SC appear to respond similarly 
to those in whom OSA is aroused by exposure to audiences or reflective 
stimuli in social situations. The explanation of results of research 
on SA-SC is similar to that offered for Duval and Wicklund's (1972) 
research on conformity. The theoretical explanation of this OSA 
research suggested that cognizance of discrepant views increased the 
likelihood of focal self-awareness and a desire to minimize disagree-
ment as a means of escaping aversive OSA. Similarly, those high in 
SA-SC will alter their expressed views, at least temporarily, in an 
apparent response to anxiety aroused by social attention. The Self-
Consciousness scale can be used as a relatively nonreactive alterna-
tive to situational manipulations of OSA in research on normal popula-
tions. 
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Clinical implications of self-consciousness. There has been 
inadequate research using clinical populations to understand the 
meaning of self-consciousness with these groups. The one published 
study (Turner & Keyson, 1978) does not provide information on norms 
for either the neurotic or schizophrenic groups sampled. Nor does it 
indicate the relationship of the subscales. It may well be that psycho-
pathological groups unite self-focus with anxiety. One purpose of 
the following research will be to examine the performance of the Self-
Consciousness scale with a clinical population. 
Turner and Keyson (1978) found that therapists could success-
fully predict the self-ratings of their patients for PR-SC and SA-SC, 
but not for PU-SC. The implication is that the first two subscales 
tap more clinically relevant phenomena that are therefore more focal 
in the course of therapy. This is consistent with the commonsense 
analysis which indicates that anxiety and awareness of internal exper-
iencing are core considerations in psychotherapy. Social anxiety, in 
particular, would be of concern to a therapist because of its disrup-
tive impact on the client's functioning. Yet, PU-SC may be an impor-
tant measure. The early stages of therapy represent the point at 
which self-consciousness before the therapist is at a maximum. It is 
at this time that some clients will experience the Sartrean entrap-
ment in the presence of the other that may cause them to flee therapy. 
So, levels of PU-SC and SA-SC may both be important in determining 
length of stay. 
All three subscales, and the total score on the Self-Conscious-
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ness scale are hypothesized to be clinically relevant. All will be 
considered as predictors of premature termination from psychotherapy. 
Additionally, different diagnostic groups are characterized by dif-
ferences in their propensity for and reaction to self-focused attention 
(Kennedy, 1977; MacKinnon & Michels, 1971). The SC subscale profile 
may vary across diagnostic groups. Paranoid patients, whose defenses 
externalize responsibility, would be expected to be low scorers on 
all subscales. Obsessives and passive character types are hypothe-
sized to be generally high in self-consciousness. Obsessives should 
peak on PR-SC, but their SA-SC scores may be attentuated by the re-
liance on intellectualization. High PU-SC may be characteristic of 
hysterics and sociopathies, since the self-esteem of both groups is 
tied to their success in managing other's impressions of them. 
Hypothesizing about the relationship between diagnosis and self-
consciousness remains speculative in the absence of additional re-
search on clinical groups using the SC scale. An additional goal of 
this dissertation project will be to provide empirical evidence on 
this subject. 
But a preliminary step is clearly required. In the absence 
of previous published research on SC scores among psychopathological 
groups, norms and intercorrelations for the subscales need to be 
obtained. Specific hypotheses derived from self-awareness theory can 
be applied to clinical situations. But they will be useful only to the 
extent that the theory generalizes to a clinical population. The next 
section reviews the Ego Strength scale, which will be used in this 
study of external validity. 
~o Strength 
In the previous section, the application of self-awareness 
theory to clinical psychology was based on analogy. For example, 
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the situation that caused subjects to leave the experimental setting 
in Duval, Wicklund, and Fine's (1971/1972) research is similar to 
the situation faced by a patient at the beginning of psychotherapy. 
An empirical test of the generalizability of self-awareness theory is 
also possible. The central issue is the degree to which patients 
seeking treatment respond to the Self-Consciousness scale in a manner 
similar to that found for college students. 
Barron's Ego Strength (ES) scale will be correlated with the 
Self-Consciousness measure to examine the impact of degree of pathology 
or, conversely, the availability of ego resources, on the handling 
of self-focused attention. The Ego Strength scale (Barron, 1953) 
will be used as a global measure of the degree of ego impairment. 
The following review argues that the scale, which has been used for 
multiple purposes over the last three decades, functions most ade-
quately for this specific purpose. 
Ego Stregth scale and prediction of improvement in psycho-
therapy. Barron (1953) developed the ES scale to predict response to 
treatment with brief, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. From 
the MMPI item pool he selected the 68 items most highly correlated with 
rated improvement of 33 neurotic outpatients. On cross-validation 
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samples, the scale correlated .42, .38, and .54 with ratings of improve-
ment. But recent reviewers have questioned the adequacy of the scale 
for this purpose (Clayton & Graham, 1979; Clopton, 1979; Graham, 1977a, 
1977b). Graham (1977b) concludes: 
While the ES scale predicts response to psychotherapy when 
neurotic patients and individual, psychoanalytically oriented 
therapy are involved, it probably is not very useful for pre-
dicting responses to other kinds of treatment or for other kinds 
of patients. (pp. 35-36) 
He apparently relies heavily on Barron's work as other research is 
inconsistent for all diagnostic types. There are some successes 
reported, but among inpatients. Dahlstrom, Welsh, and Dahlstrom (1975) 
report that ES has predicted clinical improvement of VA patients in 
one sample. Holmes (1967) reports modest correlations between the ES 
and speed of therapeutic response of 38 inpatients as rated by the 
treating psychiatrist. And Wirt (1955) reports significant but un-
specified differences in ES between three groups of VA inpatients 
rated by therapists and supervisors as showing degrees of clinical 
movement. Other results are less clearcut. Distler, May, and Tuma 
(1964) found, among male schizophrenics in their first inpatient 
treatment episode, that high ES scores related to greater improvement 
in symptom checklists but lower ratings by judges on overall health. 
The relationships were reversed for females. Kidd (1968) reported a 
trend for female outpatients with ES scores above 30 to be rated in 
better condition at discharge. No such pattern was found for males. 
The absence of expected correlations with improvement has been reported 
for students in personal counseling (Gallagher, 1954), for alcoholics 
(Fowler, Teal, & Coyle, 1967), for chronic state hospital patients 
(Hawkinsen, 1962), for VA inpatients (Levine & Cohen, 1962), and 
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for several samples of outpatients (Endicott & Endicott, 1964; Fiske, 
cartwright, & Kirtner, 1964; Getter & Sundland, 1962). 
For some samples, high ES indicates a poor prognosis. Gottesman 
(1959) notes that delinquents are as consistently high on ES as they 
are low in therapeutic change. Clayton and Graham (1979) indicate that 
low scorers among a sample of 92 inpatients showed more improvement as 
measured by pre and post testing with the MMPI. Crumpton, Cantor, and 
Batiste (1960) found that psychiatrist ratings of neurotic outpatients 
correlated with ES scores to a significant degree, but inversely, ~ 
-.41. These latter results may be confounded by regression effects 
and patient defensiveness, respectively. But they illustrate the 
unreliability of the Ego Strength scale as a predictor of improvement 
with therapy. 
The ES scale is consistently poor in predicting perseverance 
in therapy. Watson (1968) found it unrelated to hospital stay. It 
fails to correlate with length of treatment for alcoholics (Fowler et 
al., 1967; Gertler, Raynes, & Harris, 1973; Trice & Roman, 1970). 
And ES fails repeatedly in predicting outpatient stay (Getler & 
Sundland, 1962; Lorr, McNair, Michaux, & Raskin, 1962; Rosenzweig & 
Folman, 1973; Sullivan, Miller, & Smelser, 1958). 
If Barron's measure fails to predict change in therapy, there 
is evidence that therapy leads to changes on the Ego Strength scale. 
The ES scale increases as a patient's mental status clears (Dahlstrom 
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et al., 1975) and during the course of inpatient treatment (Lewinsohn, 
1965), though not after electroconvulsive therapy (Dana, 1957). Higher 
ES scores follow outpatient treatment for VA patients (Lorr et al., 
1962; McNair, Callahan, & Lorr, 1962), for obese women, rehabilitation 
patients, AA members, and narcotic addicts (Hollon & Mandell, 1979). 
Barron & Leary (1955) found that eight months of treatment lead to 
comparable and significant increases for outpatients in individual 
and group therapy. Interestingly, similar increases were found for 
27 untreated therapy candidates from the waiting list. It may be 
argued that ES changes mirror improvement in the clinical condition, 
whether or not therapy is the source of enhanced functioning. 
To this point the review has cited studies which are, on the 
whole, critical of the performance of the ES scale in predicting out-
come of psychotherapy. Dahlstrom et al. remark that "as a predictor 
of response to relatively brief, psychoanalytically oriented psycho-
therapy, the ES scale has received little cross-validation beyond the 
original efforts of Barron" (1975, p. 169). They are technically 
accurate, if the scale is restricted to this very specific use. But 
the expansive tone of the original article, epitomized in the name given 
the scale, indicates a broader application. It fails empirically, in 
application to other populations and schools of therapy, as a predictor 
of outcome. Yet, the consistent relationship with therapy, evident in 
ES changes over treatment, suggest the scale has valid meaning and 
satisfactory reliability (Barron, 1953; Gaines & Fretz, 1969; Silverman, 
1963). 
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There are two basic and interacting features of the measure 
which likely account for its failure in predicting therapy outcome. 
First, there is a dilemma posed by the definition of improvement. 
Change is relative to a baseline. A person entering therapy with a 
high baseline level of functioning will have less room for improvement 
than a patient with more initial impairment. If the key element in 
predicting improvement is level of premorbid functioning, then a 
ceiling effect is likely. One conclusion of the critical literature 
is that the ES is more accurately construed as a measure of functioning 
and underlying personality resources than as a measure of change. 
Second, the ES is a self-report scale subject to defensive distortion. 
A person may achieve a high score because he denies problems. Yet, 
that same defensiveness will limit change in treatment. To anticipate 
the future argument, it is noteworthy that defensiveness need not imply 
greater pathology or, therefore, invalidate the measure as an index of 
ego strength. 
Ends and Page (1957) correlated the ES of 63 hospitalized, male 
alcoholics with the change over treatment in MMPI clinical scales and 
a Q-sort measure. The expectation was ES would correlate significantly, 
as it did with decreases in the MAS, D, and Pt scales. It proved un-
related to the Q-sort measure. But, rather than accept the null hypo-
thesis, that the two measures are unrelated, the authors offer an 
alternative account: "If ES is measuring ego strength, one of course 
would not expect it to be closely related to personality change asso-
ciated with short term therapy" (p. 150). The irony of this statement 
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is that it interprets the use of the scale in a manner totally opposite 
to that offered by Barron in first introducing the scale as a predictor 
of success (presumably personality change) in brief treatment. This 
quote illustrates the lack of conceptual clarity which has complicated 
the interpretation of the ES. Clayton and Graham (1979) found that in-
patients low on ES showed greater improvement, as measured by change 
in average T-score of the MMPI clinical scales, than did those high on 
ES. It would be plausible to conclude: 
1) that low ES scores are the better therapy candidates, in 
contrast to Barron's contention, or, 
2) that the results are an artifactual consequence of regres-
sion effects. Knowing that low ES is related to high T-
scores on the clinical scales, one would expect more im-
provement for the low ES group based simply on regression 
to the mean. Or, conversely, if high ES patients show 
relatively little elevation in their composite MMPI profile, 
there is little room for change. 
Future research should distinguish carefully between condition on dis-
charge, with which ES should be positively correlated, and change during 
treatment, with which ES may be inversely related. 
A second reason often cited in explanation of inconsistent re-
sults is defensive test-taking attitudes on the part of some patients. 
King and Schiller (1958) note that a maximum score requires 43 false 
to only 25 true responses. An acquiescent set leads to low scores, 
while a set to deny the symptoms listed leads to high ratings. For 
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one sample, King and Schiller report a higher correlation (.67) with 
the response set than withES scoring (.34). Block (1965) counters 
with evidence that an acquiescence controlled version of the scale 
is highly correlated with the original, and that acquiescence, there-
fore, is not an adequate explanation of the scale. This may be true 
in general, but certain defensive subjects are likely to distort their 
responses and present an artificially favorable picture of themselves. 
Significant correlations are reported for ES with K (Gottesman, 1959; 
Kleinmuntz, 1960; Von Evra & Rosenberg, 1963) and with the K-F ratio 
(Distler et al., 1964). Crumpton et al. (1960) report that defensive 
patients achieve scores similar to normal students, with both groups 
higher on the ES than nondefensive patients. This interaction of 
defensiveness with ES leads Dahlstrom et al. to qualify the conven-
tional interpretation of the prognostic utility of the scale: 
If extremely high ES scorers in fact have standard MMPI profiles 
clear of any important elevation, yet are patients in a clinic 
or hospital, they are probably massively denying their personal 
or emotional difficulties. This extreme elevation on ES, then, 
is probably a poor prognostic sign for almost any psychological 
intervention. If, however, there is evidence from the rest of 
the record that they have some significant problem, and they 
also have scores on ES at or above the general mean, their dif-
ficulties may be of recent origin, their symptoms may be circum-
scribed, and the total interference in their life adjustment from 
these troubles is likely to be only moderate. For such cases, the 
prognosis for some form of psychotherapy is understandably favor-
able. (1975, pp. 169-170) 
Along the same lines, Gottesman (1959) found that delinquents were 
significantly higher than a normal comparison group, and so suggested 
that ES be interpreted in conjunction with K and Pd. The Ego Strength 
scale, he concluded, "may be a sign of psychic energy per se, whether 
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it be thought of as coming from the ego or the id" (p. 345). Von Evra 
and Rosenberg (1963) examined the ES scores of two groups of psycho-
paths, 1ifferentiated into primary and neurotic subtypes according to 
the MAS scores. Aa predicted, the nonanxious, primary psychopaths 
were significantly higher in ES (48.84 as opposed to 40.88) as well as 
1 and K, reinforcing the interpretation of ES as a measure of defen-
siveness and the ability to supply socially desirable answers. Primary 
psychopaths were found to have lower scores on the neurotic triad and 
on an EPPS measure of conflict, which serves as a reminder that defen-
siveness need not imply greater ego weakness. King and Schiller (1960) 
failed to find a significant association between ES and defensiveness 
among subjects whose driving licenses had been revoked. But those with 
higher ES scores were likely to use the relatively mature defense of 
rationalization and less reliant on the more primitive mechanisms of 
denial and projection. Among normal students, however, it was the 
lowest ES scorers that used rationalization, as part of a pattern of 
responding to a task with more defensiveness and less logical analysis. 
The literature suggests that defensive subjects, at least among 
patient groups, tend to achieve higher ES scores. To the extent that 
defensiveness limits change in therapy, this further invalidates the 
use of the ES scale for its intended purpose of predicting progress in 
treatment. Yet, more refined analysis suggests that high ES scorers use 
more mature defenses and suffer less neurotic conflict. Intact de-
fenses enhance ego functioning. So the failure of the ES as a prog-
nostic instrument need not limit its utility as an index of available 
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personality resources. 
Ego Strength scale versus ego strength concept. While exten-
sive use of the ES scale casts doubt on its utility in predicting 
response to therapy, an accumulation of data supports its validity 
as a measure of the somewhat nebulous concept, ego strength. The rela-
tionship was suggested initially by Barron (1953) on the basis of the 
content of the scale items. High scores result from endorsing items 
indicative of satisfactory physical functioning and stability; freedom 
from psychastheni~seclusiveness, phobias, various immature anxieties, 
religious dogmatism, and excessive moral rigidity; a secure sense of 
reality; and confidence in personal adequacy and ability to cope. To 
Barron, this represents a "capacity for personal integration, or ego 
strength" (p. 329). Crumpton et al. (1960) obtained 14 factors from 
a sample of inpatients and medical students, prominently including 
absense of symptoms, religious dogmatism, psychopathic tendencies, 
and lack of anxiety and obsessions. A cluster analysis reported by 
Stein and Chu (1967) substantially confirms these accounts. Three 
interrelated clusters tap physical, cognitive, and emotional aspects 
of well being. They involve freedom from symptoms of physical distress, 
intruding primary process thoughts, and anxiety and depression. Addi-
tional clusters include items tapping a "religious attitude of nonbelief 
and nonparticipation" (p. 155)--or denial of items with religious con-
tent--and "seeking heterosexual stimulation and escape from boredom" 
(p. 155). Comparisons among various normal and clinical groups found 
lower cluster scores among the more pathological with the exception of 
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the religion items, on which normals obtained lower scaled scores than 
either anxious or schizophrenic subjects. The failure of the religion 
factor is in keeping with Crumpton, et al.'s (1960) finding that medical 
students were more religiously dogmatic than patients. This subscale 
of the ES detracts from the overall validity of the scale, which other-
wise has adequate construct validity. 
Further attempts to validate the scale have included correla-
tional studies in which the ES is related to test scores and behavioral 
indices of effective functioning and empirical comparisons between 
groups presumably differing in ego strength. Results have been dis-
sappointing only with regard to the relationship of ES and ego strength 
measures obtained from projective tests. Otherwise there has been 
consistent support drawn from sufficiently diverse criteria and a large 
enough sampling of populations that the ES scale can be considered a 
valid index of ego strength. 
Crumpton et al. (1960) summarize published results prior to 
1960 when they write that: 
Correlates of high ES scores are such variables as low MMPI 
clinical symptom scales, intelligence, and lack of ethnic pre-
judice; ratings of poise, drive, etc.; Q-sort items descriptive 
of personality functioning; independence of judgment in a group 
situational test {Asch-type]; ability to orient oneself correctly 
to the vertical plane in darkness [Witkin's field independencel; 
favorable aspects of functioning such as W and M on the Rorschach; 
denial of need for help; improvement in hospitalized patients. 
(pp. 283-384) 
A diverse network of interrelationships link ES to effective ego func-
tioning. It is consistently related to intelligence. Although Tamkin 
(1957) found a nonsignificant relationship for one small sample, most 
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reports show correlations with the Wechsler scales ranging from .32 
to .44 (Adams & Cooper, 1962; Barron, 1953; Tamkin & Klett, 1957; 
Williams & Lawrence, 1954; Wirt, 1956). Other significant correlates 
include the Otis (Fowler et al., 1967), the Shipley-Hartford (Roos, 
1962) and a measure of conceptual ability (Grace, 1960). Correlations 
with the CPI index of intellectual efficiency are even higher, ranging 
from .47 to .52 (Adams & Cooper, 1962; Barron, 1953). Not surprisingly, 
ES is also related to education level (Clopton, 1979; Fowler et al., 
1967; Tamkin & Klett, 1957) and to social status (Fowler et al., 1967). 
Modest and inverse correlations are typically obtained for age 
(Getter & Sundland, 1962; Roos, 1962; Tamkin & Klett, 1957), although 
Graham (1977b) indicates some inconsistencies have been reported. 
Barron (1953) found that ES and ethnocentrism correlated -.47 for pa-
tients, -.46 for graduate students, and -.23 for air force officers. 
Not only is it related to tolerance of others, but also toward oneself. 
David (1968) factor analyzed patient's self and ideal-self descrip-
tions and found ES loading on a factor with lenient self-evaluation, 
large self-ideal discrepencies, an ideal distinct from that of the 
parents, and low psychopathic tendencies. The composite suggests a 
more individuated and self-accepting person. Similarly, Fiske et al. 
(1964) found that ES loaded highly on a self-evaluation factor which 
included Q-sort adjustment. 
The validity of ES as an ego strength measure is supported 
not only by its relationship to self-acceptance, but by its associa-
tion with constructive response to stress. Grace (1960), using the 
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McKinney Test, found inpatients high in ES more able to tolerate 
stress and to recover from it. Dahlstrom et al. (1975) reviewed 
studies using a psychogalvanometer which show that high ES subjects 
are less responsive at rest and more responsive during stress. The 
interpretation made was that high ES scorers spend less energy on 
homeostasis and so have more reserves available in crisis. This 
research is particularly compelling because it is not subject to the 
same distortions attending self-report measures. 
Studies correlating the ES with other derived and clinical 
scales from the MMPI routinely show less anxiety and symptoms among 
high scorers. Distler et al. (1964) obtained a correlation of -.71 
with MAS for schizophrenic patients, while Ends and Page (1957) found 
ES inversely related to pre and post hospitalization MAS for alcoholics. 
Factor analyzing responses to a mental status examination from female 
schizophrenics, Spitzer, Fleiss, Endicott, and Cohen (1967) obtained 
a main anxiety factor, to which ES correlated -.52. Similarly, Levine 
and Cohen (1962) found ES associated with absense of anxiety and psycho-
tic symptoms for a sample of VA schizophrenics. The Ego Strength scale 
correlates -.66 with the MMPI critical items (Tamkin, 1957; Tamkin & 
Klett, 1957) and is similarly related to the other clinical scales 
(Barron, 1953; Dahlstrom et al., 1975). While the degree of associa-
tion may be exaggerated by the inclusion of overlapping items, it is 
clearly considerable. Barron (1953) concludes that the ES "is picking 
up a general factor of psychopathology in the MMPI" (p. 330). It 
also correlates .47 with Meeker's LH-4 Scale, an independent MMPI-
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derived ego strength scale (Greenfield, Roessler, & Crosley, 1959). 
Factor analyses of MMPI scales typically generate a main 
factor often labelled ego strength. The ES scale is usually found to 
have a high and negative loading, again showing the denial of symptoms 
(Adams & Cooper, 1962; Corotto & Cornut, 1962; Kassebaum, Couch, & 
Slater, 1959). Lewinsohn (1965) found a similar structure when 
examining residual change scores (discharge less predictions from 
admission) of treated psychiatric inpatients. The ES correlated -.84 
with the main anxiety/ego weakness factor. Williams and Lawrence 
(1954) also found ES highly loaded on their ego strength factor which 
included verbal IQ and the Rorschach W, CF, and K scores. The Ego 
Strength scale is clearly a good index of degree of pathology as 
measured by the MMPI. 
Despite the naming of the above-mentioned factors, it would 
be premature to call ES a measure of ego strength inasmuch as it 
shares only the most minimal common variance with similarly intended 
scales derived from other instruments. Intercorrelations include: 
.09 with the Rorschach Genetic Level (Levine & Cohen, 1962); .08 
with the Goldberg Scale (Kidd, 1968); .02 and -.12, respectively, 
with the Bender Gestalt Z-score (Corotto & Cornutt, 1962; Roos, 1962); 
.12 with Cartwright's revision of the Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale 
(Adams & Cooper, 1962); and .13, .22, .12, and .13 for different 
samples using Klopfer's Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale (Adams & 
Cooper, 1962; Endicott & Endicott, 1964; Herron, Gvedo, & Kanter, 
1965). After finding only 2 of 36 significant intercorrelations 
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among different ego strength measures, Herron et al. (1965) thorough-
ly understated the situation when they concluded "there seems to be 
little evidence for the construct of objectively measurable ego 
strength" (p. 404). The low correlations may be attributed to dif-
ferences between verbal-cognitive and visual-motor tests (Corotto 
& Cornutt, 1962), but it is clear that ego strength is not a unitary 
concept. In the absense of convergent validation on this point, the 
ES must be evaluated in terms of its correlation with other measures. 
The literature surveyed has been remarkably consistent in showing 
high ES scorers to have more cognitive resources, greater self-
acceptance, greater resilience, and relative freedom from anxiety and 
other pathological symptoms. 
Further validation is available when comparisons are made 
between high and low ES scorers on a variety of dimensions. Most 
globally, Hunter and Goodstein (1967) found that ES scores matched 
judge's ratings of ego strength as rated on the basis of defensive-
ness expressed in transcripts obtained from undergraduates explaining 
their poor performance on a symbolic reasoning task. In his original 
validation study on 40 graduate students, Barron (1953) found that 
high scorers were rated as functioning better, directing their energy 
more effectively, having broader cultural backgrounds, being more 
physically adequate, and more at ease socially. For students above, 
but not for those below, 21, Crites (1960) reported more developed 
career interests among those higher in ES, even when intelligence dif-
ferences were partialed out. Teter and Dana (1964) found no difference 
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in adjustment, as questionably operationalized as persistence at an 
unsolvable maze. Yet, Kormun (1960) found psychiatric inpatients with 
high ES scores outperformed lower scorers in a sensory discrimination 
task. Students self-referred for therapy were found to have higher 
ES scores than those referred by others (Himelstein, 1964). But 
student counselees were lower in ES than those not requesting coun-
seling (Reschke, 1967). Welkowitz (1960) used the Bales rating 
system to evaluate the behavior of neurotic and psychotic patients 
in group therapy. Those higher in ES showed a more positive attitude 
toward therapy, were more sociable, and interacted more during the 
session. Jones (1969) studied the ES profiles of physically handi-
capped adults in a rehabilitation program. Those who were unsuccess-
ful were equally represented at all ES levels. But, for those who 
improved, ES was related to degree of success. Another interesting 
nonpsychiatric application is reported by Greenfield and his asso-
ciates (1959). Reasoning that ego strength should be expressed in 
the speed of recovery from illness, he compared ES scores of 18 under-
graduates with rapid recuperation and those of 20 students who took 
longer than average to recover from mononeucleosis. The quick 
recovery group was, as expected, significantly higher in ES. Though 
the difference in means was small, 50.39 versus 48.00, it was felt 
to be meaningful in an otherwise homogeneous group. To summarize this 
disparate group of studies, it is again apparent that hypothesized 
relationships between ES and ego strength are generally supported des-
pite a variety of perspectives, multiple methods, and diverse criteria. 
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consistent results in the face of such varied applications is power-
ful support for the general application of ES as an index of ego re-
sources. 
The greatest research effort assessing the adequacy of ES as a 
measure of ego strength has been directed at the comparison of groups 
varying in degree of psychopathology. The general conclusion of re-
viewers, supported here, is that the scale functions well in making 
gross distinctions--as between normal and psychopathological groups--
but is inconsistent with more refined discriminations (Dahlstrom et 
al., 1975; Graham, 1977b). In comparisons between normals and patients, 
only one of nine studies failed to report significant differences. 
Winters and Stortroen (1963) examined ES scores from 25 normals, 25 
general medical patients, and 25 schizophrenics. The top third of 
the distribution of ES scorers was found to contain 47% schizophrenics, 
when only 33% would have been expected by chance and even less were 
hypothesized. While unexpected, these results may be demonstrating a 
ceiling effect. The lower part of the ES range may be more discrim-
inating. Normals were found to be significantly higher than a 
variety of psychopathological groups in other studies (Crumpton et 
al., 1960; Gottesman, 1959; Himelstein, 1964; Quay, 1955; Silverman, 
1963; Spiegel, 1969; Stein & Chu, 1967; Taft, 1957). Among these, 
Silverman (1963) repeated the comparison between general medical 
patients (in this case, those with tuberculosis) and schizophrenics. 
He found in two separate administrations, once with ES embedded in 
the full MMPI and once alone, that the normals achieved significantly 
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higher ES scores. Spiegel (1969), for males and females separately, 
not only found significant differences between normal and pathological 
individuals, but subdivided each population into subgroups according 
to rated health and found consistent and progressively increasing 
ES scores as healthiness increased. Similarly, Gottesman (1959), 
found educationally and occupationally superior adults significantly 
higher than normals, who were, in turn, higher than most disturbed 
samples. The ES, then, can dichotomize normal from abnormal samples, 
and may be able to differentiate those with exceptional resources. 
Barron's scale is less effective, although not totally un-
satisfactory, for discrin1inating between diagnostic groups. Gottesman's 
(1959) study showed mixed results. Delinquents were higher than 
emotionally disturbed adolescents, indeed, they were higher than 
normal adults. But no significant differences were found between 
psychotics and two groups of neurotics, those with peak MMPI scores 
on Hs and Hy or D and Pt. In his research, Tamkin reports no dif-
ferences between mixed neurotic groups and psychotics (Tamkin & Klett, 
1957) or neurotics and character disorders (Tamkin, 1957). Hawkinson 
(1962) was unable to discriminate neurotic~ from manic-depressives, from 
schizophrenics with the ES. He questioned the utility of the scale 
noting that self-esteem, sense of reality, and ability to delay grati-
fication are separate ego functions with differing implications for 
each of the diagnostic groups sampled. Others have extended this argu-
ment, which is the most compelling against the utility of the ES. It 
is not a unitary scale. Crumpton et al. (1960) extracted 14 factors, 
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of which 13 significantly discriminated medical students from VA in-
patients. But patients obtained the higher score on four of these. 
Significant differences on one subscale were offset by opposing dif-
ferences on another. Stein and Chu (1967) found that only the core 
subscale tapping sense of well being satisfactorily discriminated 
normals from neurotics, who, in turn, had higher scores than schizo-
phrenics. But within this factor, the cluster of items relating to 
physical symptoms failed to differentiate. And on the separate 
religiosity factor, schizophrenics achieved higher ES subscale scores 
than either normals or anxiety neurotics. There is an apparent double 
bind in using the ES: it must contain separate subscales to have ade-
quate construct validity as a measure of such a global construct as 
ego strength. Yet, this internal complexity tends to obscure dif-
ferences between diagnostic groups. 
There have been successes, even when fine discriminations have 
been made. As previously discussed, Von Evra and Rosenberg (1963) 
found that primary psychopaths have higher ES scores than neurotic 
psychopaths. Roos (1962) reported groups with character disorders 
or neurotic diagnoses exceeded schizophrenics. Rosen (1963) com-
pared five internally homogeneous diagnostic groups. While some 
individual ~-tests were nonsignificant, the ES scores did success-
fully distinguish neurotics from psychotics. More specifically, 
neurotics with physical symptoms were significantly higher than 
neurotics with anxiety or depressive features, who were higher than 
paranoid schizophrenics. In his discussion. Roos criticized Tamkin 
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and Klett (1957) for attributing nonsignificant differences to the ES 
when the problem may well have been in failing to create homogeneous 
comparison groups. In support of such an account, Figetakis (1964) 
was able to demonstrate that reactive schizophrenics achieve higher 
ES scores than do process schizophrenics. 
Graham's (1977b) review concludes that the ES scale generally 
works as a measure of adjustment. Valid discriminations can usually 
be made between normals and psychiatric patients, and between neurot-
ics and psychotics. This review concurs with two specific qualifica-
tions. As previously discussed, the scale is multidimensional. So 
the general accuracy of the scale in measuring adjustment will be dis-
rupted when one of the dimensions is particularly pertinent to a 
specific comparison group, as with religiosity among schizophrenics 
(Stein & Chu, 1967) or students from a fundamentalist medical school 
(Crumpton et al., 1960). Second, as a self-report instrument, it will 
underestimate the pathology of those who deny or ignore their pathology. 
People with ego syntonic disorders will score higher on ES than those 
whose symptoms are ego-alien, as is demonstrated in the case of socio-
pathic types (Gottesman, 1959; Roos, 1962; Von Evra & Rosenberg, 1963). 
Apart from these limitations, the ES is often capable of fine dis-
criminations among diagnostic groups and certainly adequate at the 
molar level as an index of maladjustment. 
The ES scale, in summary, has been validated with a wide range 
of designs and measurement techniques, for a wide cross-section of 
the population. It has been shown to be a multidimensional index of 
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ego strength related to cognitive and emotional resources, to self-
acceptance, and to freedom from symptoms. While it is unreliable as 
a vehicle for predicting change with psychotherapy, it is an adequate 
measure of the general degree of adjustment demonstrated by the indi-
vidual at a given point in time. 
Ego Strength scale and objective self-awareness. One thrust 
of this research project will be to assess the validity of the Self-
Consciousness scale, and the whole concept of the handling of reflec-
tive self-awareness, among clinical populations. The ES provides a 
means of relating SC to the level of psychopathology. The ES will 
be presented as an independent 68-item scale. While most of the 
research presented abstracts ES from the total MMPI, evidence suggests 
the separately administered scale performs similarly (Gravits, 1970). 
While it has been previously argued that different diagnostic groups 
will present with discrepant patterns and overall levels of SC, no 
major common variance is expected when the ES and SC are correlated. 
Individual subscales may well be linked. Private self-consciousness, 
because of the cognitive abilities required for the reflective process, 
may be positively related to ES. Social anxiety, in contrast, would 
be expected to peak among the less functional, and so to vary inversely 
with ES. But the validity of the SC with a clinical population will 
be optimized if the common variance with ES is limited. To the extent 
that the scales are independent, the SC should function for patient 
groups in a manner comparable to that found with college students. 
Should the scales prove to be correlated, the different pattern in 
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the use of the SC by disturbed groups may undermine the hypothesized 
link between Self-Consciousness and behavior in therapy to be dis-
cussed in the next section. 
Premature Termination From Psychotherapy 
Premature termination from psychotherapy has been the subject 
of a great deal of study over the past three decades. There are two 
main reasons for this interest. First, it was quickly recognized that 
a high percent of patients leave treatment early on and without con-
currence from their therapist. Brandt (1965) indicates that up to 35% 
fail to begin agreed upon treatment. Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) 
estimate 20 to 57% leave after one session, and that a minimum of 31% 
have dropped out by the fourth session. Malzer (1980) suggests 65% 
ultimately end treatment unilaterally. (Table 8 summarizes the per-
cent of termination and the criteria used for the populations sampled 
in this review). Premature termination is a major problem in the alloca-
tion of limited professional resources. Second, length of treatment is 
typically assumed to be related to improvement. As a conveniently 
available and quantitative index, it is often used as an outcome measure 
in therapy research. 
Methodological issues. The generally shared assumption that 
length of therapy is an index of successful outcome (Lorr, McNair, 
Michaux, & Raskin, 1962; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Saltzmen et al., 
1975; Strickland & Crowne, 1962; Tolman & Meyer, 1957) has received 
at least some support. 
Table 8 
Pe;:cent of Patients Terminating Prematurely in Stt!dies Reviewed 
Reference 
Affle<:k & Hednick (1959) 
Auld & Eron (1953) 
Brown & Kosterlit:;: (19611) 
Carncena (1965) 
Cartwr:!.t:ht ( 1955) 
Conr acl (19 Sl1) 
Dcl.oac:l (l '177) 
D<'dd (l 970) 
Fi,.,;~<>r et "'. (1974} 
r'ralll<. et ai.. (i.957) 
FreeJman "t al. (!958) 
GatfidJ et aJ .. (1963) 
Garfield & Kn~z (1952) 
f!0rtlcr et al. (1973) 
Gihbey et al. (1953) 
Gibbey et al. (1954) 
Gandlach & Gelle::- (1958) 
Hei!hrun (1961) 
!leine & T>:osman (1960) 
H!Jer (1958}, UJler (1959) 
Horenstein (J 975), llormtstein 
& Houston 0976) 
!lorton [, Kri.mtcf.unas (1970) 
Imber et al. (1955) 
Imber ct al. (l956) 
Katz & Solomon (1958) 
l~olkov (195R) 
Kotkov & "c~dow (1953) 
Population or center type 
VA, non-OBS 
CHile, mixed 
Uuiversity cl !nil',, mixed 
University cmmseling center, mixed 
University counseling center, mixed 
VA, mixed 
University clinie, neurotic students 
Hospltal clinic, mixed 
CMIIC, mix::.d 
llni•;ersity clinic, nonpsychotic 
n·mc, schizophrenic 
0•Jtpatient clinic, nonpsychotic 
VA, mixed 
Outpatient clinic. alcohol!~ 
VA, e1ixed 
VA, mixed 
An:tlyt:h: training center, mixed 
University counseli.ng center, mixed 
Outpatient clink, mixed 
VA, mb:cd 
Unlversity cllnic, mixed students 
Chl.ld 1\Uidllnre cl 'nf.c, mixed 
adolescents 
lhi.verslty c! i.nic, nonpsychot i.e 
llnivcn~ity clinic, nonpsyrhotic 
!~spital clinic, mixed 
VA, neurotjc 
VA, neurotic 
Comparison group cri.teri.:t 
5- vs. 20+ sessions 
9- vs. 10+ sessions 
4- vs. 5+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
6- vs. 7+ sessions 
1- vs. 1+ month 
3- vs. 4+ sessions 
2-, 2+ but not ~m, ~IB 
3- vs. 4+ sessions 
9- vs. 10+ sessions 
6- vs. 7+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
12- vs. 12+ mont.hs 
0, 1 to 5 sessions, 
6+ months 
5-, 6 to 19, 20+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessions 
5- vs. 20+ sessions 
3- vs. 4+ orientation 
sessions 
MR- vs. HI\ 
4- vs, 5+ sessions 
3- vs. 4+ sessions 
5- vs. 6+ sessiuns 
7- vs. 8+ sessions 
3- vs. 9+ sessions 
Percent 
N terminating 
50 
33 36 
76 59 
60 35 
78 20 
100 4 7 
62 
169 4 7 
391 J6 (2-) 
35 (2+) 
91 30 
54 '•6 
24 50 
560 '• 3 
97 79 
q9 
269 40 (5-) 
6 
73 55 
46 48 
216 
J r,t, 1! 
60 
60 )3 
57 37 
351 '•'• 
52 
52 
Note. Use of "-" indicates less than or eq,.utl to the crltP.rion indicated. ThE" or.ly C'xception is for "Nil-", 
l,h!t~h t!esiP,twte'l l0ss lhnn JI"lxb'"'" benifit. Use of "+'' represents p,reater th3n or equal to the crttPrion. 
Unreported d~ta is represented with a dash. 
Reference 
Lorr at al (1958} 
torr et al (1962) 
McNair et al. (1963) 
Mc·ndelr.::.hn (1%6) 
Hensh & Golden (!951) 
r;ash et :tl (1957} 
'N'?t·aJ l f., Aron,cn (1963) 
R:1porort ( 1976) 
RogC'rS ct :tL (l'iSi) 
ltn:W•tl hal & !'ra.lk {195!1) 
Huhe•ISt::!iu & l.orr ( 1956) 
Saltzn,:ln et :tl. (l'H6) 
S•nF.:ler ( l'J7)) 
ShC'Phan & Surman (197!1) 
Sherry (1977) 
Str.,kcr ·~t al.. (1967) 
Strickland & Growne (196~) 
Sullivan et al. (1958) 
Tnul be-~ (!'J5S) 
WC'Iss & Schale (1958) 
w:..nd(,r s~ a;.. (1967) 
Ynlo•~ 1!066) 
Table 8 (Continued) 
Population or center type 
VA, m:l.xed 
VI\, ncn-OBS 
VA, non-em; 
University coun3elin::; center, student 
VA, !l'ixed 
University clinic, non;lsychot:!.c 
llonpital cU.nic,, nonpsychoti.c 
VA, mixed 
VA, mixed 
llonpitvl clinic, mJ,:ed 
VA, nonpsychotic 
University counseling center, 
nonpsy~f1of:~.c stutic11ts 
!~spital hehavtor therapy clinic, 
mi. xed 
VA, mixed 
Hospital clinie, mi.xed 
Ou~p3tient clinic, mixed 
VA, mixed 
VA, neuro~ic 
Outp~tient clinic, rnix~d 
Child guidance cente-r, pArents 
Outpatient clinic, nonlJS)'ehot i.e, 
group therapy 
Comparison group criteria 
7- sessions, 26+ weeks 
15- vs. 16+ sessions 
4- vs. 5+ sesd.ons 
J- vs. 13+ sessions 
1- vs. 2+ sessiom; 
0, 1 to 6, 7+ session~ 
t, ·- vs. 5+ ~essi0ns 
0, I to 5, 6+ senstons 
s- sessions, 6+ months 
10- vs. ll+ sessions 
HB- vs. HB 
6- liS. 7+ sessions 
Mil- vs. HB 
10- vs. 11+ sessions 
9- vs. l.O+ SPS'3ions 
lJ- vs. 14+ sessions 
i1!1- vs. Mil 
10- vs. 20+ sessions 
i2- vs. 13+ sessions 
N 
230 
133 
282 
111 
638 
48 
t,o 
90 
IO<J 
JH/1 
128 
91 
71 
2?0 
85 
2b8 
85 
603 
23 
97 
Percent 
terminating 
38 
65 
14 2 
'•3 
20 
JO (0) 
31 (l-'i) 
22 
15 
39 
12 
J ,, 
7l 
~~ 7 
38 
16 
00 
0 
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Cartwright (1955),in her examination of length of stay and 
outcome for 75 cases seen at the University of Chicago Counseling 
Center, found a generally positive and linear relationship that was 
interrupted between the 13th and 21st sessions. Cases terminating in 
this "failure zone", were rated no more improved than those dropping 
out after three sessions. Taylor (1956) replicated this pattern of 
a disrupted linear relationship, with outcomes rated poorer during 
the teens. A plausible interpretation is that this is the stage in 
therapy at which relationship factors become paramount. Dropouts 
leave therapy unimproved because they are unable to tolerate a depen-
dent relationship with the therapist (Fulkerson & Barry, 1961). 
Cartwright (1955) suggests that two different functions, both essen-
tially linear, may be superimposed in her study. Short-term therapy, 
with a goal of symptom relief, may achieve maximum benefit and end 
by the 12th session. Long term therapy, with its focus on personality 
change, begins to show results, once the relationship is developed, 
after 20 sessions. The implications are two-fold. First, number of 
sessions are related to therapy outcome, justifying an underlying pre-
mise of dropout research. But second, the relationship is not simple 
and so the criterion number of sessions should be selected carefully. 
Either the criterion number of interviews should be kept low (about 
five), or the terminator should be compared with long term remainers 
having more than 20 sessions. A split comparing patients above and 
below, say, nine sessions runs the risk of comparing short term and 
long term patients and failing to make the assumed comparison between 
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terminators and remainers. 
Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) add that: 
patients with acute situational problems will derive little benefit 
from extended treatment and may resist it by dropping out after 
they have gotten from it what they wanted in the first place • • • • 
Having realized their goals, which are not the same as those of 
their therapist, they may nonetheless get considerable benefit from 
treatment. (p. 744) 
Meltzoff and Komreich (1970) concur. Fiester and Rudestam (1975) found 
four factors characterizing treatment dropouts from a state hospital 
clinic (none replicable for a community mental health center cross-
validation sample). Two of the four factors (patient seeking and 
getting direct advice, and achieving some problem resolution with a 
close and well-adjusted therapist) suggest the patient achieved desired 
objectives before termination. Rosenthal and Frank (1958) reported 
32.5% of their improved patients had only five sessions. To set a 
higher number of sessions as criteria increases the risk that people 
who accomplished their treatment objectives, and so should be thought 
of as remainers, will be mistakenly considered dropouts. For these 
reasons, the present research will use five sessions as its criteria. 
Those having five or less sessions will be designated as terminators, 
unless the chart indicates a mutually agreed upon ending or a referral 
on discharge, while those continuing for six or more sessions will be 
defined to be remainers. 
Despite the volume of research, there is a considerable lack of 
clarity about the determinants of premature termination. A considera-
tiou of the possible domain of relevant variables would minimally 
83 
include patient traits, therapist dispositions and techniques, state 
variables resulting from their interaction, clinic policy and setting, 
and the family and cultural context in which treatment takes place. 
Research began with client characteristics and has paid less attention 
to each successive level. As a result, there is inadequate data of 
clinic and contextual features. 
The lack of clarity also results from methodological complex-
ities peculiar to the research area. In the following paragraphs, 
some of the most important will be briefly reviewed. Among them: 
1) lack of agreement in the definition of premature termina-
tion leads to differing and contradictory criteria of 
dropping out, 
2) even when premature termination is defined in terms of a 
set number of sessions, the number chosen to delimit the 
terminator group varies widely, 
3) there is concern that aggregate data may obscure different 
profiles if, as is likely, there is more than one type of 
dropout, and 
4) there is some disagreement whether or not those who fail 
to begin treatment are sufficiently similar to those who 
begin therapy and then quit unilaterally that the two 
groups can be combined for comparison with those who 
remain in treatment. 
These issues will be considered before this review proceeds to consid-
er the results of the research literature. 
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There have been three approaches to the operationalization of 
premature termination. Some have suggested that time in therapy is 
more relevant to outcome than is the number of sessions (Lorr et al., 
1962). Comparison groups are constructed based on duration of treat-
ment. There are obvious practical problems with such an approach, 
such as how to handle the patient who delays therapy because of a 
vacation or illness. A second approach, equally quantifiable, uses a 
set number of sessions as the criteria for remaining in treatment. 
"Since the number of visits directly measures the patient's exposure 
to treatment, it is to be preferred to time in treatment as a measure 
of dropping out" (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975, p. 741). Perhaps the 
conceptually purest measure is one which defines premature termina-
tion as any unilateral move by the patient to end treatment (Fiester, 
Mahrer, Giambra, & Ormiston, 1974). With this definition, a patient 
could still be considered a terminator after hundreds of hours of 
treatment. It is questionable whether this individual should be 
defined as belonging in the same group as the patient quitting after 
a single interview. Since, as noted above, unilateral termination 
may express either dissatisfaction with therapy or the attainment of 
desired goals, Fiester's approach is misguided. Moreover, the quality 
of the archives used in most of these studies is inadequate to reliably 
differentiate unilateral from mutual decisions to end treatment. This 
study will use the second approach, setting six sessions as the mini-
mal criteria for being considered a "continuer". This means that the 
results will not be directly comparable to studies using either alter-
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native approach to operationalizing premature termination. 
Although most studies use the number of sessions for the 
criterion, there is still considerable disagreement about where to 
set the cutting point. As indicated in Table 8, McNair, Lorr, and 
Callahan (1963) called all of those terminating before the 16th 
session dropouts, even though the typical course of treatment is only 
eight sessions in the majority of clinics studied (Garfield, 1978). 
Again, a much lower number of sessions is used to minimize the inclu-
sion of patients leaving with major treatment goals satisfied. 
Inconsistent results can be expected since the evidence sug-
gests that premature termination is a complex and overdetermined 
phenomenon. Aggregate data may obscure as well as elucidate contri-
buting factors if too many distinct subgroups are pooled in composing 
the terminator sample. Yalom (1966) is the most clear in presenting 
this argument. Citing nine different factors leading to defection 
from group therapy, he stressed that few would have proven significant 
in any analysis of aggregate data. A variable might be applicable to 
only one or two respondents, yet its importance could be so paramount 
in these cases that it is the determining element. Evidence of such 
subgroup differences appears repeatedly. Saltzman et al. (1976) 
sampled patient and therapist reactions after the first, third, and 
fifth sessions. In analyzing the results from subsequent dropouts, 
termination after one session was attributed to low anxiety while 
dissatisfaction with the relationship was evident for those leaving 
later. So there is some indication that there are subgroups based on 
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length of stay even when the criterion number of sessions is very 
limited. Heilburn (1961) compared terminators and remainers on eight 
subscales of the Gough Adjective Checklist. For six of them there 
were significant interactions by sex indicating that different criteria 
are needed for males and females. But later research on the Counseling 
Readiness subscale (Heilbrun, 1962) failed to replicate sex differences. 
A more consistent observation is that dropouts can be discrim-
inated into subgroups according to whether they later seek help or 
not. Tolman and Meyer (1957) examined records of 354 VA patients and 
found that only 6% of those terminating within four sessions return, 
while 12% of the continuers have subsequent contact with the Mental 
Hygiene Clinic. No information was provided on use of other mental 
health resources. Chameides and Yamanoto (1973) observed that 78% of 
their failed referrals got help elsewhere, as did 63% of the sample 
studied by Brandt (1964). Fiester et al. (1974) found that their 
sample of community mental health center patients who remained until 
mutually agreed upon termination were more likely than dropouts to have 
had previous clinic contact. Some portion of the terminators return 
for successful treatment later while others reject mental health in-
terventions entirely. Although no differences are reported, presumably 
these two groups are distinct. The usual practice of combining them 
is likely to obscure distinctive patterns characterizing the subtypes. 
However, in the absense of specified and empirically validated pre-
dictive variables, it is impossible to separate subgroups. Aggregate 
data must continue to be used while clinical impressions and followup 
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research attempt to clarify the means of discriminating distinct 
subsamples within the larger population of terminators. At the same 
time, retrospective interviews with dropouts are suggested as useful 
in attempts to more fully appreciate the multidimensional deter-
minants of premature termination from psychotherapy. 
There has been some discussion of differences between those 
who dropout of treatment after one or more sessions and those who 
refuse treatment or fail before it begins. Here the distinction is 
easily objectifiable: no treatment versus one or more sessions. 
Several studies compare these groups. Garfield and Kurz (1952) 
report that for a VA sample of 768 men found suitable for treatment, 
27% refused treatment (compared to 31% dropping out through the 
fifth session). Garfield (1978) described rejectors as having low 
income and socioeconomic status, vague problems, and poor motivation. 
Such descriptions are typical for dropouts as well, as will be seen 
below. Gibby, Stotsky, Miller, and Hiler (1953) found rejectors and 
terminators similar in their constricted Rorschach records and somatic 
complaints, features that distinguish them from remainers. Williams 
and Pollack (1964) found no demographic distinction between families 
of refusers and terminators at a child guidance clinic. Brandt's (1965) 
review suggests that differences that have been reported are not con-
sistent, have not been replicated, and are not clinically useful for 
prediction. His conclusion, consonant with the evidence from this re-
view, is that reported differences are sample specific and artifactual. 
However, the sample used in this study will be examined on a post hoc 
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basis, on the assumption that anxiety related to objective self-aware-
ness will be aroused more among those who begin treatment. 
One final source of inconsistency, and one most typically 
encountered in literature reviews, is the reality that studies examine 
different populations armed with a wide variety of measurement devices. 
Even a strong and consistent effect would likely be missed as often as 
found. Conflicting results are seen as evidence of multiple perspec-
tives being taken on a complex phenomenon. Fortunately, enough con-
sistency emerges that crucial determinants can be identified. 
Psychological tests. The first research used psychological 
tests to measure patient characteristics related to premature termina-
tion. The results have been generally discouraging. Initial suc-
cesses have failed on replication or have been reinterpretted as evi-
dence of the impact of confounding variables. This pattern holds for 
the course of research on the Rorschach, the MMPI, and the specially 
designed Terminator-Remainer Battery. The studies to be reviewed 
below indicate that standard psychological tests have little to contri-
bute to the prediction of psychotherapy dropouts. 
Research with the Rorschach began inauspiciously when Rogers, 
Knaus, and Hammond (1951) found that none of 99 selected formal ele-
ments significantly discriminated VA patients terminating before the 
fifth session. Taulbee (1958) found significant differences for R, C, 
V, An, A%, and number of rejections. But his use of 13 interviews as 
the criterion for remainers makes his results suspect, for the reasons 
described above. When Kotkov and Meadow (1953) attempted to replicate 
a formula based on R, FC-CF, and D%, they found a nonsignificant 
trend for D% to be higher for continuers, which contradicted their 
earlier results with group therapy patients. Continuers offered 
significantly more R and FC-CF responses. Auld and Eron (1953) 
w2re able to replicate differences only for R. When they partialed 
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out the effects of verbal IQ, the correlation of R with the number of 
sessions dropped from .55 to .07. Affleck and Mednick (1959) found 
significant differences in R, M, and marginally in H when 25 veterans 
dropping out in 4 or less sessions were compared with 25 continuing 20 
or more interviews. The importance of IQ was challenged since re-
mainers, although higher, didn't differ significantly from terminators. 
Gibby et al. (1953) characterized terminators as producing constricted 
records, with few movement and color responses, and reliance on easy 
shapes (F+%). The same researchers (Gibby, Stotsky, Hiler, & Miller, 
1954) later developed a formula using R, K, and M which was 67% accu-
rate on cross validation. However, R alone correctly predicted 69%. 
With IQ partialed out, its correlation with continuation dropped from 
.38 to .32. Much of this was probably related to social class stand-
ing, which itself predicted perseverance in psychotherapy with 63% 
accuracy. 
This discussion leads to the same conclusion reported by other 
reviewers (Fulkerson & Barry, 1961; Garfield, 1978): R is the only 
Rorschach variable that reliably discriminates between those perse-
vering in therapy from early terminators. Continuers are not only 
more intelligent, but also more ego-involved and cooperative. The 
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lower productivity of the terminator is equated with depression, pas-
sivity, and incapacitating anxiety (Hiler, 1958; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 
1970). Interestingly, Hiler (1958) and his associates (Gibby et al., 
1954) found that some therapists are able to retain patients with low 
R. So patient productivity interacts with therapist characteristics 
instead of being a main effect in some research. In all, the Rorschach 
is a rather cumbersome screening device for predicting continuation in 
therapy. 
Results with the MMPI have been inconclusive. Taulbee (1958) 
found continuers (13 or more sessions) higher on D, Pa, Pt, and Sc. 
Sullivan et al. (1958) dichotomized his veterans' sample at nine ses-
sions and found terminators higher on Pa and lower on K. Their first 
cross-validation sample showed remainers higher on Pt, but no dif-
ferences on other MMPI scales, including initially significant derived 
measures of social status, intellectual efficiency, ego strength, 
anxiety, and repression. All MMPI scales failed to discriminate on 
a second cross-validation sample. Dodd's (1970) study of outpatients 
at a university hospital clinic also failed to find MMPI differences 
in average T-score or number of elevated clinical scales. Horton 
and Kriavciunas (1970) found adolescent continuers compliant, as 
indicated by lower F, Pa, Sc, and Ma. And students continuing at a 
counseling center were typified by moderate Hy and Pd scores (DeLoach, 
1977). Their Ego Strength scale scores were no different from termina-
tors, as was the case with the veterans studied by McNair, Callahan, and 
Lorr (1962). Lastly, McAdoo and Roeske (1973) found no differences in 
the MMPI profiles of continuers versus terminators among parents at 
a child guidance center. In summary, neither clinical or derived 
scales from the MMPI have yet proven effective predictors of perse-
verance in therapy. 
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Lorr and his associates (Lorr, Katz, & Rubenstein, 1958; 
Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956) derived a Terminator-Remainer battery (TR) 
from the most discriminating items of a self-ideal discrepancy rating 
scale, the F-scale, Taylor's Manifest Anxiety scale, and a behavior 
disturbance scale (Applezweig, Dibner, & Osbourne, 1958). The TR 
Battery outperformed the parent scales and significantly discrim-
inated dropouts from continuers, with predictive accuracy above 60%. 
McNair et al. (1963) cross-validated the derived formula and was 
able to exceed base rate accuracy. But Garfield (1978) reports that 
the multiple R obtained was only .44. The implications of McNair's 
study are further confused by considering all patients with 15 or 
less sessions to be terminators. Despite this, terminators were 
described as impulsive psychopaths or as authoritarians who deny 
anxiety or self-dissatisfaction. Stern, Moore, and Gross (1975) 
begin their critique by noting that such a description has often 
been applied to lower class clients. In a completely crossed design, 
with 17 nonpsychotic outpatient clinic clients per cell, middle and 
lower class terminators and remainers were compared. The TR battery 
did predict premature termination (with five or fewer sessions), 
but only across social class. Within class the TR accuracy was only 
50%, identical to chance expectancy. The failure of the TR to 
92 
reappear in the literature since Stern's report suggests that it was 
persuasively rejected by this study. The TR battery is like other 
P'~rsonality tests in having failed to demonstrate patient personality 
characteristics that are related to premature termination from psycho-
therapy. 
Social class. The variable that has most consistently pre-
dicted therapy dropouts is social class. Whether measured by a compo-
site index or component elements such as income, education, occupational 
status, or housing type, length of stay in psychotherapy is shorter and 
dropout percent higher for the lower class client (Auld & Myers, 1954; 
Frank et al., 1957; Imber, Nash, & Stone, 1955; Imber, Frank, Gliedman, 
Nash, & Stone, 1956; Karmin & Coughlin, 1963; Katz & Solomon, 1958; 
McNair et al., 1963; Myers & Schaffer, 1954; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; 
Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956; Sandler, 1975; Schaffer & Myers, 1954; Stern 
et al., 1975; Weiss & Schaie, 1958; Winder & Hersko, 1955). 
This finding is not universal, since some studies find no 
relationship (Brill & Storrow, 1960; Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964; Lorr 
et al., 1962; Strickland & Crowne, 1963; Taulbee, 1958) or mixed 
results across cross-validation samples (Dodd, 1970; Fiester et al., 
1974; Lorr et al., 1958; Sullivan et al., 1958). But the supportive 
evidence is great enough that lower class patients must be considered 
likely to terminate prematurely. 
In part, this may be attributed to referral and selection pro-
cedures. Clinics routinely put patients through a "creaming" process 
so that the most desirable patients are retained. Middle class patients 
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are among the selected (Brill & Storrow, 1960; Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964; 
Rosenthal & Frank, 1958). Those with a lower class background are more 
likely to request help with somatic problems and be judged as unsuit-
able for insight oriented therapy (Schaffer & Myers, 1954). When they 
are retained on the client roles, lower class clients get group, cus-
todial, or organic therapies instead of analytically-oriented psycho-
therapy (Bailey, Warshaw, & Eichler, 1959; Kamin & Coughline, 1963; 
Robinson, Redlich, & Myers, 1954; Winder & Hersko, 1955). They may 
be assigned to less experienced and less competent therapists (Brill 
& Storrow, 1960; Myers & Schaffer, 1954). So clinics may complicate 
preexisting difficulties in retaining lower class clients by offering 
them the least preferable services. But the preexisting difficulties 
are exemplified by one clinic's finding that 48% of lower class, com-
pared with 12% of middle class, drop out before therapy begins (Myers 
& Schaffer, 1954). Selection practices reflect rather than create the 
communication obstacles that prevent the retention of the socio-
economically deprived. 
Other variables, including the psychological test indices re-
viewed above, have been reinterpretted in terms of social class. 
Auld and Myers (1954) argue that requisite therapy skills (psycholo-
gical mindedness), rewards (such as empathy and insight), and punish-
ments (fees) are all mediated by socio-economic status. Noting the 
.403 correlation of class and number of therapy sessions, they suggest 
that what are called personality factors are really socio-demographic 
ones. But the syllogism can be reversed. Freeman (1961) found that 
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the relatives of patients with higher amounts of education used psycho-
genic explanations of illness, responded favorably to hospital treat-
ment, expected recovery, and were less likely to blame the patient. He 
suggested that social class is a screen for the more crucial education 
and intelligence differences that determine attitudes. Reviewers seem 
to concur. Garfield (1978) believes that "educational level may be 
only one component of a larger factor or complex of factors that may 
include verbal ability, sophistication about psychotherapy, income, 
interest in receiving psychotherapy, and similar components" (p. 198). 
Meltzoff and Kornreich continue: "socioeconomic variables do not 
seem to be of great importance by themselves. What would seem to be 
significant are the psychological implications of the social position 
of the patient: his learned behaviors, roles, attitudes, expectancies, 
and traits" (1970, p. 362). Lower class patients modally are less 
inclined to monitor or express thoughts and feelings, to interpret 
anxiety of behavior disturbance psychologically, to accept prolonged 
treatment from a relatively passive therapist, or to find acceptance 
for his status as a psychotherapy patient. Note how this early comment 
by Myers and Schaffer (1954) anticipates the current interest in 
client/therapist similarity and expectancy match: 
psychotherapy involves intimate communicative interaction 
between the patient and therapist. Therefore, it may be facili-
tated if a certain similarity in culturally determined symbols 
and learned drives exist in both patient and therapist. Dif-
ferences in value systems and patterns of communication on the 
other hand may hamper the establishment of the therapeutic rela-
tionship. At present, it appears possible that lower-class 
patients need to acquire new symbols and values to participate 
in expressive psychotherapy. Since this is a difficult process, 
many of them may be considered unpromising candidates for suc-
cessful treatment. (p. 310) 
Other patient characteristics. Therapist and expectancy 
variables will be discussed in detail below. But first to be con-
sidered are personal characteristics of the patient that have been 
linked to premature termination from psychotherapy. As a starting 
point, Figure 1 summarizes the findings of previous reviews. The 
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constellation of personality characteristics related to social class 
typically includes lower intelligence, referral from social agency or 
courts, low TR scores, somatic or situational presenting problems, 
lack of psychological mindedness, and poor motivation for treatment 
(items 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 19, respectively). While the results 
are not entirely consistent, the bulk of the evidence suggest patients 
compelled to seek treatment drop out (Frank et al., 1957), while 
continuers are self-referred or coming from a psychiatric source 
(Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Straker, Davanloo, & Moll, 1967; Weiss & 
Schaie, 1958). Four of the six studies reviewed concur that initial 
complaints that are somatic or nonpsychological are more frequent 
from patients who drop out early in treatment (Gibbey et al., 1953; 
Hiler, 1959; Katz & Solomon, 1958; Kotkov, 1958). Complaints empha-
sizing depression, anxiety or other neurotic features not only typified 
those who continue in treatment, but those with a middle class back-
ground. Both psychological mindedness and motivation for therapy are 
the types of global and abstract concepts that are seldom objectively 
measured but appear in summary statements, particularly after projec-
Factor 
Type 
Fulkerson and 
ll,rry (1961) 
Patient Characteristics: 
1. 
2. 
Low Rorschach R 
!...ow intclligencl! 
3. Low suggestibility 
t,. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
I I. 
12. 
t3. 
u •. 
l). 
ln. 
!7. 
18. 
Dtagnosis other 
than neurosin 
Lo~! socl~l clasH 
Brandt (1965) 
Diagnosis other 
than neurosis 
No previous ther~py 
Sex differences 
denied 
-··-----· ---·----------------
Reviewers 
Dodd (1970) 
Diagnosis without 
anxiety 
Low social class 
Race other than 
caucasian 
Sex differences 
denied 
Agenr.y referral 
Me] tzo ff and 
Kornreich (1970) 
niagnosis differ-
ences denied 
Low social class 
Baekeland and 
J,undwall (19 7 5) 
Low an.dety and 
depression 
Low social class 
Female 
Low TR battery score 
So mat lc prescr.t ing 
pcohlem 
Paranoi.d signs 
Sociopathy 
Nomadic 
Aggressive or 
passive-aggressive 
Social isolation 
Not psychologically 
minded 
------------
Fi)•,qrp I. RC'VI!'\~erG' r('sponHPS to variabl!'s at'lsoelate<l 'l.lith pn•111ature termlnatJon from psychothernpy. 
Garfield (1978) 
Low intellige-nce 
D:f.agnosis differ-
ences denied 
Low social class 
S•'Y. d l f f erl'nces 
denietl 
Reviewers 
------------------
Factor 
type 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Fulkerson nnd 
Barry (1961) 
Therapist Characteristics: 
22. 
z3. 
24. 
25. 
n. 
2 7. 
:Brandt (1965) 
Age difference"' 
denied 
Do<Jd (1970) 
Age differences 
deni<'d 
Inexperience 
Lack11 warmth 
[nt:er:-~ctl.nn o( !'nti!'nt and Therapist Characteristics: 
28. 
/9. 
Cl inlr Charncteristlcs: 
]0. 
Meltzoff and 
Kornreich ( i970} 
Inexperience 
llaekeland and 
i.undwall (19 7 5) 
Poor motivation 
High social 
desirability 
Younger 
Inexperience 
Rejects dependency Rejects dependency 
Garfield (197 8) 
Age difference~ 
denied 
Dislikes patient Rates patient's 
attractiveness low 
Dissimilar 
backgro•.:nd 
Male 
Dissimilar 
background 
Dissimilar 
expectations 
Lon~ waiting lists 
Rates vrognosh; 
roor 
llissjmi l a r. 
e>xpect~tions 
Note. Each f:u·tor liRted is specifically mentioned by one or Hore reviewers as n cnuse of pre1Mtu1:e terrnlnation. Also l !sted 
Hre f ac.tors rejected by eac.b review. In these· cases, "denied" is added to the 1:1 sting. 
Flgure I. (Contlnued). 
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tive testing (Gibby et al., 1954; McNair et al., 1963). Frank et al. 
(1957) rated motivation from patients' retrospective self-reports. 
They found the variable significant only for comparisons with those 
who failed to come for even a single session. Once contact was 
initiated other factors assumed preeminence. Whether psychological 
mindedness or motivation adds anything beyond that explained by con-
cepts such as expectancy match remains to be proven. 
Suggestibility (item 3) has been investigated by the Johns 
Hopkins group. It has been measured using the sway test, in which the 
patient is blindfolded and given the repeated suggestion that he or 
she is falling backwards. When degree of motion is coded, the "swayer" 
can be identified with 67% accuracy as a continuer (more than three 
sessions) and the nonswayer is likely to drop out in a similar percent-
age of cases (Imber et al., 1956). A replication found marginally 
significant differences in the expected direction (Frank et al., 1957). 
Presumably the treatment is enhanced by the suggestible subject's 
dependence on the therapist. Yet, judges' ratings of patient depen-
dence were not significantly related to perseverance (Garfield et al., 
1963) and therapist reaction to dependent verbalizations by the patient 
was found to be unrelated to continuing (Caracena, 1965). Baekeland 
and Lundwall (1975) indicate that extremes of dependence or counter-
dependence are bad signs, and counterdependence is a hallmark of 
dropouts from alcoholism treatment (Mozdzierz, Macchitelli, Conway, 
& Krauss, 1973). Yet, the verdict is still out on general psychiatric 
outpatients. It is likely that the importance of suggestibility and 
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dependence are found in interaction with specific situations rather 
than on a trait level. Winder, Ahmad, Bandura, and Roo (1962) com-
pared therapists responses to dependent verbalizations (item 24) by 
patients leaving by the lOth session or remaining past the 20th. 
While there were no significant differences in overall dependent 
behavior or its acceptance, almost 100% accurate discrimination was 
achieved for this small sample when therapist's response to patient's 
verbalization of dependence on the therapist was measured. Dis-
couraging responses led to premature termination in each case. More 
research is clearly needed, although existing data is promising. 
Cartwright's (1955) explanation of the "failure zone" in terms of 
difficulties in negotiating a satisfactory relationship offers a con-
vergent theoretical perspective that could be used in research. 
The relationship of diagnosis (item 4) to duration in therapy 
is controversial, as indicated by differences among the major reviews. 
In part, this is a function of the way in which the term is used: 
the wider the scope, the more likely that some element will be shown 
to differentiate. In the literature reviewed, the weight of the nega-
tive evidence is heavy. No differences among diagnostic groupings 
were reported by Brown and Kosterlitz (1964), Fiester et al. (1974), 
Katz and Solomon (1958), Lorr et al. (1958), or Mensh and Golden 
(1951). Number of symptoms, (Lorr et al., 1958), degree of pathology 
(Conrad, 1954), and severity and duration of illness (Katz & Solomon, 
1958) were also unrelated. However, Frank et al. (1957) found pa-
tients stayed in treatment if they had been ill longer or if symptoms 
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fluctuated. These researchers also found those complaining of anxiety 
or depression remained. Other experiments indicate that specific symp-
toms correlate with premature termination: absense of anxiety 
(Freedman, Englehardt, Hankoff, Glick, Kaye, Buckwald, & Stark, 1958; 
Kotkov, 1958); absence of depression (Straker et al., 1967); or 
alcoholic, sociopathic, or paranoid features (Sherry, 1977; Straker et 
al., 1967). But conflicting results appear when individual symptoms 
are assessed. In contrast with Sherry's results, Freedman and his 
associates found less suspiciousness or hostility among the ambula-
tory schizophrenics leaving treatment early. Apparently they were 
functioning well enough that treatment was discretionary. Similarly, 
Heilbrun's (1962) dropouts describe themselves as better adjusted 
then did continuers. People seek therapy for various reasons: 
because they want to change or because their pathology is so evident 
that they are pressured to seek help. Any of a variety of symptoms 
(including items 12, 13, 14 & 16 from Figure 1) may lead a person to 
treatment. Because of this diversity, it is unlikely that diagnosis, 
severity of impairment, or presence of specific target symptoms will 
consistently discriminate terminators from remainers. Kotkov (1958) 
found neurotics and personality disorders overrepresented among con-
tinuers. Dodd (1970) found more psychotic reactions or neurotics. 
To summarize these observations in the context of earlier reviews, 
little more specificity can be expected than that remainers are likely 
to be in more acute distress, and therefore, to be experiencing more 
problems with anxiety or depression than will terminators. 
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Previous psychotherapy (item 6) characterizes those who remain 
in therapy. Since Brandt (1965) noted this finding in three of five 
studies reviewed, similar results have been reported by Fiester et 
al. (1974) and Sherry (1977). In part, this may represent the develop-
ment of a chronic population who depend on clinics but never attain 
maximum benefit. More optimistically, initial therapy experiences 
may educate the consumer as to process of treatment so that later ther-
apy is begun with more realistic expectations. 
Demographic variables have generally failed to differentiate 
dropouts from continuers. Race (item 7) is the most problematic. 
Three studies reviewed (Fiester et al., 1974; Mensh & Golden, 1951; 
Overall & Aronson, 1963) find no differences, while three others re-
port whites are likely to stay longer (Dodd, 1970; Lorr et al., 1958; 
Rosenthal & Frank, 1958). Garfield (1978) argues that race differences 
are usually an indirect expression of social class. But two of the 
experiments finding differences evaluated socioeconomic status and 
found minimal effects. Further studies in which race is assessed 
with class controlled are needed to resolve the issue. Males are 
found to remain in treatment longer than women in three studies 
reviewed (Brown & Kosterlitz, 1964; Rosenthal & Frank, 1958; Weiss 
& Schaie, 1958). Heilbrun (1973) suggests that traditionally femin-
ine clients will have difficulties with a male therapist's passive or 
detached role. Five other studies found no sex differences (item 8). 
Nine experiments reported no age differences (item 21). When age 
proved important, Katz and Solomon (1958) found old terminators, Sherry 
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(1977) lost young patients, and Brown and Kosterlitz (1964) found 
disproportionate termination at both ends of the age spectrum. The 
inconsistency suggests an artifactual or sample specific basis for 
significant differences. Marital status discriminated in only two of 
eight studies. Weiss & Schaie (1958) found single patients to be con-
tinuers, while Katz and Solomon (1958) found both single and married 
clients remained longer than those with broken relationships. On 
balance, the evidence from this review leads to the same conclusions 
reached by Dodd (1970) and Garfield (1978) in denying the importance 
of age, sex, and marital status. 
Dodd found differences based on religion in two of four 
studies. This review also found two samples with differences. Lorr 
et al. (1958) had relatively few Jewish terminators. Dodd (1970) 
had Protestant continuers, although this pattern failed on cross-
validation. A lack of significant effects attributable to religion 
characterized four other reports (Fiester et al., 1974; Katz & 
Solomon, 1958; Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956; Weiss & Schaie, 1958). Demo-
graphic variables have generated conflicting results, but no clinically 
significant pattern has emerged and no theoretical basis has been 
developed to justify their continued inclusion. Most likely demo-
graphic variables are reported so frequently because they are easily 
quantifiable and readily available in archival sources. 
A cluster of variables relating to the patients social skills 
has appeared in the literature. Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) listed 
both an unstable, nomadic lifestyle and social isolation (items 15 and 
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17) among the correlates of premature termination from therapy. Both 
characteristics indicate a lack of enduring interpersonal attachments 
that should be reflected in a shallow or unstable relationship in 
therapy. But experimental studies are contradictory. The Johns 
Hopkins group found more social ineffectiveness among dropouts in one 
study (Nash et al., 1957) but no difference in another (Frank et al., 
1957). Dropouts in this latter study, however, presented a history of 
fewer group memberships or relationships. McNair and his associates 
(1963) found that it was the continuers who were more retiring, as 
rated on the Gilford-Zimmerman Sociability Scale. But a previous 
study by the same group (Lorr et al., 1962) had failed to find dif-
ferences on the Sociability or Friendliness scales or on the Leary 
Interpersonal Checklist. Freedman et al. (1958) found, in keeping with 
their expectation that dropouts were healthier, that these patients 
were more active and involved with others. Once again, the inconsis-
tency of the evidence makes it impossible to endorse Baekeland and 
Lundwall's enumeration of patient characteristics discriminating drop-
outs from therapy continuers. 
No other patient characteristic reviewed, including the per-
cent of disability compensation in studies of veterans (Lorr et al., 
1958; Mensh & Golden, 1951; Rubenstein & Lorr, 1956), was found to 
be significant in one study and replicated in another. Such results 
have led some researchers (Fiester & Rudestam, 1975; Frank et al., 
1957; Garfield et al., 1963) to comment on their surprise at the lack 
of potency of patient differences and to turn their scrutiny to state 
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variables or therapist character traits. However, this review has 
confirmed the importance of some factors. The terminator is likely 
to be characterized by some combination of the following: low socio-
economic status, with associated impoverishment in intelligence, ver-
bal skills, cooperation, or productivity in therapy (Rorschach R); 
somatic concerns; low distress, with less anxiety or depression in 
evidence; less experience with psychotherapy; and difficulties entering 
a dependent relationship. One other abstract characteristic deserves 
consideration because it recurs in the work of several different re-
searchers. Usually this comment appears in the summary of discussion 
almost as an intuitive footnote. Those who persevere in therapy seem 
to bring all projects begun to closure. Rubenstein and Lorr (1956) 
talk about the combination of impulse-control and frustration tolerance 
which results in a certain stick-to-it-iveness. Garfield et al. (1963) 
call them achievers. Frank et al. (1957) find evidence of this per-
severance in continuing group activities, and in finishing a stage of 
education (at whatever level) rather than quitting midway. These 
authors felt this to be the only true personality trait represented 
among several related to the interaction of different features of the 
therapeutic situation, predicting continuation in therapy. It has 
not been measured in a standard or specific way. But perhaps there 
is some cogency in calling such patients the ones who persevere in 
treatment. 
Therapist characteristics. In an interpersonal activity such 
as therapy, it is clear that characteristics of the therapist also 
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contribute significantly to the patient's experience. Confirmation 
of this notion is found in the long training of mental health pro-
fessionals and in the frequent discussion in the applied literature 
of how the therapist uses his self to further the treatment. Some 
studies have examined the early dropout phenomenon with an eye to the 
therapist's contribution, and, in a few cases, to the interaction or 
match of the patient and counselor. This review will begin with gen-
eral/demographic characteristics, move on to more treatment-specific 
qualities, and end by discussing interacting features. Because it has 
generated such a volume of studies, expectancy match, a special case 
of interaction, will be considered in a separate section of this re-
view. 
Despite Baekeland and Lundwall's (1975) contention to the con-
trary, there is no direct relationship between therapist sex and 
treatment dropouts (Lorr et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Sullivan 
et al., 1958). Nor is there an interaction between sex of therapist 
and sex of patient (Mendelsohn, 1966; Saltzman et al., 1976). Hiler 
(1958) did find differences attributable to therapist sex in studying 
the interaction with patient productivity. It will be recalled that 
patients producing few responses on the Rorschach are likely to ter-
minate in the first sessions. Hiler found that female therapists 
lose fewer of their nonproductive patients. But this was offset across 
all clients because they tended to lose more of the patients with high 
R. For the predominantly male samples in the studies reviewed, thera-
pist sex (item 26 on Figure 1) does not seem to be a relevant variable 
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in dropout rate. Studies on the overlapping variables of race and 
socioeconomic background of the therapist similarly find little direct 
effect· Yamamoto, James, Bloombaun, and Hatten (1967) found that 
therapists scoring high on ethnocentrism lost proportionally more 
blacks than whites by the sixth ses'sion than did their less ethno-
centric counterparts. This finding leads reviewers to conclude: 
"Research does suggest that the attitudes and biases of the therapist -
for example, in regard to blacks, lower-class people, and women may 
be more important than the demographic issues themselves" (Parloff, 
Waskow, & Wolfe, 1978). In session behavior is more predictive than 
the therapist's demographic background. 
There is clearly a therapist contribution to the dropout 
question. Gibby et al. (1954) found that some therapists were able 
to retain the unproductive patient. Hiler (1958) found the same 
pattern and suggested that therapist warmth and sex were critical 
mediator variables. McNair et al. (1963) also found a group of 
therapists who seemed to select and retain a disproportionate number 
of predicted quitters. But they were unable to discriminate this 
group by sex, profession, experience, amount of personal therapy, A-B 
type, judged competence, or liking for the patient. 
The source of these therapist effects remain elusive. Studies 
report failure to discriminate based on professional discipline (Lorr 
et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Sullivan et al., 1958). Reviewers 
see experience as important (Dodd, 1970; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970), 
with Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) finding six of seven articles 
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indicating that experience is important. Of the studies reviewed 
here, only two considered experience significant, and no comparisons 
were presented in one (Fiester & Rudestam, 1975) while the other 
compared medical students to residents (Dodd, 1976). No difference 
was found in length of stay as a function of therapist experience in 
a number of standard studies from the literature (Caracena, 1965; Lorr 
et al., 1958; McNair et al., 1963; Saltzman et al., 1976; Sullivan et 
al., 1958) which were available to the reviewers. This review con-
cludes that faith in the central importance of experience has blinded 
others to the conflicting evidence on the subject. Further research, 
including this study, must evaluate this variable. There is more 
support for the related concept of therapist competence. McNair et 
al. (1963) found no differences and Garfield et al. (1963) found only 
a trend for the competent to retain more clients. But Hiler (1958) 
found productive patients remained for those rated most competent by 
judges (55% as compared to 29% kept by less competent therapists), and 
Saltzman et al. (1976) found a significant relationship between con-
tinuing and patients' ratings of therapist commitment and competence 
after the third session. 
Studies of therapist personality traits offer mixed results. 
The often-examined A-B type offers little to the explanation of the 
dropout phenomenon (McNair et al., 1962, 1963). Reviewers have sug-
gested that therapists must permit dependency (Baekeland & Lundwall, 
1975; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970). Caracena (1965) and Winder et al. 
(1962) found no significant differences, but these results may be 
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attributed to the high acceptance of dependence in their therapist 
sample. When patients expressed direct dependence on them personally 
(item 24), therapists did respond differently. And here the accep-
tance versus avoidance of dependence during the first two sessions was 
almost 100% accurate in predicting length of treatment (Winder et al., 
1962). Conversely, the detached therapist may discourage patients 
remaining in treatment. This may be particularly important to the 
traditionally oriented woman who expects to be able to be dependent 
on an active male therapist (Heilbrun, 1973). Kamin and Coughlin 
(1963) interviewed patients after the conclusion of treatment. Most 
criticisms from both sexes focused on the quality of the relationship, 
specifically, on the perception of therapists as being silent and aloof. 
Hiler (1958) failed to find the expected disproportionate attrition of 
unproductive patients of passive therapists. But Saltzman et al. 
(1976) found that those who ultimately dropped out before the tenth 
session rated their therapists significantly lower on concern, parti-
cipation, and commitment through the first five sessions. By the 
third session these patients also felt they had experienced less 
respect and understanding from their therapist. Along the same lines, 
Lesser (1961) found low therapist empathy related to early termination. 
The importance of the counselor's warmth (item 23) is stressed in 
Dodd's (1970) review and in Hiler's (1958) report that it removed the 
preexisting tendency for the unproductive patient to leave early. 
But Freedman et al. (1958) failed to find a main effect for therapist 
warmth with their schizophrenic population. Instead, there was a 
109 
significant interaction in which there were more remainers when a warm 
therapist worked with a patient who acknowledged his illness or a 
detached therapist was matched with a denier. This last finding re-
emphasizes the power of the interaction during the session as a deter-
minant of premature termination of treatment. On the balance, however, 
patients will be more likely to continue if their therapists are able 
to accept dependency; be active and involved; and offer the facilita-
tive conditions of respect, empathy, and warmth. It is likely that it 
is through these variables that any contribution of therapist experi-
ence or competence is expressed. 
The importance of interaction is also evident in the predictive 
value of therapist liking for the patient (item 25) and interest in 
the presenting problem. Despite the failure of McNair et al. (1963) 
to find a significant relationship, the tendency to lose the disliked 
patient is stressed by reviewers (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975; Garfield, 
1978; and Meltzoff & Kornreich, 1970) and empirically supported by 
Caracena (1965) and Strickland and Crowne (1963). Moreover, the ef-
fect is mutual. Kamin and Coughlin (1963) found that 70% of patients 
with positive feelings toward their therapist rated themselves as 
improved after treatment, compared to 0% improvement for those who 
disliked the counselor. Interest in the patient's problem was found 
to relate to longer continuation in research by McNair et al. (1963). 
Similarly, Garfield et al. (1963) found willingenss to accept the 
patient into therapy associated with the patient's length of treatment. 
A good deal of outcome research has focused on the match of 
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the patient and therapist in terms of personality or background. The 
field is complex, with researchers variously championing the value of 
similarity, complementarity, or positing a curvilinear relationship 
between degree of therapeutic success and similarity (Parloff et al., 
1978). A powerful argument can be made that pairs from a similar back-
ground will have the advantage in ease of communication, shared values, 
and common expectancies. McNair et al. (1962) adopt such an approach 
in suggesting type B therapists, those with interests in skilled labor 
and technical occupations, may have more in common with the predom-
inantly lower class client seen at a Veterans Administration Clinic. 
In the absence of contradicting evidence, this review accepts the 
contention that similarity in background (item 28) encourages perse-
verance in treatment (Baekeland & Lundwall, 1975; Meltzoff & Kornreich, 
1970). Mendelsohn (1966) compared staff and clients on the Meyers 
Briggs Type Indicator to assess the importance of similarity in cogni-
tive style. The relevance of the results is attenuated since the 
study used students reporting for one to six sessions of educational 
or vocational counseling. It is questionable whether such results can 
be generalized to the psychopathological veterans considered in the 
present study. But Mendelsohn found cognitive dissimilarity led to 
early termination, while the similar pairs were variable in duration of 
treatment. He concluded that "similarity is something of a necessary 
condition for continuation but it is certainly not a sufficient condi-
tion as well" (p. 231). 
Expectancy match. A great deal of research has been focused 
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on expectancies. Based on the model of placebo effects in medicine, 
it has been argued that therapeutic results depend on the mobiliza-
tion of the client's hopes more than on specific techniques (Frank, 
1968). Investigations have included attempts to manipulate patient 
expectancies. So true experiments have been done, in addition to the 
naturalistic studies relied upon so exclusively in the studies re-
viewed to this point. To avoid a common confusion, expectancy for 
improvement, which includes prognosis, will be distinguished from 
match of role expectations, which is a variant on the similarity 
issue addressed above. 
Expectations for improvement is a translation of Frank's 
measure of hope. It may be operationalized as a single global measure 
(as in therapists' prognostic rating), as a questionnaire, or as the 
difference between current and anticipated self-descriptions. Scores 
on one of these measures are crosstabulated with an outcome measure. 
Wilkins (1973) has criticized the frequent use of global ratings of 
improvement or self-report, because of the possibility of self-serving 
bias. Martin and his associates (Martin, Moore, Stern & McNairy, 1977; 
Martin, Stern, Moore, & Lindsey, 1977), administering the MMPI at 
intake and discharge as a measure of change, were able to demonstrate 
significant correlations of improvement with expectation as rated by 
therapists and by patients undergoing their first course of inpatient 
treatment. From both perspectives, expectation was more highly cor-
related with the initial MMPI than the one at discharge. If expec-
tancies were causative, the opposite would be expected, namely, there 
112 
should be more impact on the final measure of adjustment. Martin 
et al. concluded that both patients and therapists are able to read 
preexisting clues in making their judgments about probably outcomes. 
Expectations are predictions. 
Outpatients may be less successful in predicting outcome, or 
at least their expectations are not clearly related to likelihood of 
continuing in psychotherapy. Heine and Trosman (1960) found no dif-
ference in expectations for improvement among those terminating before 
or after the fifth session. Garfield et al. (1963) found role and 
outcome expectancies unrelated to length of stay or change. Goldstein 
(1960) found duration of treatment and subjective ratings of change 
were unrelated to initial expectations for improvement of 15 students 
treated at a university clinic. 
Therapist expectations for improvement may be more important. 
Goldstein's (1960) therapists' predictions were significantly related 
to duration of treatment and degree of improvement. Sherry (1977) 
examined 71 patient/therapist pairs at a Veterans Administration clin-
ic and found that a negative prognosis was more likely for those who 
eventually terminated. But Garfield et al. (1963) cautioned against 
assuming a simple main effect for therapist outcome expectations. 
Match of expectations is important. A disproportionate number of ter-
minators were found to have therapists expecting more change than anti-
cipated by the patient. Such cases may well be examples of disagree-
ment about therapeutic goals rather than failed therapy (Baekeland & 
Lundwall, 1975). 
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A number of studies examine the importance of expectancy match 
in regard to treatment goals, duration, and roles (item 29 of Figure 1). 
Most report them to be important. Heine and Trosman (1960) found 
significantly more remainers if patients and therapists agreed on 
treatment aims (symptom relief through medication and information or 
behavior change through talk and advice). However, Gliedman, Stone, 
Frank, Nash, and Imber (1957) found terminators only slightly and non-
significantly more discrepant with conventional treatment goals than 
were continuers. Sandler (1975) and Sherry (1977) found that degree 
of agreement in predictions of duration was significantly related to 
the likelihood of continuing in treatment. 
Congruence in role expectations is significantly related to 
remaining in therapy according to reports by Gulas (1974), Heine and 
Trosman (1960), Overall and Aronson (1963), Rapaport (1976), Sandler 
(1975), and Straker et al. (1967). Some dissenting reports have been 
found. Garfield et al. (1963) found judges ratings of congruence 
unrelated to therapy duration. Sherry (1977) obtained mixed results. 
Terminators were more discrepant in regard to the types of techniques 
used. But remainers were less likely to agree about expectations for 
therapist detachment. Horenstein and Houston (1976) argue that too 
much similarity may be counterproductive, as it minimizes the need to 
change. They found a quadratic trend. Remainers were moderately dis-
crepant. Those that were extremely congruent, like those patients who 
had inaccurate expectations, were more likely to terminate during the 
course of a three session orientation group. 
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Expectancy disconfirmation is a part of all therapy. Gliedman 
et al (1957) found that 71% of the dropouts and 63% of the continuers 
had goals for therapy that were at variance with those conventionally 
associated with insight oriented psychotherapy. Overall and Aronson 
(1963) found that their model patient found the treatment to be less 
active, supportive, and medically oriented than expected. Such dis-
crepancies were especially characteristic in the treatment of lower 
class patients and may be the basis of the social class effects dis-
cussed previously (Garfield, 1978; Heitler, 1976; Malzer, 1980). 
Some of the more recent studies reviewed (Rapaport, 1976; Sherry, 
1976) comment that even lower class patients have more accurate ex-
pectations than expected. It may be that pop psychologies and the 
greater visibility of the helping professions during the last decade 
have contributed to a greater public awareness of the therapy process. 
If a course of therapy continues, role expectancies converge (Gulas, 
1974; Sandler, 1975). The critical issue is not the fact of discrepant 
expectations but the way in which they are managed. Either differences 
of great magnitude or therapist insensitivity to their existence is 
likely to result in a brief and unsatisfactory course of treatment. 
Direct education has been used to correct mistaken assumptions. 
Hoehn-Saric, Frank, Imber, Nash, Stone, and Battle (1964) used a role 
induction interview to explain expected behaviors, realistic outcomes 
and when they should become apparent, and the nature and handling of 
superficial resistance. Using a true experimental design, with thera-
pists blind to the manipulation, patients given the education were 
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rated significantly better than controls on a variety of process and 
outcome variables. Relevant to the current study is the observation 
that experimental subjects attended an average of two more sessions 
during the four months of treatment evaluated. Later research by 
Sloane, Cristal, Pepernick, and Stapler (1970) clarified that it is 
the role socialization rather than hope induction that accounts for 
improvement. Heitler's (1976) review stresses that reduced attrition 
is a consequence of such efforts. 
Wilkins (1973) criticized the research of expectancies and 
questioned the spate of hopeful reports it has generated. Signifi-
cant results were attributed to reliance on global measures subject 
to demand characteristics. While this contention may be applicable 
to some, it is clearly not an explanation for all of the results re-
viewed. And these results have been remarkably consistent in showing 
that common role expectations (including estimates of duration and, 
possibly, of goals) are crucial for developing a sustained therapeutic 
relationship. Wilkins is correct, however, when he points out that 
expectancies are hypothetical mediating variables without direct or 
observable causal impact on length of treatment. People do not quit 
therapy becuase their understanding of the patient role is wrong. 
They quit because they feel frustrated with the lack of desired change. 
Expectancy is a summary label for a range of correlated beliefs and 
behaviors. But this name is preferable to other summary labels current 
in the field, particularly social class, because it implies something 
that is dynamic. Where social class evokes a sense of immutability 
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that can only be accommodated (perhaps by offering less ambitious 
forms of therapy), expectancies can be modified and altered. Direct 
education becomes feasible, whether formally through therapy sociali-
zation training or informally during the discussions in an intake in-
terview. The concept of expectancies is useful because of its explana-
tory power and because of the activist stance it offers for the clini-
cian. 
Other factors. While patient and therapist characteristics 
and the interaction between them are of central importance in deter-
mining continuation in treatment, the therapy operates within a wider 
clinic and community context. This context has been barely considered 
despite its evident importance. The general cultural attitude toward 
mental health and the patient role influence the likelihood of seeking 
out and persisting in treatment. As the mediator of these values, the 
family clearly plays an important role. Dengrove and Kutash (1950) 
in an impressionistic report suggest the lack of family support, par-
ticularly the expectation to "handle things on your own", is important. 
Freeman (1961) interviewed family members shortly after the return of 
a psychiatric inpatient. He found that those with low levels of in-
telligence and education were less positive about the treatment offered 
or the possibility of recovery, more likely to blame the expatient, and 
less likely to conceptualize the illness in the psychological terms that 
support further treatment. These attitudes are similar to those typi-
cal of lower class patie·ilts so often cited as the reasons for premature 
termination. Most discouraging is Freeman's conclusion that these 
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beliefs are not easily changed. Frank et al. (1957) obtained retro-
spective ratings from patients in which dropouts, compared with re-
mainers, said there were less advantages in continued treatment, less 
support, and more opposition from relatives. The theoretical impor-
tance of the family context and the limited empirical support available 
ratify Baekeland and Lundwall's (1975) call for more study of this 
area. 
The clinic environment, whether in terms of physical facilities 
or policy, also deserve more study. Feldman, Lorr, and Russell (1958) 
report that large VA clinics keep patients longer. Dengrove and Kutash 
(1950) list short sessions, therapist absenses, changes in treatment 
personnel, pretherapy hurdles, and doubts about confidentiality among 
the factors that discourage patients. The limited research available 
minimizes the importance of session length (Lorr et al., 1958) or 
frequency (Lorr et al., 1962). Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) sug-
gest that retention rates will increase if waiting lists are shortened, 
significant others are involved, and a range of therapeutic modalities 
are made available. Bailey et al. (1959) and Dodd (1970) found longer 
continuation if patients request and are offered medication, while 
Kotkov (1958) found that initial willingness to accept psychotherapy 
predicted persistence. So patients offered their choice of therapy 
type remain in treatment. Although Lorr et al. (1958) found no signi-
ficant differences across modalities, two studies from the John 
Hopkins team found higher termination rates among group therapy mem-
bers. Many drop out before the first session, suggesting initial 
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apprehensions (Frank et al., 1958). But even those attending a ses-
sion experience more attack and less support than those in individual 
therapy (Nash, Frank, Gliedman, Imber, & Stone, 1957). Although the 
termination rate may be higher from groups, "in many respects the 
psychological characteristics of the group therapy dropout parallel 
those of the dropout from individual psychotherapy" (Baekeland & 
Lundwall, 1975). For example, Yalom (1966) identified features such as 
intimacy problems, lack of insight and psychological sophistication, 
and lower socioeconomic status and education as characteristic of ter-
minators from groups. To summarize, the type of service offered, and 
its match to patient preferences, are important variables. But there 
is no need to look for separate profiles of terminators from different 
modalities. 
One last contextual issue to be considered is the contribution 
of so-called "reality factors". Therapy becomes impossible if it 
interferes with critical work or family tasks, if transportation ob-
stacles cannot be managed, or, most clearly, if the patient moves out 
of the area. Such difficulties are commonplace, especially among lower 
class clients. Garfield (1963) found 6 of 11 dropouts cited reality 
factors, as did at least 6 of 37 interviewed by Brandt (1964), 6 of 
21 inpatients leaving against medical advice (Scheer & Barton, 1974), 
and 5 of 35 group therapy droupouts interviewed by Yalom (1966). 
Such cases should not be included with the terminators in research 
attempting to identify psychological patterns of the patient or thera-
pist effecting length of treatment. Yet a majority of the studies 
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reviewed failed to specify how such cases are handled. This is a 
methodological problem. The current research project will exclude 
from consideration, among either terminator or remainer groups, those 
who quit therapy because of reality factors or are referred for treat-
ment elsewhere. 
This concludes the review of research on extrapatient factors 
involved in premature termination from psychotherapy. With the signif-
icant exception of research on patient expectancies, it is even more 
sketchy and unsystematized than that on patient factors. Accordingly, 
conclusions must be presented cautiously. Among the therapist vari-
ables contributing to early dropout are a lack of similarity or famil-
iarity with the patient's background; low competence, as evident in 
an inability to tolerate dependence, a detached or passive stance, and 
low levels of facilitative conditions; dislike of the patient or dis-
interest in the presenting problem; and an inability to bridge dis-
crepent expectations about the therapy process and outcome. A summary 
of all factors judged to have been empirically substantiated is pre-
sented in Figure 2. 
Self-consciousness and the treatment dropout phenomenon. 
It is clear that there has been no direct examination of self-con-
sciousness levels of terminators as compared to remainers. Theoreti-
cally, terminators would be expected to have extreme scores on the 
Self-Consciousness scale: high ratings corresponding to flight from 
therapy because of the anxiety elicited, low scores signifying lack of 
requisite skills and motivation to use insight oriented therapy. In 
Patient Factors: 
Low socioeconomic status 
Low intelligence 
Lack of verbal skills 
Lack of cooperation 
Somatic presentation 
Low anxiety or low depression 
No previous therapy 
Counterdependence, inability to tolerate intimate 
relationships 
History of failure to complete projects 
Therapist Factors: 
Low competence 
Inability to tolerate dependence 
Detached and passive 
Low levels of respect, warmth, and empathy 
Dislike for patient 
Disinterest in presenting problems 
Interaction Factors: 
Dissimilar background or cognitive style 
Unresolved dissimilar role expectations 
Contextual Factors: 
Lack of family support 
Group therapy 
Failure to provide desired treatment modality 
Other reality factors 
Figure 2. Summary of variables associated with premature 
termination from psychotherapy. 
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the absense of direct measurement, the task is to reevaluate variables 
that may be conceptually related to self-consciousness. 
The patient characteristics reviewed relate termination to the 
lack of requisite self-monitoring skills. The closest conceptual 
parallel to SC is psychological mindedness. Whether this is opera-
tionalized as the lack of verbal skills or as focus on somatic inter-
pretations of the presenting problem, the likely terminator is portray-
ed as one who is unused to examining behaviors or affective states and 
comparing them to internal standards. The observation that low levels 
of anxiety or depression are typical of terminators also suggests low 
levels of self-consciousness. It appears that the dropout enters 
therapy without the habit of self-monitoring, and, presumably, without 
the skills to handle it productively. 
The demands of therapy, with the heavy emphasis on self-scruti-
ny, then propel the patient into an area for which he or she is ill 
prepared. If high levels of self-consciousness lead to premature ter-
mination from therapy, as extrapolated from the findings that objective 
self-awareness (OSA) is avoided, then features of the therapist and 
context contributing to dropping out should be those likely to force 
self-consciousness on the patient. This seems to be the case with at 
least some of the variables found to predict premature termination. 
Group therapy produces more dropouts. It also should dramatically 
heighten social self-consciousness, and attendent anxiety. That this 
seems to be the case is evident in patient descriptions of experiencing 
the group as threatening and attacking. 
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The therapist's role, from the perspective of self-awareness 
theory, is to carefully manage the patient's self-monitoring so that 
internal standards can be accessed, to motivate desired behavior 
change, while debilitating anxiety is avoided. To this sensitive 
task, the therapist brings a number of tools. The active or directive 
therapist can distract the patient from excessive self-scrutiny. The 
supportive and empathic therapist can, in effect, desensitize the per-
son through the offering of facilitative conditions so that problematic 
areas of the patient's life can be explored without too much self-
criticism. Warmth, respect, and interest all communicate an acceptance 
that the patient can use as a model. Empathy indicates that an ex-
perience is understandable to another, while the nonjudgmental tone 
serves as a cue that self-chastisement is unnecessary. So therapist 
characteristics would be expected to be important mediators of length 
of stay. The silent or detached therapist is easily perceived as the 
judgmental other, heightening both self-scrutiny and anxiety, and so 
placing the therapist in the role of the passive accomplice in flight 
from treatment. In contrast, the competent therapist helps to manage 
self-consciousness by alternating among support, the implicit protec-
tion of encouraging dependence, the desensitization offered in com-
municating warmth and empathy, the modeling of expressions of attrac-
tion or interest in internal experiencing, and the distraction from or 
restructuring of internal standards that go with being directive. To 
use these skills with the deftness required for a successful outcome, 
the therapist must be very attuned to the patient's experience. Dis-
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similarity in expectation, background, or cognitive style contribute 
to premature termination because they block the "third ear" and so 
render inoperative the array of tools for managing self-consciousness. 
Self-awareness theory, as applied to the early stages of ther-
apy, would suggest that a patient will leave because of insufficient 
anxiety to motivate change or because of excessive anxiety resulting 
from an immoderate dose of self-scrutiny. Most of the patient charac-
teristics delineated as correlates of premature termination in Figure 
2 are hypothetically associated with the absense of self-scrutiny. 
Most of the therapist and interaction factors relate to excessive self-
consciousness developing in the patient. In this sense, OSA theory can 
draw together a number of disparate and seemingly unrelated sources of 
flight from therapy. The theory has the unique advantage of being able 
to explain both sources of early termination cited by Saltzman et al. 
(1976): lack of anxiety after the first session and dissatisfaction 
with the therapy relationship during the third to fifth visits. 
Personality Typology 
This research tests specific applications of self-awareness 
theory to two areas of clinical psychology. The last section relates 
to the first of them: the prediction of premature termination from 
therapy. This section will address the second, which is the distinction 
among personality types in the level and handling of self-awareness. 
A psychodynamic personality typology. The prevailing diag-
nostic nomenclature is inadequate for the purposes of this research. 
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The number of categories, even when restricted to functional disorders 
of adults, totaled a prohibitive 82 under DSMII and has risen with 
DSMIII (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, 1980). Distinctions 
between these diagnoses are notoriously unreliable (Spitzer & Fleiss, 
1974). Even when syndromes are discriminable, they may obscure rather 
than highlight important personality differences: "Although all the 
individuals described as having the same mental disorder show at 
least the defining features of the disorder, they may well differ in 
other important ways that may affect clinical management and outcome 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 6). This is especially 
true in diagnosing disorders of habit; a person may be classified 
because of behavior in a restricted area without reference to overall 
personality style and adaptation. These drawbacks more than offset 
the advantage of using the clinician's language system. 
A condensed and revised typology was developed for this study. 
It collapses a number of the dimensions that lead to the extensive 
and confusing scope of DSMII. First of all, it focuses on the pa-
tient's pervasive personality style or life style. Circumscribed 
behavior patterns (e.g., substance misuse or paraphilia) are not 
regarded as a substantial enough sampling of the individual's manner 
of relating to the world. Second, it collapses the DSMII distinctions 
between psychoticism, neuroticism, and personality disorders. Research 
suggests that degree of pathology is better represented on a continuum 
than as discrete categories (Eysenck, 1960; Luborsky, 1962). Clinical 
distinctions are also based on degree of anxiety and affective tone. 
125 
While fine discriminations in these two dimensions account for many 
of the diagnoses (in DSMII there were, for instance, five diagnoses 
in which depression is a defining element), they are seen as being 
symptomatic and more or less transient rather than basic to the pa-
tient's personality. 
When these dimensions are collapsed, the residual categories 
are personality types which function much like the Axis II diagnoses 
of DSMIII. That is, they describe the basic and sustained styles 
which give rise to and yet persist beyond the symptoms that lead pa-
tients to seek treatment. In this sense they resemble, and borrow 
from, typologies developed in psychoanalytic theory. The styles are 
described in terms of characteristic defenses, likely symptoms or 
complaints, typical manner of relating, and quality of the transfer-
ence. 
There is empirical as well as theoretical support for such a 
manner of conceptualizing core personality differences. Miller and 
Magaro (1977) successfully used cluster analysis to identify four 
distinct types. As with this research, they defined their types as 
applicable across the entire spectrum of adjustment, and they defined 
personality style in terms of "a specific combination of psychological 
defenses, cognitive and affective styles, belief and value systems, 
moral development, etc." (p. 460). Profiles were developed for hys-
teric, compulsive, depressive, and character disorder types. These 
were used to predict performance on a variety of brief personality 
measures (Rotter's Locus of Control Scale, Byrne's Repression-Sen-
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sitization Scale, etc.). The experimental hypotheses for each group 
specified which tests should be associated and the direction of devia-
tion from test means. Protocols were then factor analyzed, with re-
sults evaluated in terms of the number of predictions verified. When 
a sample of 107 Introductory Psychology students were used, the hys-
terical and character disorder types were validated. However, the 
compulsive and depressive styles overlapped. A replication with 130 
juniors and seniors with different majors, found increased discrimina-
tion between types. Five clusters emerged and 18 of 23 scale predic-
tions were verified. Hysterical (seven of eight predictions) and 
character disorder types (four of five predictions) were crossvali-
dated. The depressive cluster conformed to expectations (five of six 
scale predictions) and explained the most variance. However, the sec-
ond most important cluster represented an overlapping of hysterical 
and depressive features. The compulsive style was only "moderately 
supported", with two of four scale predictions confirmed. Scales 
loading for the four predicted types are listed in Figure 3. 
Miller and Magaro's (1977) findings offer general support for 
the validity of a brief typology and do much to clarify its content. 
Character disorder and hysterical types will be included in the current 
research scale. Depression will not be. Despite its important contri-
bution to the variance, Miller and Magaro's results support my convic-
tion that depression overlaps too many other clinical conditions to 
be considered a meaningfully discriminable personality style. 
The five personality types and descriptions, as given to 
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Hysteric: 
Empirically: altruistic, repressor, field dependent, 
extraverted, lowa neuroticism, low dogmatism, high sensation 
seeking; 
Descriptively: reliance on repression, global cognitive and 
affective style, suggestible, naive, dependent. 
Character Disorder: 
Empirically: high sensation seeking, Machievellian, 
extraverted, low altruism; 
Descriptively: egocentric, manipulative, highly developed 
social skills, lack of affect. 
Depressive: 
Empirically: low sensation seeking, sensitizer, field 
dependent, introverted, high neuroticism; 
Descriptively: cognitively rigid, lacks personal self-worth, 
obedient to authority, reduced satisfactions, prejudice 
toward outgroups. 
Compulsive: 
Empirically: field independent, introverted. 
Note. From Miller and Magaro (1977). 
aThe adjectives "low" and "high" indicate a score deviating more 
than .5 standard deviations from the grand mean. 
Figure 3. Characteristics of different personality styles. 
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clinicians, are listed in Figure 4. They were developed with the in-
tent of including the major personality styles while still preserving 
the economy of the scale and the clarity of distinction between styles. 
The choice of styles, and their description is influenced by 
psychoanalytic theorizing. The distinction between obsessive and hys-
terical styles, for instance, was made early on by Freud in his attempts 
to explain patients presenting with ideational versus physical symptoms 
(Freedman, Kaplan, & Sadock, 1972). At the first level, the scale 
draws on the tripartite model. With the consolidation of the superego, 
a second regulatory mechanism is available to assist the ego in the 
regulation of drives. Defects in superego development will lead to a 
personality distinct from those attributable to problems in ego devel-
opment. The sociopathic category is intended to represent those prob-
lems derived from the failure of the superego to operate effectively. 
Drives are acted out instead of being blocked from discharge (Pervin, 
1970). The references to substance abuse and conflict with authority 
capture this inability to delay impulse gratification. The likelihood 
of external compulsion to enter treatment is further testament to the 
absense of self-regulation. The sociopathic category is essentially 
equivalent to Miller and Magaro's (1977) empirically validated Charac-
ter Disorder type. Because it is traced to superego defects it is 
conceptually and clinically distinct from other typologies which de-
scribe different styles of ego functioning. 
One crucial aspect of ego functioning is management of defense 
mechanisms. Because individuals develop habitual defensive styles, the 
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Hysterical: overuse of repression; likely presents with somatic 
concerns or the feeling of being used in personal relation-
ships; exhibitionistic, dramatic; relates so that the 
therapist has a sense of engagement with the patient despite 
a focus on external events. 
Paranoid: projection prominent; presents with concerns about 
being isolated or deliberately abused by other people; 
relates vaguely and guardedly; therapist feels a strong pull 
to confirm the patient's perspective or else be confronted 
with the patient's underlying anger. 
Obsessive: isolation and intellectualization prominent; problems 
related to feared loss of control or, if loss of control has 
been experienced, feelings of depression, anger, and guilt; 
high expectations for personal productivity and morality; 
insight into thoughts and motives without affect; patient is 
controlling, and the interview may become so wordy as to 
become boring. 
Passive: schizoid and avoidant; may present with multiple fears 
and feelings of helplessness; inward focus on fantasy; 
history suggests lack of social skills and contacts; 
therapist may still feel detached after the interview; include: 
passive dependent, passive aggressive, and narcissistic char-
acters. 
Sociopathic: history of acting out tensions; mlnlmlzes problems, 
and likely attends the interview because of pressure from 
family, courts, or other outside source; may be problems 
with alcohol or drugs; appears socially skilled and com-
fortable, and yet the contact remains superficial and the 
relationship feels tenuous. 
Figure 4. Personality types and descriptions. 
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analysis of primary defenses is an important aspect of dynamically-
oriented assessment (Dewald, 1971), and a convenient means of dis-
tinguishing personality styles. Again, hysterical and obsessive 
styles are easiest to separate. Repression limits access to conscious-
ness of problematic contents, resulting in the apparently naive and 
global cognitive style of the hysteric. In contrast, the ideational 
defenses of the obsessive split off the affective component while 
permitting verbal awareness of the content (Doyle, 1968). There-
sult is a characteristically detached insight, with emotions restricted 
or appearing convulsively (Kennedy, 1977). The tension in both of 
these defensive styles is internal: conscious versus unconscious, 
affect versus cognition. This contrasts with the remaining character 
styles, in which the conflict is between self and other, or, more 
accurately, between internal representations of the self and the ex-
ternal object. This is clearest in paranoids, whose "capacity for 
delusions represents a confusion in their sense of identity between 
what is part of their personality and what is separate from it" 
(Kennedy, 1977, p. 302). To some degree all use of projection and 
introjection harkens back to their developmental precursors, the con-
fusion of the self-boundary that occurs prior to the cognitive dif-
ferentiation of self and other (Gedo & Goldberg, 1973). In combina-
tion with underlying anger, this explains why the paranoid's world is 
experienced as dangerous. To the passive type, for whom the world is 
also experienced as threatening, the defense is characteristically 
avoidance. This may include withdrawal into a dependent relationship, 
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if available. The upshot is a retrenchment that leaves the narcis-
sistic character with impoverished object relations or restricts the 
accessible world of the phobic. 
There is a development flavor to much of the preceding descrip-
tion of defensive styles. It is not accidental. Defenses become 
available in a developmental sequence (Fisher & Greenberg, 1977; 
Gedo & Goldberg, 1973). Repression, isolation, projection, and with-
drawal are successively more primary and primitive (DeWald, 1971). 
Indeed, each of the personality styles can be presented as represen-
tative of a step in the developmental sequence posited by psycho-
analytic theorists. This will be done in the succeeding paragraph. 
But a clarification is required first. Because of the strong etio-
logical focus of analytic theorizing, most psychic phenomena are 
related to development events. This includes degree of psychopathology. 
Freud explained progressively more severe disturbance through refer-
ence to earlier developmental arrest or regression to more primitive 
stages. The implication would be that typologies representing earlier 
psychosexual stages would also include more disturbed patients. But 
this would be an oversimplification. Experiences at later develop-
mental stages may result in the secondary automony of certain core ego 
functions (Gedo & Goldberg, 1973). Even a regression from the oedipal 
to the oral stage may not lead to as much evident pathology as develop-
mental arrest at, say, the phallic stage. So while the linking of 
personality type to developmental level may help elucidate the primary 
defense, the likely presenting problem, and the basic interpersonal 
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stance, it does not define the degree of psychopathology. Type re-
mains independent of degree of disturbance. 
Each of the four types of ego-functioning can be roughly 
identified with a different developmental stage. Passive types are 
most clearly linked with oral characteristics. As hypothesized by 
Abraham and empirically confirmed since oral traits are most pertinent 
to the dimensions of dependent/independent, passive/active, and close 
to others/distant from others (Fisher & Greenberg, 1977). The passive 
and avoidant emphasis of the typology, with its phobic and pessimistic 
stance, captures the likely response to oral frustration. At this 
stage, the possibilities of interaction is limited to the excessive 
dependence of self-object union or to the absense of contact of the 
autistically self-preoccupied. In the passive character these quali-
ties are apparent in the therapist's sense of detachment or in the 
dependent pull underlying the passive dependent or passive-aggressive 
style of relating (Freedman, Kaplan, & Sadock, 1972). The paranoid 
type is associated with frustration of oral-aggressive drives. The 
lasting insecurity and ambivalence about trusting relationships is 
evident in the patient's guarded style and suspicions of others. The 
underlying rage communicated in therapy is an attempt to avoid depen-
dence as well as an expression of aggressive drives (Kennedy, 1977). 
The obsessive has traditionally been associated with the anal period 
(Fisher & Greenberg, 1977). A central and continuing theme of the 
anal character is the tension between defiance and the feared loss of 
love if the rage surfaces (MacKinnon & Michels, 1971). So the rigid 
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moral standards, the feared loss of control, the isolation of emotion, 
and the controlling style of relating can be seen as sequellae to the 
attempt to control anger and obstinance (Kennedy, 1977). The link 
between the phallic stage and the hysterical style is evident in that 
the exhibitionism and demand for attention of the hysteric closely 
parallels the child's assertiveness and beginning sexual identity 
awareness during the phallic period (Pervin, 1970). 
The analogy between four of the personality types and the psy-
chosexual stages has three purposes. First, it should accent the 
central issues and relationship styles of each style. Second, it 
indicates the distinctness of each type, and so justifies their in-
clusion in the typology. Third, and finally, it is intended to con-
vey the sense that this list of character types is reasonably compre-
hensive. While there might be some quibbling about descriptive phrases 
for one or another specific type, the descriptions are generally con-
ventional and noncontroversial. The disagreement that might be antic-
ipated relates more to the number and choice of character types. This 
study has attempted to make use of basic psychodynamic categories and 
to justify their use by indicating how they collectively cover the 
range of personality types suggested by the tripartite and genetic 
models from psychoanalysis. The presence of empirical evidence of 
the importance of at least two of the categories adds further support 
for the assumed validity of the scales. 
Personality type and level of self-awareness. Among the 
characteristics that differ across personality types, the level and 
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means of handling objective self-awareness can be expected to vary. 
While I know of no studies within abnormal psychology or self-aware-
ness research that bear directly on this issue, there is some indirect 
experimental work and good theoretical grounds for expecting dif-
ferences. 
Eysenk (1960) has attempted to redefine conventional diagnos-
tic categories in terms of his factor analytic schema. In the course 
of doing so, he presents replicated and consistent findings that 
neurotic groups, at least, vary along the dimension of introversion-
extraversion. Obsessives are highly introverted, or attuned to their 
internal, subjective world. Hysterics and psychopaths are on the op-
posite, extraverted pole. Obsessives can be expected to be the most 
self-conscious of the three groups overall. At the subscale level, 
obsessives would have the higher scores on private self-conscious-
ness (PR-SC), because of their attention to at least their internal 
ideational status. But hysterics and psychopaths, with the extra-
verts' greater general social skills, may well have higher scores on 
public self-consciousness (PU-SC). 
Table 9 summarizes the expected rankings of the five person-
ality types on the Self-Consciousness scale. In deriving these hypoth-
eses, the empirical evidence discussed above is supplemented by ex-
pectations based on the typical defenses and interpersonal style of 
each group. Passive types are expected to be the most self-conscious 
overall. Their self-preoccupation should be evident in high scores on 
PR-SC, while their social anxiety (SA-SC) is expected to be highest 
135 
Table 9 
Expected Rank Order of Personality Types 
Personality type 
Passive 
Obsessive 
Hysterical 
Sociopathic 
Paranoid 
on the Self-Consciousness Scale 
Self-consciousness subscale 
Private Public 
1 2 
1 2 
2 1 
3 1 
3 3 
Total self-
Social Anxiety consciousness 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
3 4 
3 5 
Note. The group mean will be expected to differ significantly from 
that of any group with a different number. An identical ranking has 
been given whenever there is no basis for assuming significant dif-
ferences. 
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since their phobic/avoidant style entails experiencing anxiety 
regularly and consciously. Passive types are regarded as being 
intermediate in their sensitivity to the social impact; less of their 
self-image is involved with impression management than would be the 
case for hysterics and sociopaths. Obsessives will be highly self-
aware, as evident in their capacity to report internal events. However, 
the isolation of affect should limit their cognizance of the anxiety 
that arises from their self-scrutiny. 
Hysterics are renowned for their naivete. Despite their 
ability to express superficial emotionality, there is an absense of 
appreciation of internal states and motivation that will lower their 
subscale scores on PR-SC. Even the characteristic daydreaming centers 
on recognition in an interpersonal context. Accordingly, their highest 
ranking will come in the area of public self-consciousness, which 
emphasizes appearance and social impression. The hysteric tends to 
experience less anxiety than other personality types (MacKinnon & 
Michels, 1971). The fluid defenses, the reliance on repression, and 
quick ventilation through emotional expression all are expected to 
contribute to lower scores on SA-SC. As a consequence,hysterics should 
have lower overall Self-Consciousness scores than passive types or 
obsessives. A somewhat similar profile should apply for sociopaths. 
They will have their highest subscale ranking on public self-conscious-
ness, since sensitivity to the impact of their interpersonal style is 
basic to obtaining their gratifications through other people. But 
this external, goal-oriented focus will curtail internal attention and 
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lead to low scores on PR-SC. Their response on the SA-SC is problem-
atic. Conventionally, sociopaths are regarded as unable to experience 
guilt or anxiety. But this has been interpretted differently: 
They exhibit little if any anxiety, but this is a result, according 
to some, of their low tolerance for anxiety. Many of the dynamic 
mechanisms employed by the antisocial personality react very early 
to fend off, defend against, or snuff out the slightest bit of 
anxiety • • • . What seems like an indifferent exterior may be the 
outer evidence of a massive psychological effort to hold anxiety 
at bay. (Kennedy, 1977, pp. 283-284) 
Presumably, the quick denial of anxiety will prevent their reporting 
concerns about social evaluation on the SC scale. Combined with low 
scores on private self-consciousness, they should be ranked low on the 
scale as a whole. 
The lowest SC scores, overall and on each subscale, are ex-
pected from the paranoid patient. His whole dynamics force a vigilant 
focus on what is happening "out there" that must severely limit atten-
tion to internal ideation and affect. Even the scale measuring anxiety 
in social settings, a characteristic experience for the paranoid, will 
have a low score because the items are phrased in the first person. 
The paranoid sees the world in terms of "they do" rather than "I feel". 
Related to this personality style is the guarded response to all re-
quests for information, including the research questionnaire. The pa-
tient's response bias will compound his phenomenological lack of self-
consciousness and lead to very low SC scores. So the paranoid is hy-
pothesized to be lowest overall and not significantly higher than any 
other group on any subscale. 
In the absense of previous experimentation in this area, the 
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hypothesized relationship between personality type and level of self-
consciousness must be regarded as tentative. This is particularly 
true in regard to predictions of subscale rankings. At the most con-
servative, the total SC mean for the passive and obsessives would be 
expected to be significantly higher than that from the other three 
types. Additionally, the personality types will have identifiably 
different levels of self-consciousness. This assumes, as this chapter 
has argued, that the five styles can be reliably classified, are mean-
ingfully distinct from one another, and that self-awareness is an im-
portant contributer to their distinctiveness. The detailed hypotheses 
provide a predictive standard in terms of which to evaluate the via-
bility of these assumptions. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
This research constitutes an introductory exploration of the 
clinical implications of self-focused attention. Different aspects 
evaluate the relationship of self-consciousness to degree of pathology, 
premature termination from therapy, and personality type. For the sake 
of clarity, results will be presented separately for each of three 
experiments. The specific hypotheses are presented below: 
Experiment 1: Self-Consciousness Levels of Psychiatric Patients: 
1. Response to self-focused attention is less differentiated 
among patients than in the standardization samples. The 
three SC subscales will be more highly correlated than 
among normals. 
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2. Patients are more self-conscious, or experience more dis-
ruption than do normals in response to self-focused atten-
tion. Social Anxiety (SA-SC) will have a higher mean than 
previously reported. Total SC scores will vary signifi-
cantly from that found among normal samples. 
3. There will be greater variability in subscale and total 
SC scores among patients. 
4. The SC scale will be valid as an index of propensity for 
self-focused attention among clinical populations. It 
will be generally independent of degree of pathology. 
There will be minimal common variance between the Self-
Consciousness scale and the Ego Strength scale (ES). 
5. Pathology is related to specific facets of self-conscious-
ness. Private self-consciousness and ES will be positively 
correlated. But, SA-SC and ES will be inversely related. 
Experiment 2: Self-Consciousness and Premature Termination from 
Psychotherapy: 
1. Excessively high levels of self-consciousness lead to 
flight from therapy. Patients dropping out of treatment 
between sessions one and five will be overrepresented 
among the top SC scorers. 
2. Patients drop out or fail to begin treatment because 
they lack sufficient insight or anxiety to motivate change. 
Dropouts and treatment decliners will be overrepresented 
among those scoring lowest on SC. 
3. There will be a curvilinear (inverted U) relationship 
between total SC and the proportion of patients con-
tinuing in therapy for six or more sessions. 
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4. SC means will be significantly different for continuers, 
terminators, and those who decline to begin treatment. 
5. Group therapy provides excessive stimulus to awareness of 
the social self and so will be intolerable to those dis-
positionally sensitive to their public presentation. 
Terminators will be higher in PU-SC than those who continue 
in group therapy. 
6. Patients with previous therapy will have developed self-
consciousness management skills. Those returning for a 
repeat course of treatment will be less likely to drop out. 
7. Self-consciousness is an important determinant of pre-
mature termination. A discriminant function separating 
remainers from terminators will include SC scores. 
8. Since therapists contribute a variety of anxiety manage-
ment techniques during the beginning of therapy, SC will 
be significantly related to ratings of therapist experience. 
Experiment 3: Self-Consciousness and Personality Type: 
1. Different personality types vary in the level and handling 
of self-consciousness. Obsessive and Passive types will 
be greater than Hysterics and Sociopaths, who, in turn, 
will exceed Paranoid patients in mean SC. 
2. These differences result from predictions of differentiated 
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elevation on subscales. On PR-SC, Obsessives will be 
significantly higher than Hysterics and Sociopaths. The 
opposite results are expected for PU-SC. Passive patients 
should exceed others on SA-SC. 
3. Each personality type will have a distinctive profile 
across the three SC subscales. The average value of an 
item will vary from one subscale to another. For Socio-
paths, PU-SC should be greater than PR-SC. For Passive 
types, PR-SC and SA-SC will be approximately equal and 
greater than PU-SC. For Obsessives, PR-SC is predicted 
to exceed SA-SC. While for Hysterics,PU-SC should be 
greater than either PR-SC or SA-SC. No specific subscale 
profile is predicted for Paranoid patients. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The research was conducted at a large, urban, Veterans Admin-
istration Hospital between May, 1979 and July, 1980. All subjects were 
male veterans, with the rare exception of those who were still in ser-
vice. As the setting is metropolitan and the treatment is free of 
charge, subjects were diverse in terms of ethnicity and economic back-
ground. The sample was bimodally distributed by age, with Vietnam era 
and World War II veterans predominating. Two groups were used in this 
study: 94 inpatients and 136 outpatients. The characteristics of 
these groups will be described, and data will be presented on how rep-
resentative they are of their respective populations. 
The 94 inpatients were tested near the end of their hospital-
ization. The treatment philosophy of the facility stresses short-
term stays sufficient to stabilize the veteran. Those in need of 
chronic or custodial care were generally excluded. Participants were 
identified by nursing staff as likely candidates for referral to the 
Mental Hygiene Clinic. During the research period, 43.1% of those 
eligible to participate did so. The main constraint on including sub-
jects was the restricted availability of the researcher to only one or 
two set sessions per week. Only those veterans available during the 
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group testing sessions participated. A minority of patients invited 
refused to participate or turned in unusable records (14.5%). But 
the presence of the researcher permitted collecting responses even 
from those unable to read or attend to the materials. 1 Because it is 
relatively inclusive, the sample is probably representative of the 
population. But because of the initial selection by nursing staff, 
it is possible that cooperative patients and those with clearcut 
discharge plans are overrepresented. 
The initial sample consisted of 106 cases. Experimental at-
trition resulted from: four patients withdrawing consent during 
testing, one failing to sign the consent form, two failing to turn in 
all test forms, two records having random responses, eliminating two 
records from patients retested on successive admissions, and elim-
inating the record of the one female patient. 
The inpatient sample was selected as probable referrals to the 
outpatient mental hygiene clinic. Of the 94 subjects, 77 had intake 
appointments scheduled, 50 were seen, and 29 began treatment. Ten of 
those seen were rated by the intake interviewer. In the main, the 
group sampled does represent potential outpatient clinic clients. Al-
though less likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenic or neurotic than 
veterans included in the outpatient sample, they were comparable in 
1 
Sessions were held on Monday and Thursday afternoons between 
May and July, 1979. From August, 1979 through July, 1980 
testing was done on Thursday mornings. 
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global diagnosis (which included psychotic, neurotic, personality dis-
order, organic brain syndrome, and others as categories) and in per-
sonality type. They were comparable in such other group descriptors 
as age, incidence of service connected disability, and in the distance 
between their residence and the clinic. Although the ten inpatients 
receiving intake ratings are too few for sensitive statistical com-
parisons, no gross differences were evident in their prognosis or in 
their motivation for treatment. It seems justifiable to combine in-
patient and outpatient samples in evaluating the clinical impact of 
self-focused attention. 
However, as a group, inpatients were handled differently when 
they entered treatment at the Mental Hygiene Clinic. To begin with, 
they were more likely to have had previous contact with the clinic. 
Of the inpatients, 45% had previous referrals and 20% had had treatment 
there. For outpatients, the respective indices of familiarity with the 
clinic drop to 23% and 12%. Perhaps because of this prior contact, 
inpatients were seen marginally sooner for intake (9.6 days after re-
ferral as opposed to 14.3 days), had significantly fewer evaluation 
sessions (1.2 versus 1.7), and accordingly began therapy significantly 
sooner (17.1 versus 26.7 days). Because of the potential importance 
of these variables in determining length of stay in treatment, the 
distinction between inpatients and outpatients will be pursued in the 
phase of the research pertaining to premature termination from psycho-
therapy. Despite these differences in the way in which they were pro-
cessed at the clinic, the two samples were similar demographically. 
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The 135 outpatients were sampled from those seen for intake 
at the Mental Hygiene Clinic. These patients can be divided into 
three subgroups. For 113, the scale was administered at the time of 
the intake interview, and was accompanied by an Intake Rating Scale. 
An additional 12 completed the form at intake but were not rated by a 
therapist. The remaining 11 completed the Self-Consciousness scale 
while awaiting a screening session with a staff psychiatrist. As such, 
they returned at a later date for intake interviews. Each man had 
previous contact with the hospital and was referred through the Admit-
ting Office, a general medical floor or clinic, or Inpatient Psychia-
try. Participants included both recurrent and first time users. Those 
sampled constituted 17.1% of those having intake appointments. Because 
the research documents were self-administered, the sample was poten-
tially unrepresentative of those entering the clinic. Those whose 
insufficient education or extensive psychological impairment prevented 
them from completing the materials were excluded, as were those who 
neglected to return the forms to the receptionist, and those few (16 
total) who refused consent. The most impaired and negativistic were 
likely underrepresented in this sample. Materials from 12 additional 
cases were excluded. These included two females and the ten veterans 
previously sampled as inpatients. According to the specific hypothesis 
being evaluated, other cases were excluded. Such, for instance, was 
the case in the premature termination study for cases closed during the 
first five sessions because of hospitalization or mutually agreed upon 
cessation of treatment. In addition, incomplete records were available 
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for some cases. Figure 5 shows how the sample was composed for each 
phase of the research. Reading vertically, one can see the number of 
subjects having each combination of research materials. 
The 116 outpatients whose records were used in the personality 
type study had each been rated by their intake interviewer on a series 
of questions related to diagnosis and suitability for treatment. In-
terviewers had also rated 96 other cases who did not complete the 
Self-Consciousness scale. A comparison between these two groups per-
mits an assessment of the degree to which research subjects are repre-
sentative of the outpatient population. Participants were not statis-
tically different from the 96 rated patients in diagnosis, global 
diagnosis, prognosis, motivation for treatment, referral, or recom-
mended therapy. The two groups did differ in their expressed reaction 
to recommended treatment, x2 (2)=11.54, .E_ ( .01, with those who completed 
the SC scale disproportionately represented among those neutral in 
their response. This finding runs contrary to what would be expected 
if participants were unrepresentatively compliant or enthusiastic. The 
evidence suggests that those sampled are representative of the psy-
chiatric outpatients attending the VA clinic. 
Inpatients are demographically and clinically similar to 
outpatient participants, who, in turn, are not significantly different 
than a sample of outpatient nonparticipants. This network of rela-
tionships suggests that the sampling procedures were at least grossly 
successful in creating a representative sample. The demographic pro-
file of the combined inpatient and outpatient groups is presented in 
Table 10. The modal veteran is middle aged, self-referred, and not 
Total n for each 
Type of data available Combinations phase of the research 
Self-Consciousness scale X X X X X X X X 230 
Ego Strength and Self-Consciousness X X X X 94 
(Inpatients) 
Termination and Self-Consciousness X X X X 133 
Personality type and Self-Consciousness X X X X 116 
Total n with each combination of data 24 40 6 29 44 4 77 6 
Figure 5. Number of subjects participating in each of the component studies. 
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Table 10 
Demographic and Clinical Management Characteristics 
of Research Participants 
Category 
Degree of service connected disability (n=132) 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Global diagnosis (~=198) 
Psychotic 
Neurotic 
Personality disorder 
Organic brain syndrome 
Other 
Rated prognosis (~=193) 
Poor 
Guarded 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
Rated motivation for treatment (~=194) 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
Patient reaction to recommended treatment (~=207) 
Negative 
No reaction or neutral 
Positive 
Percent of sample 
86.4 
3.8 
.8 
2.3 
.8 
3.0 
.8 
.8 
1.5 
33.5 
31.6 
13.1 
1.9 
19.9 
9.3 
21.8 
34.2 
33.7 
1.0 
17.5 
38.7 
38.7 
5.2 
6.3 
19.3 
74.4 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Category Percent of sample 
Disposition at registration (n=108) 
Accepted for: 
Individual therapy 
Group therapy 
Family therapy 
Hypnotherapy 
Medication only 
Referred 
Discharged without referral 
Previous therapy at the Mental Hygiene Clinic (~=140) 
None, never referred 
None, previously referred 
All episodes terminated within five sessions 
One or more episodes with at least six sessions 
Referral source (n=198) 
Admitting Clinic 
Inpatient Psychiatry 
Inpatient General Medicine 
Outpatient General Medicine 
Sessions before beginning therapy (~=90) 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
Category 
Days between referral and scheduled intake (~=139) 
Days between referral and beginning treatment (~=87) 
Age (~=134) 
38.9 
20.4 
19.4 
3.7 
7.4 
8.3 
1.9 
68.7 
16.4 
1.5 
13.4 
61.1 
22.7 
7.6 
8.6 
52.2 
38.9 
6.7 
2.2 
Average 
16.94 days 
32.36 days 
40.72 years 
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service-connected. Despite considerable variability in diagnosis, 
his prognosis is moderately favorable. His first contact with the 
clinic is approached with a neutral attitude (evident in midscale modes 
on motivation) but an acceptant (74% positive) reaction to the recom-
mendation of individual therapy. 
Materials 
Copies of the materials used in the research are located in 
Appendix A. Primary among them is the Self-Consciousness scale 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975). All inpatient and outpatient participants 
completed this 23-item survey, which was modified for this study. 
The changes were minor, consisting of definitions or synonyms of words 
found in pretesting to be too sophisticated for some veterans. Com-
prehension was enhanced because of these parenthetical additions. 
None of the original scale was deleted. Because the changes were clar-
ifications rather than alterations, the scale used is felt to be fully 
comparable to the original. The other standardized test used was 
Barron's (1953) Ego Strength scale. All inpatients completed this 
protocol as a free-standing instrument, apart from the rest of the 
MMPI. 
Two additional forms were especially designed for this study. 
The premature termination research necessitated a review of each par-
ticipants medical record and the clinic appointment calendar. Data 
recorded from this review included such potential covariants of length 
of stay as age, degree of service connected disability, referral source 
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to the Mental Hygiene Clinic, elapsed time between referral and ini-
tial appointment, time between referral and beginning treatment, num-
ber of appointments prior to initiating therapy, number of sessions 
attended, type of treatment provided, and discharge status. As in-
dicated in Figure 5, this data was completed for I33 cases. Addi-
tional information on variables related to termination and to person-
ality type was collected from intake interviewers with the "Intake 
Rating Scale". This protocol (available in Appendix A) included DSM-II 
diagnosis, recommended disposition and modality of treatment, a rating 
of the patient's reaction to the suggested treatment, and therapist 
ratings of patient prognosis and motivation for treatment. The in-
take interviewer also used this scale to identify the veteran's 
personality type, using the definitions provided in Figure 4. The 
combination of forms administered tapped the therapist, patient, and 
the objective/archival information sources. 
Reliability of personality type. Because the third experiment 
is so dependent on the adequacy of the personality type ratings, a 
special reliability study was done for this item. Over the course of 
five weeks, therapists of the Mental Hygiene Clinic used the typology 
to rate each patient attending the Diagnostic Staffing group. In this 
manner II therapists rated 20 patients. Despite the name, the purpose 
of the group is to decide on the clinical management of problematic 
cases. Beyond asking the patient for a brief perspective on the nature 
of his problem and the services desired, there is no attempt to solicit 
diagnostic information or to make a decision as to probable diagnosis. 
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Nor is there discussion between staff as to classification. The 
interviews are short and, since done in a group context, intentionally 
superficial. So judgments of personality type were abstractions based 
on manner of relating in the group setting rather than inferences sup-
ported by a review of the symptoms. Lastly, to the extent that the 
cases which are difficult to manage are also likely to present diagnos-
tic dilemmas, these cases are unrepresentatively difficult to classify. 
As such, the reliability estimate obtained approximates the minimum 
range of reliability available with the scale. 
Of a possible 220 ratings of the 20 patients by 11 therapists, 
159 (or 72.3%) were made. (See Appendix B for raw scores and tables 
presenting the degree of inter-rater agreement for each case and type). 
Of the 20 cases, three were modally rated hysterical, four paranoid, 
four obsessive, five passive, and four sociopathic. The first analysis 
examined inter-rater consistency in two ways: as percent agreement 
with the modal diagnosis and as percent agreement as to the appropri-
ateness of a given typology for the case. The latter statistic ex-
presses findings on a relatively less challenging task, since it is 
often easier to decide which types are inapplicable than to choose a 
specific diagnosis. However, since the task involved five choices per 
patient (decisions as to the suitability of each of the five scales) 
a larger pool of observations was available and a more refined estimate 
of agreement could be made. Table 11 presents these statistics as a 
summary for the total sample and for each personality type separately. 
The average agreement with the modal diagnosis is 68.6%. But 
Personality type 
Hysterical 
Paranoid 
Obsessive 
Passive 
Sociopathic 
Total sample 
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Table 11 
Agreement between Clinicians 
in Classifying Personality Types 
Percent agreement 
with modal type 
65.2 
66.7 
57.7 
63.6 
87.9 
68.6 
Percent agreement about 
appropriateness of 
each type 
89.3 
89.3 
86.2 
84.9 
91.2 
88.2 
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there is considerable variation in the accuracy with which different 
types are identified. Most readily recognized were the sociopathic 
patients, about whom clinicians agreed 87.9% of the time. Sur-
prisingly, the most difficult discrimination was of the obsessive type, 
for which there was only 57.7% agreement. Apparently the features of 
this style of relating are less flagrant than others. Clinicians no-
ticed them, but considered them secondary. If a secondary rating was 
accepted in evaluating percent agreement, and such ratings were per-
mitted in the instructions for the rating scale, then the consistency 
in identifying the obsessive style rose to a more robust 73.1%. When 
asked to judge the applicability of each type for a given patient, the 
percent agreement rose, as anticipated, into the upper SO's. Such 
findings are comparable to what have been reported in other studies 
of diagnostic consistency (Kreitman, 1961; McGuire, 1973; Zubin, 1967). 
In view of the criticisms of diagnostic accuracy, this is, however, not 
entirely reassuring. 
A more rigorous test of reliability is Cohen's Kappa, which 
corrects for chance agreement (Cohen, 1960). The weighted average 
Kappa was calculated by combining the reliabilities obtained in pair-
wise comparisons. The resulting reliability estimate is .374 for pri-
mary types, and .473 if secondary types are included. These levels 
are disappointingly low. Although therapists agreed at better than 
chance levels, there was little consensus about type. While the 
Diagnostic Staffing group provides considerably less information about 
the patient than would be obtained in the intake interview, the low 
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reliability will weaken the research. Effects attributable to per-
sonality types will be diluted because of errors in classification. 
Any of the hypothesized effects that do appear, despite the flaws in 
the scale, are likely to be quite robust. 
Procedures 
Experiment 1. The purposes of the first phase of the research 
were to gather normative data on self-consciousness among psychiatric 
patients and to assess the validity of the Self-Consciousness scale 
(SC) for this population. For this study, all inpatient and outpatient 
records were used, providing a total sample of 230 cases. For those 
veterans arriving at the Mental Hygiene Clinic, the scale was ad-
ministered before the beginning of therapy. The typical intake pro-
cess includes a brief screening by a psychiatrist, usually occurring 
on the same visit as a diagnostic assessment by clinic therapists. 
The patient may be asked to return for a group interview at a staff 
meeting, if there is some question as to the appropriate treatment 
recommendation, or he may be directly assigned to begin therapy. A 
full range of dynamically-oriented individual, group, and family ther-
apy options are offered by staff and students with degrees in psychol-
ogy, social work, or nursing. Veterans are seldom followed for medica-
tion only. 
Research materials were administered at the earliest point of 
contact possible. The procedure followed at the outset had the pa-
tient complete the Self-Consciousness scale under the supervision of 
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the intake interviewer, which permitted prompt response to the pa-
tient's questions and the opportunity for a clinical decision to can-
cel a patient's participation should the protocol or accompanying con-
sent (see Appendix A) appear disturbing to the subject. The scale was 
administered before or after the intake interview proper at the dis-
cretion of the therapist. In those instances when a patient's psy-
chiatric screening occurred on a different day than the intake inter-
view, the scale was handed out by the receptionist and completed while 
the patient waited for the psychiatrist. After the first month of 
data collection it became clear that participation in the research was 
seldom stressful to the veteran but often an imposition on the thera-
pist. The procedure was altered so that the scale was always self-
administered. The research documents were handed out by the recep-
tionist on the patient's arrival and completed in the waiting room 
prior to the intake interview. Completed forms were given to the 
therapist or to the receptionist. 
During the course of this study, patients filled out the SC 
scale under any of three conditions: before the session, at the begin-
ning of the intake session, or at the end of the interview. An item 
on the Intake Rating Scale identified the patient in terms of which 
procedure was followed. For the 102 outpatients for whom data was 
available on this variable, there were no significant differences in 
total SC or on any subscale as a function of the time the question-
naire was completed. Similarly, the variation over the 10 months of 
the data collection was neither consistent nor significant. 
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The procedure differed for inpatients. Their greater acces-
sibility permitted group testing under the supervision of the re-
searcher. The day prior to the research session, head nurses from 
each of the four inpatient units were asked to identify all patients 
who were likely to be discharged in the coming week, who would have 
referrals for outpatient therapy at the Mental Hygiene Clinic, and 
whose mental status was sufficiently clear that they could tolerate 
participation in the study. Each identified patient was subsequently 
asked to participate by the researcher, who assembled the subjects in 
a quiet room off the unit and administered the measures. Testing 
groups ranged in size from one to eight veterans. Introductory com-
ments were minimized so that the principal explanation of the study 
was found in the consent form, which was identical to the one used 
with outpatient subjects. During testing, the researcher provided 
minimal responses to patient's questions or concerns and remained 
otherwise occupied with reading. For occassional subjects, greater 
structure was provided. In three instances the items were read and 
responses recorded by the experimenter. In addition to the Self-Con-
sciousness scale, inpatients were also administered the Barron Ego 
Strength scale. The scales were counterbalanced in order of presenta-
tion to control for order effects. 
The order of presentation did effect SC scores. Table 12 pre-
sents subscale means as a function of order of presentation and shows 
a significant impact on Private Self-Consciousness. Apparently, con-
vening the group and presenting instructions elicited more attentiveness 
Table 12 
Self-Consciousness Scale Scores 
when Administered Before or After the Ego Strength Scale 
Order of presentation 
Self-Consciousness 
Scale first 
Self-Consciousness 
Scale second 
N 
47 
47 
*.E. < . OS, when means are compared. 
Private 
25.55* 
22.83* 
Mean self-consciousness 
Public Social Anxiety 
19.81 11.56 
19.95 12.04 
Total 
56.98 
55.26 
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to internal states than did the items from the ES scale. However, the 
impact on the total score was minor and nonsignificant. It is not felt 
to invalidate comparisons with the outpatient group or other samples. 
Means, variances, and subscale correlations were calculated 
for the outpatient and inpatient samples separately. A factor analysis 
reexamined the internal structure of the scale. For inpatients addi-
tional correlations were obtained to analyze the relationship of Ego 
Strength to the Self-Consciousness scale and its subscales. 
Experiment 2. Self-consciousness was evaluated as a con-
tributer to premature termination from therapy. Again, the outpatient 
sample was supplemented by that portion of the inpatient sample who 
did, in fact, have post-discharge intakes at the Mental Hygiene Clinic. 
Scores on the Self-Consciousness scales were obtained using the pro-
cedure described in Experiment 1. In addition, the Intake Rating Scale 
was obtained from the diagnostic interviewer for 116 of the veterans 
attending an intake session. If the therapist indicated that the case 
disposition was a referral for treatment elsewhere, the subject was 
excluded from this phase of the research. At the time of the archival 
review, 133 cases were examined and a determination was made as to the 
number of subsequent clinical appointments kept by each participant. 
Those who attended six or more sessions were considered to be con-
tinuers. Terminators were defined as those dropping out of treatment 
unilaterally or dropped from the clinic rolls for consecutive missed 
appointments prior to the sixth session. 
A subcategory of the terminators included those failing to 
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return after intake or staffing and those inpatients failing to attend 
even the scheduled intake. This subsample, occasionally identified as 
'decliners' or 'refusers' in the literature, was compared to other drop-
outs in terms of self-consciousness levels. While no differences were 
expected, based on the dominant findings in published reports, a planned 
comparison evaluated the significance of any differences between these 
subgroups. 2 A series of X analyses and ANOVAs were completed to eval-
uate the role of self-consciousness in the unilateral termination of 
psychotherapy. 
Self-consciousness is not the only variable likely related to 
perseverance in treatment. Variables drawn from the archival review 
and from the Intake Rating Scale were also evaluated as alternative 
explanations of the differences between decliners, other terminators, 
and continuers. With SC scores, they were included in a discriminant 
analysis. This procedure makes it possible to evaluate the relative 
importance of self-consciousness as a determinant of premature ter-
mination. 
Experiment 3. The third phase of this research examines self-
consciousness as a function of personality type. In this study the 
data was obtained for 116 outpatient subjects and included their SC 
scores and the clinician's rating of diagnosis and personality types 
on the Intake Rating Scale. A series of planned comparisons permitted 
evaluation of hypothesized profile differences within and across per-
sonality types. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results from each experiment will be presented and briefly 
discussed in the order outlined in the Methods. This section will 
conclude with a more general discussion of the implications of this 
research for self-awareness theory and for the clinical handling of 
self-consciousness. 
Self-Consciousness Levels of Psychiatric Patients 
Comparison of patient groups. The means, standard deviations, 
and subscale intercorrelations of the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) 
were calculated for the patient samples separately, and are presented 
in Tables 13 through 15, respectively. A series of ANOVAs examined 
the significance of the differences between means. Because the "Other 
Outpatient" sample - those not otherwise evaluated beyond completing 
the SC questionnaire - are neither hypothetically nor empirically dis-
crepant from the remaining outpatients, they are incorporated into one 
group for the purposes of the following inter-sample comparisons. For 
Private Self-Consciousness (PR-SC), K(2,226)=4.544, ~( .05, and for 
the total SC scores, K(2,226)=3.945, ~< .05, the groups varied signifi-
cantly. For Public Self-Consciousness (PU-SC), K(2,226)=2.025, ~=.134, 
and for Social Anxiety (SA-SC), K(2,226)=2.165, ~=.117, there is a non-
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Table 13 
Mean Self-Consciousness Scale Scores for Patient Groups 
Mean self-consciousness 
Groups N Private Public Social anxiety Total 
Inpatients 94 24.191 19.883 11.798 56.117 
Outpatients 113 24.053 18.920 12.478 55.690 
Screenings 11 30.000 21.545 15.545 67.091 
Other outpatients 12 24.000 18.833 11.917 54.750 
All patients 230 24.391 19.435 12.317 56.361 
Table 14 
Standard Deviations of Self-Consciousness Scale Scores for Patient Groups 
Self-consciousness scale standard deviations 
Groups N Private Public Social anxiety Total 
Inpatients 94 6.569 4.817 6.035 12.793 
Outpatients 113 6.138 5.304 5.177 12.847 
Screenings 11 7.707 6.962 7. 725 20.384 
Other outpatients 12 4.991 4.428 5.791 11.331 
All patients 230 6.429 5.166 5. 723 13.320 
Table 15 
Intercorrelations of Self-Consciousness Subscale Scores for Patient Groups 
Self-consciousness subscale correlations 
Private and Private and Public and 
Groups N public social anxiety social anxiety 
Inpatients 94 .458** .168 .343** 
Outpatients 113 .415** .263* .524** 
Screenings 11 • 718* .759* .749 * 
Other outpatients 12 • 728* .025 .326 
All patients 230 .469** .264** .455** 
*p < .01 
**E.< .001 
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significant but similar pattern in which the higher scores of those 
seen for psychiatric screening stand out against the essentially sim-
ilar scores of the inpatient and outpatient samples. 
The interpretation of these differences rests on an apprecia-
tion of the hospital procedures. Inpatients were evaluated toward the 
end of their residence, and outpatients completed the self-rating an 
average of 14.3 days after being referred for treatment. In contrast, 
screenings are done on two weekday mornings when Mental Hygiene Clinic 
psychiatrists evaluate veterans applying for treatment at the Admitting 
Clinic, the central intake unit for the Medical Center. Veterans com-
pleting the questionnaire prior to screening are making their first 
contact with the system. They are likely in crisis, at the point of 
maximum discomfort which precipates seeking help. But this is not a 
total explanation, as it is the private self-awareness rather than the 
anxiety subscale which is the most elevated relative to comparison 
groups. Additionally, the self-report device is used as an instrument 
to further the patients project of getting prompt treatment. This is 
not the same as faking bad--the scores are more elevated but in the 
same direction as is typical. But the high SC scores do express a 
self-preoccupation and heightened attentiveness to internal states 
preparatory to the patient's first attempt to explain his condition 
to an expert. What is important in understanding the scale, regardless 
of whether crisis or the necessity of self-presentation is invoked in 
explaining the elevated SC scores of screening patients, is that it 
appears to measure the patients' states in addition to enduring 
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dispositions. 
It might be countered that those seen for screening are dif-
ferent dispositionally from other patients coming to the Mental Hygiene 
Clinic. But the available data counters that view. Patients coming to 
the clinic via Admitting are common (16.9% of the current outpatient 
sample). It is not plausible to assume that those seeking treatment 
on the two days when screening takes place at the clinic are different 
from those arriving at admitting on the remaining days. When those 
seen first at screening are compared with others referred from the 
Admitting Clinic, there are no significant differences in age, diag-
nosis, personality type, prognosis, motivation, distance traveled to 
the clinic, or history of prior treatment at the Mental Hygiene Clinic. 
While a greater proportion of those seen for screening have service 
connected disabilities (28.6% versus 5.0%), the difference is not 
2 
statistically significant, X (1)=1.763, £> .10. More to the point, 
when those originally seen for screening complete the SC questionnaire 
at the time of their intake interview they do not differ from other 
Admitting Clinic referrals in total or subscale scores. It is not 
dispositional differences that account for the significant elevation 
of the scores from screening patients. With the obvious rival inter-
pretations rejected, the role of situational factors is more persuasive 
as an interpretation. The finding for screening patients is reinferred 
by the previously discussed effects of test order for inpatients. At 
least for psychiatric patients, the Self-Consciousness scale seems to 
be sensitive to transient variations in self-focused attention as well 
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as to the intended characterologically based self-awareness. 
Self-Consciousness scale scores of patients compared with nor-
mative samples. Table 16 allows comparison of the SC scores for the 
combined groups in the present study with those obtained in previous 
research. The first hypothesis was that self-consciousness would be a 
more unitary dimension for patients than for undergraduates. This 
would be evident in higher intercorrelations among subscales. The 
data supports such a conclusion. Where normative samples find signifi-
cant correlations between PR-SC and PU-SC, and occasionally between 
PU-SC and SA-SC, the present sample finds all three coefficients of 
sufficient magnitude to be statistically significant. Psychiatric 
patients tend, more than normals, to link self-focused attention and 
anxiety. However, this is a matter of degree. The common variance 
ranges between 6.9% (for PR-SC and SA-SC) and 22.0% (for PR-SC and 
PU-SC). The scales remain substantially independent. Practically, 
then, introspection may be encouraged during the course of therapy 
without automatically triggering disruptive anxiety. This observation 
is mediated by the degree of crisis. As Table 15 shows clearly, 
intercorrelations are highest for those seen for screening. Here PR-
SC and SA-SC have a common variance in excess of 57.6%. For inpa-
tients, this figure drops to 2.8%. Turner's (Note 2) data also shows 
pathological samples with intercorrelation elevated only modestly above 
the levels found in college students. In conclusion, patients show a 
great deal of variation and yet, on the whole, respond to self-focused 
attention in a more unitary manner than has been found for normal sub-
Table 16 
q~lf-Consciousn~ss Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrel&tions for Patients and Normals 
Ref~rence and 
population 
studied 
Private 
Present res.-arch, 21,. 39 
LjO pc>t f.ents 
-~--------
Turner. (Note 2). 24.0 
!, 7 neurollcs 
~I psychot icR 22.1 
·-·--- ----·-·-----
Fe>n:lgste.~n, Scheier. 
& tluss (1975), 25.9 
179 nm.le und~r-
graduates 
152 undergraduates 
Carver & Glass (1976), 25.4 
iO'j tr;>J.c under-
grathiates 
Turner. Scheier, 
C;,rver, & Ickes 
0978), 
1395 undergra()u~tes 
*p (.05 
**.r <.ot 
Heans 
Social 
PubHc anxiety Total 
19.4] 12.32 56.36 
18.8 13.6 56.4 
18.5 13.3 53.9 
18.9 12.5 57.3 
19.5 ll.S 56.5 
Self-Consciousness scale 
Stanclartl Dev:J.atlons Intercorrelations 
P~:ivate Private Public 
and anti and 
Social public social social 
Private Public anxiety Total anxiety anxiety 
6.43 5.17 5.72 13.32 .47** .26** .45 '~* 
5.3 4.5 5.5 .39** .lJ .10 
7.4 6.7 4.9 .46** . t 7 .7.5 
·---- ---------
5.0 4.0 4.1 9.2 
.26** 
-.06 
h.7 4.2 3.8 8.0 .33** -.05 -.02 
. 31 ** .11• ** .21** 
·----------- 1-' 
0\ 
00 
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jects. 
Contrary to expectation, however, patients do not show greater 
self-consciousness or self-evaluative anxiety than previous normal 
samples. Hypothesis 2 stated the SA-SC scores would be higher and SC 
total scores would vary significantly from those previously reported. 
Neither expectation is supported by the data gathered. Subscale and 
total scores are remarkably consistent with previously obtained re-
sults from normal subjects. This conclusion is reinforced, in that 
it replicates Turner's finding that patients generate unremarkable 
scores. It is further supported by a more microscopic analysis which 
reveals no significant variance, !(3,114)=1.157, £> .30, among any of 
the diagnostic groupings (psychotics, neurotics, personality disorders, 
or others). If prognosis is used as an index of severity of illness, 
then the absense of any relationship with self-consciousness, !(4,103) 
=.103, ~> .90, further suggests that self-consciousness levels do not 
vary as a function of intensity of psychopathology. Theories that sug-
gest that psychopathology or behavior in therapy can be broadly ex-
plained in terms of either excesses of deficits in the skills of self-
monitoring receive no support from this research. 
Again, this observation should not be overgeneralized. Pa-
tients are a diverse group, and level of self-focused attention may be 
a valid issue in individual cases, though not in general. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, this data does show greater variability in subscale 
and total SC scores than has been reported for normal samples. Table 
14 shows that the standard deviations are higher than those obtained 
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previously. In comparison with the samples from Fenigstein et al. 
(1975) and Carver and Glass (1976), tests for homogeneity of variance 
for the total SC and subscale scores are always significant beyond 
~ =.01. The fact that Turner also observed a comparably increased 
level of variance, lends further support to the conclusion that dif-
ferences observed are more than error of estimate. (Tests of homo-
geneity of variance show nonsignificant differences between the cur-
rent sample and those surveyed by Turner, with the exception of PR-SC 
for neurotics and PU-SC for psychotics, both different at the .05 
level.) Patients are more variable than normal college students, 
whether because of greater heterogeneity in age and life position or 
as a function of their psychopathology. Among the implications of this 
conclusion is a methodological one, it will be more difficult to obtain 
statistically reliable differences among means when comparing patient 
groups. For the practice of psychotherapy, the implication is that 
each case must be assessed individually to determine whether self-
consciousness contributes to the clinical picture. While it does not 
do so for the patient population generally, in individual cases self-
consciousness and its resulting anxiety may require special attention 
and special handling during the course of treatment. 
To explore the basis of this greater variability among pa-
tients, the effect on SC scores of a variety of covariates was examined. 
As previously mentioned, neither global diagnosis nor prognosis contrib-
uted to level of SC. Whether or not the veteran has a service connected 
disability because of his illness, perhaps another indirect measure of 
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the degree of pathology, is unrelated, F(1,130)=1.532, ~> .20. Age 
is minimally correlated, ~(133)=-.08, ~> .30. Other covariates more 
pertinent to clinic treatment of the veteran will be discussed in the 
section of predicting premature termination, but it is clear that none 
of these variables which describe characteristics of the subject con-
tribute appreciably to the level or variability of self-consciousness. 
In the absense of published materials setting the norms for 
psychopathological groups, the first goal of this research has been to 
evaluate hypotheses predicting performance of the SC scale among pa-
tients. Contrary to expectations, the group as a whole was very sim-
ilar to normal samples in total and subscale scores. Even the social 
anxiety scale, the measure of the degree to which scrutiny sets off 
disruptive self-evaluation, was not significantly different for pa-
tients than normals. In line with expectations, however, SC scores 
showed greater variability for the current sample, suggesting that 
self-consciousness may be of importance in individual cases. This is 
particularly relevant in light of the confirmation of the hypothesis 
that SC subscales would be more highly intercorrelated than previously 
reported. The patient's response to self-directed attention shows less 
independence between self-monitoring and anxiety than has been re-
ported for normals. Introspection or observation by another may lead 
reflexively to self-evaluation. 
Factor structure of the Self-Consciousness scale. Because 
the SC scale is being applied to a new population, it is appropriate 
to reexamine the internal structure of the scale. To this end, an 
172 
intercorrelation matrix was generated and a factor analysis completed. 
The average item correlates with the unadjusted total score between 
.4 and .6. All are positively related, as expected. However, four of 
the 23 items have a correlation coefficient value less than .25. These 
items are numbers 3, 9, 12, and 22 (see Appendix A). The first three 
of these are the items scored in a reverse direction (e.g., 3: "Gen-
erally I'm not very aware of myself."). The attempt to create a scale 
balanced for the acquiescence response set has failed for this sample. 
Unlike the normative sample, in which no item was endorsed in one 
direction by more than 85% of the group, three items were highly skewed. 
Items 6 (13.5%), 13 (14.4%), and 21 (8.3%) were almost never rejected 
(as being either "extremely unlike" or "somewhat unlike me") by pa-
tients. While the proportion of variance attributable to the response 
set is uncertain, it clearly constitutes a threat to the capacity to 
make sensitive distinctions and represents a major flaw in the scale. 
Future research should assess the degree to which the SC scale is con-
founded with acquiescence. 
A principal factor analysis was done, with Kaiser normaliza-
tion and varimax rotation, using the standard SPSS algorhythm (Nie, 
Hull, Jenkins, Skinbrenner, & Bent, 1975). The communality was re-
stricted on some items, most notably on numbers 2 and 17, from the PU-
SC subscale. Nevertheless, seven factors were selected which had 
eigenvalues greater than one and which cumulatively accounted for 
58.1% of the variance. Of these, the two most important accounted for 
31.7% of the variance initially and retained eigenvalues in excess of 
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one after iteration. While the entire seven factor matrix is pre-
sented in Appendix C, the following comments will concentrate on the 
two most important, which are duplicated in Table 17. 
The factor structure obtained from patients fails to replicate 
that reported by Fenigstein et al. (1975). The expected three factors, 
corresponding to the subscales, are not evident. The SA-SC subscale 
is essentially reincarnated, in more robust form, as Factor I. The 
five most highly loaded items are from SA-SC. The only subscale item 
missing is 12, one of the items scored in the negative direction. Of 
lesser importance, but still significantly correlated at the .001 level 
is one item from PR-SC and two from PU-SC. With operative words such 
as "worry" and "concerned", they reinforce the interpretation of Factor 
I as tapping a dimension related to anxiety and a disruptive fear of 
judgment. Although Factor II pulls two items from SA-SC and four from 
PU-SC, PR-SC is the most frequently (five items) and most importantly 
represented subscale. The PR-SC items included emphasize congitive 
rather than affective self-awareness. Factor II may be described as 
a generalized introspective style in combination with a concern about 
personal motives and impact on others. The elements of anxiety are 
subdued, as are most references to emotionality. The factor emphasizes 
intellectualization and cognitive controls. 
The PR-SC and PU-SC subscales, respectively, accounting for the 
greatest variance in previous reports, collapse into a secondary factor 
for this sample. They appear as essentially independent dimensions 
only among the minor factors. In Factor III, five of seven items 
Table 17 
Communalities and Factor Matrix for the Self-Cansciousness Scale 
Suuscale Variable 
-·--------------------------------------
PR-SC 
PU-SC 
PR--:JC 
SA-SS 
f'R-SC~ 
PU-·SC 
I'R-·3C 
SJ\-SC 
I'R-SC 
SI\-SC 
l'li-·SC 
Si\-SC 
PP.<'C 
Pl!-SC 
l'R-<>C 
SJ\-SC 
ru-se 
I'R-SC 
l'U-SC 
f"{-sr 
PU-SC 
PR-SC 
Si\-SC 
f 'm always tryir,g to figure myself out 
I'm concerned about my styl'! of doing things 
Generally I'm not very aware of myself 
lt takes me ti•ne to overcome my shyness in new situations 
1 reflect (or think carefully) about myself -'1 lot 
I'm concerned about the way I present myself (cr come across to others) 
I'm often the subject: {or center) of my own fantasies 
I have trouble working when someone ls watching me 
I never scrutinize myself (ol: examine or look at my8elf closely) 
r ~;et cmharrasse.l very ensi!.y 
1'111 self-conscl.ous about the way T look 
l don't find lt hnrd to talk to strange..--s 
1 'm generally attentive to (or aware of) my inner feelJ.ngs 
I. usually worry about making a good impressicr. 
I'm constantly examJninr, my motives (or looking at my reasons for acting as I do) 
I feel anxious when I speak in front of a grou~ 
One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror 
1 sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself 
I '•• con.:erned about what other p?.ot'le t!>ink of me 
I'm alert to changes in MY mood 
I'm usually awnre of my appearan<:e 
r 'm aware of the way my mind works ~hen I work through a problem 
Large groups mnke me nerv0us 
Communality 
.627 
.192 
.406 
.852 
.438 
. 284 
• 334 
.464 
.290 
·'•88 
.528 
.259 
.321 
.538 
.451 
.218 
• 11•1 
.413 
.429 
.400 
.343 
• 35'• 
.63) 
ltem loadings 
Factor Factor 2 
'125 • 709* 
• 171 .353* 
-.113 -.027 
.643* • 234 * 
.186 . )45* 
.112 .ld(l* 
.268* • 275* 
.606* • 16'• 
.060 .OWJ 
.526* .n1* 
• I 53 . 121 
.100 .027 
.104 • 11, l 
.303* . 325* 
. 151 • 591* 
.391* . 182 
.139 .lSR 
. 1.85 .25)* 
.3il* . J38* 
.025 • O!,z 
-.099 -.026 
-.095 • Ol, t 
.7Jv* . 116 
l~_t_c. The Self-Consciousness subscales are Abbrevinted PR-SC for private, PU-SC for public, and SA-SC for social anxiety. 
*~" .001 
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loading, and the most highly correlated items among them~are from PU-
SC. Likewise, Factor IV is dominated by a single subscale, in this 
case Private Self-Consciousness. But these are of lesser importance. 
The important finding of this analysis is that SA-SC emerges essentially 
intact as the dominant feature of self-consciousness among a psycho-
pathological population. The importance of this subscale is to be 
highlighted throughout this research. Moreover, its emergence as the 
central factor underscores the difference between patients and stu-
dents: anxiety is the central feature of self-consciousness for those 
seeking psychotherapy. 
Self-consciousness and ego strength. For the 94 inpatients 
completing the Ego Strength Scale (ES), the mean was 39.71 and the 
standard deviation 7.91. Table 18 shows the correlation of ES with 
the subscale and total scores from the Self-Consciousness scale. 
The generalizability of previous findings about the SC scale would be 
enhanced if SC was minimally related to degree of psychopathology. 
If the scale performed the same with schizophrenics as with normal 
students, one could be more confident in predicting avoidance of added 
stimuli to self-scrutiny in the clinical population. But, as already 
encountered with the factor analysis, it is clear that the SC scale is 
not treated in the same manner by patients as by normals. The signifi-
cant correlations with ES confirm this finding. Those who are most 
severely disturbed (low ES) are some 17 points higher in self-conscious-
ness than those with the mildest pathology. Alternatively, those with 
the highest SC scores admit to greater anxiety and symptomatology. 
Correlation 
Probability 
Note. N=94. 
Table 18 
Correlations for the Ego Strength Scale 
with the Self-Consciousness Scale 
Private 
-.109 
.149 
Self-consciousness scales 
Public 
-.169 
.052 
Social anxiety 
-.569 
.001 
Total 
-.390 
.001 
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Although each variable retains considerable independence from the 
other, with a common variance of 15.2%, the ES is a major contributor 
to total self-consciousness. This is contrary to the expectation ex-
pressed in Hypothesis 4. 
Because the two scales are more related than expected overall, 
the subscales also are correlated with ES in a manner other than 
hypothesized. Private self-consciousness was expected to have a direct 
relationship with ES, on the assumption that it embodied the cognitive 
skills of introspection that would be more intact in the less disturbed 
patient. Instead, Table 18 shows a nonsignificant, inverse relation-
ship. Public self-consciousness, for which no correlation was pre-
dicted, proves to be negatively correlated to a marginally significant 
degree. It is apparent that the generalized introspective style 
(Factor II, above) is, if anything, more typical of the most patho-
logical rather than the most intact elements of this sample. The 
social anxiety subscale relates to ES in the direction hypothesized, 
but to a much greater degree than anticipated. Almost a third of the 
variance of SA-SC (32.4%) can be traced to the psychopathology dimen-
sion captured in the ES scale. While PR and PU-SC may share minimal 
linear relationship with ES, it is clear that social anxiety--which 
proves to be the central dimension of self-consciousness for patients--
takes on different meaning and increasing importance as the level of 
ES drops. Table 19 summarizes the intercorrelation of SC subscales at 
four different levels of ES. It shows that the association of anxiety 
and public self-consciousness increases as ego resilience decreases. 
Table 19 
Intercorrelations of the Self-Consciousness Subscales for Patients 
at Different Levels on the Ego Strength Scale 
Intercorrelations of self-consciousness subscales 
Level of the Ego Strength Scale N Private with Private with Public with 
public social anxiety social anxiety 
More than one SD below the mean 13 0 726** .359 .695** 
Less than one SD below the mean 28 .170 -.049 .363* 
Less than one SD above the mean 36 .479** .078 .284* 
More than one SD above the mean 17 .651** .319 .188 
*.E. <. 05 
**.E.< .01 
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Other relationships are less clear. But, like those seen for screen-
ings, the most disturbed of the participants show the least indepen-
dence among the component subscales. Anxiety pervades self-awareness. 
To summarize the findings up to this point: 
1) Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the Self-Consciousness sub-
scales are less distinct and independent for psychopathological samples 
than for normal students. This is particularly true for those pa-
tients--those attending screening appointments in this study--who are 
exposed to situations which serve as special stimuli to self-awareness. 
2) Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the mean levels of self-con-
sciousness are quite consistent between therapy patients and normals. 
Even the anxiety scale scores were not elevated in this sample. How-
ever, the SA-SC subscale does take on special importance in a clinical 
population since it lies at the core of the dominant factor of the 
SC scale. The PR-SC and PU-SC subscales are neither so important nor 
so independent as reported for the normative sample. 
3) Patients are moderately more variable in their SC scores 
than are normals, as stated in Hypothesis 3. For this reason, self-
consciousness levels of an individual patient may comprise an impor-
tant treatment issue, even though patients as a group show self-
consciousness levels no greater or lower than normals. 
4) Contrary to Hypothesis 4, ES and SC are importantly re-
lated. Self-consciousness takes on a different meaning for subgroups 
within the patient population. Not only is SA-SC an increasingly 
important dimension, but self-evaluation levels increase--as does 
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general self-consciousness--among the more seriously disturbed. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported in part: SA-SC and ES are significantly 
and inversely related. Contrary to expectation, and consistent with 
its diminished role among patients, PR-SC is neither positively nor 
significantly correlated with the Ego Strength Scale. 
Self-Consciousness and Premature Termination from Psychotherapy 
A central hypothesis of this dissertation is that self-con-
sciousness levels can be used to predict premature termination from 
psychotherapy. This expectation is derived by analogy from self-
awareness theory, where research shows subjects experiencing cognitive 
dissonance avoid stimuli to objective self-awareness. It is also 
based on an analysis of causes of premature termination, which concluded 
that an absense of self-monitoring skills (i.e., insufficient self-
consciousness) leads to dropping out because of a lack of motivation, 
while excessive anxiety and self-consciousness results from an in-
sufficiently structured therapeutic relationship and also results in 
unilateral and early termination. Thus, an inverted U relationship 
was expected between self-consciousness (SC) and the percentage of 
patients dropping out of psychotherapy (Broen & Storms, 1961; Wine, 
1971). The following discussion will present data by which to evaluate 
the central hypothesis. 
The following section will be structured in four separate, but 
related sections. First will be a discussion of the direct relationship 
of SC scores to the number of sessions attended. Second will be an 
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examination of potential indirect effects in which other variables 
relating to length of stay are examined for their association with 
self-consciousness. Third, a discriminant analysis will assess the 
importance of SC scores relative to other variables in the prediction 
of premature termination. Fourth, data on other variables suggested 
in the literature as being related to perseverance in treatment will 
be reviewed. 
Self-consciousness and continuation in treatment. Clinic rec-
ords of subjects completing the SC scale were reviewed and the number 
of sessions recorded. All veterans who attended six or more sessions 
were defined as continuers. Those who never began treatment comprised 
another comparison group, referred to in this report as treatment 
decliners. Table 20 presents the mean levels of SC for patients falling 
into the respective groups by length of stay. Since the literature is 
inconsistent in discriminating decliners from terminators, the groups 
are presented separately and combined. Because the number of termina-
tors is rather small, the data is pooled as well as presented on a ses-
sion by session basis. Yet, in none of these groupings is there any 
deviation of note from the grand mean. The relevant ANOVAs (see Table 
21) are all nonsignificant. Even when SC scores are examined in terms 
of the sample specific factor structure, there is no evidence of rela-
tionship with perseverance in treatment; Factor 1: !(2,137)=.146, £> 
.80, Factor 2: !(2,137)=.045, £> .90. The absense of differences in 
means suggests the absense of gross differences. But it only partially 
responds to the hypothesis. The prediction was that terminators would 
Table 20 
Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners, Terminators, and Continuers 
Mean self-consciousness scores 
Group Sessions N Private Public Social anxiety Total 
Decliners 0 53 24.54 19.27 12.36 56.30 
Terminators 1 9 22.55 20.33 12.78 55.66 
2 3 24.00 22.00 13.00 59.00 
3 6 30.00 21.83 13.83 65.66 
4 2 20.50 17.50 12.50 50.50 
5 1 22.00 9.00 12.00 43.00 
Terminators 1,2,3,4,5 21 24.66 20.19 13.05 57.90 
Decliners and 0-5 74 24.58 19.53 12.55 56.75 
terminators 
Continuers 6 or more 59 24.67 19.51 12.39 57.27 1-' 00 
N 
Table 21 
ANOVAs for Self-Consciousness Levels of Decliners, Terminators, and Continuers 
! (and associated z) for Self-Consciousness Scale scores 
Contrasts df Private Public Social anxiety Total 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6+ 6,126 1.046(.399)a 1.239(.291) .076(.998) .840(.542) 
1,2,3,4,5,6+ 5,74 1.314(.267) 1. J88 (. 239) • 078 (. 995) .952(.453) 
0-5 vs. 6+ 1,131 .008 (. 931) .000(.983) .030(.863) .055(.814) 
0 vs. 1-5 vs. 6+ 2,130 .006(.994) .263(.769) .134 (. 87 5) .150(.861) 
1-5 vs. 6+ 1,81 .008 (. 929) .087(.769) .002(.960) .017(.898) 
aThe format of all entries is I(~). 
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include veterans with extremely low as well as extremely high SC 
scores. These subgroups could well cancel one another out in a statis-
tic which pools their means. 
A Chi-square analysis provides the appropriate test of the 
distribution of terminators across levels of SC. Each SC score was 
recoded into intervals of one standard deviation. The expectation, 
then, is that terminators would be overrepresented in the extreme in-
tervals. In Table 22, a summary of the distribution on total SC, it 
is apparent that those terminating after three sessions roughly conform 
to the hypothesis. However, none of those staying other lengths of 
time do. There is no statistically significant difference between 
decliners, terminators, and continuers in distribution across SC, 
2 X (18)=16.65, £>.SO. Nor are differences significant when length of 
stay is plotted against distribution on PR-SC, x2 (18)=27.60, p > .05, 
2 2 PU-SC, X (18)=22.64, £>.20, or SA-SC, X (18)=15.09, £>.60. Termina-
tors are not different than continuers or decliners in their distribu-
tion on SC scores. When decliners are excluded, the relationship be-
tween SC and perseverance in treatment still fails to approach signifi-
cance. Moreover, none of the groups varies much from a normal distribu-
tion. Terminators have no more extreme scorers and continuers are not 
concentrated near the mean. Figure 6 presents the percentage of people 
remaining in treatment at each level of total SC. There is no evidence 
of the hypothesized inverted U relationship. Quite clearly there is no 
direct association between the degree of self-consciousness and per-
severance in treatment. Hypotheses 1 through 4 are not supported. 
Table 22 
Total Self-C<msciousness Score Intervals by Length of Stay 
----·---------------·-----~ 
Number of sessions attended 
Dec liners Terminators Continuers 
·--·---Total score on the rcrcent in 
~elf-Consciousness scale 0 2 3 r, 5 6 o1.· more each interval 
----- --------
Hore than one SD 15.8% 10.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 50.0% 11.9% 14.3 
below the mean 
Lc>io!S thau one SD 33.37. 40.0% )3.37. 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 39.0% 35.0 
below the mean 
Less than one SD 36.8% qQ.O% 66.7% 28.6% 0.0% 50.07. 33.9% 35.7 
above the mean 
Hore than rme SD 14. o~; 10.0:'( 0.0% 42.n. 0.0% 0.0% 15.3% i 5.0 
abovf~~ the mean 
Total N 57 10 3 7 z 2 59 
Note. Percents arc tabulated vertically, that is, within session. 
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Intcrv>~l 47 52 
tvteans 
57 62 67 
Cases per 
Interval 1 l 3 4 8 
77 82 87 92 9"/ 202 107 
1.4 10 5 18 7 7 4 l 
Percent Contir,uc.r!3 Among Patients in St1ccessive IntcrvnJ.s on Total-SC. 
71.1\ - /Woraqc 
Percent 
Continuing 
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Indirect effects of Self-Consciousness scores on premature ter-
mination. Even in the absense of a direct effect, SC scores may in-
fluence continuation in therapy by virtue of their common association 
with other variables. Clinic records and the Intake Rating Scale pro-
vided information on a number of potential covariants of length of 
stay. However, none of these variables successfully discriminated con-
tinuers from terminators. Client variables not significantly related 
included: age, !_(2,131)=1.191, .e_> .30; presence of disability, x2 (2) 
=.22, E.> .80; and rated prognosis, x2 (8)=12.99, E.> .10. Source of 
referral was used as an index of the presenting problem since it re-
fleets the patients attempt to identify the nature of his problem as 
physical or psychological. 2 It was unrelated, X (16)=14.37, .E_> .50. 
Prior perseverance in treatment at the clinic was employed as a rough 
measure of the extent to which the patient was therapy-wise, that is, 
skilled in the execution of the patient's role. It failed to dis-
criminate, 2 X (6)=10.13, .E.> .10. One variable, motivation for treat-
ment, did discriminate those who failed to begin therapy, x2 (6)=15.05, 
E.~ • 05. Those rated as poorly motivated dropped out without a single 
session (72.2% versus 26.4% for the sample as a whole) while those 
identified as excellently motivated usually continued for at least six 
sessions (66.7% compared to 52.9% for the entire sample). But, even 
motivation failed to discriminate between terminators and continuers, 
2 X (3) = 1. 4 7 , E. ). • 50 • 
Therapists do play a role in length of treatment. A comparison 
of the seven therapists treating more than five research subjects each 
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(59 patients in all) showed a significant therapist effect, x2 (6)= 
13.48, ~ ~.05. But this could not be attributed to student or staff 
status, x
2 (2)=.10, ~}.90; discipline, x2 (3)=2.10, ~).50; years of 
clinical experience, x2 (1)=.001, p > .90; or even to the patients reac-
2 tion to their recommendations for treatment, X (4)=.76, ~}.90. Con-
sistency in treatment was unrelated, whether measured as the same ther-
apist throughout treatment, x2 (1)=1.60, ~>.20, or as the same thera-
pist who conducted the intake interview, x2 (1)=1.28, ~> .20. It made 
no difference whether or not the actual treatment provided matched that 
2 initially recommended by the therapist, X (2)=2. 62, .E_) .10, or even 
what modality of treatment was involved, x2 (6)=3.35, .E_).70. Even the 
number of visits to the clinic prior to the inception of treatment 
failed to discriminate continuers, terminators, and those who failed 
to ever begin treatment, x2 (4)=1.52, E._> .80. It will be recalled that 
inpatients and outpatients varied in time between referral and either 
intake or beginning of treatment. Yet, these variables also were not 
demonstrably related to length of stay: for intake, f(l,80)=.000, 
E._) .90, and for time before beginning therapy, f(1,80)=.381, ~>.50. 
The practical consideration of distance of the clinic from the patient's 
residence proved nonsignificant, f(1,80)=.328, E._} .50. 
None of the readily available predictors of patient, therapist, 
or contextual factors in premature termination succeeded in discrimi-
nating between groups in a meaningful way. The differences in percent-
age retained among different therapists indicates that there is some 
variance to be accounted for. It remains a challenge for more finely 
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focused research. For the purposes of this project, it is sufficient 
to note that it is futile to look for an indirect path by which SC 
scores effect length of treatment when a direct association cannot be 
found between the target and the many other variables hypothetically 
associated with it. For the record, Table 23 reports the association 
of self-consciousness to the purported covariates of perseverance in 
therapy. 
Discriminant analyses. A discriminant analysis optimizes what-
ever power each of a set of variables has to distinguish criterion 
groups. Despite the absense of significant univariate relationships, 
the following set of variables was used to generate discriminant func-
tions: days between referral and intake appointment (intake); rated 
prognosis; rated motivation; the patient's reactions to the recommended 
treatment, on a scale from 1 (negative) to 3 (positive); patient age; 
degree of disability; distance of residence from the clinic; and PR-
SC, PU-SC, SA-SC, SA-SC or, in a separate analysis, total SC. 
When the analysis included those declining treatment, this 
group was the one most effectively distinguished. Using capacity to 
minimize Wilk's Lambda (and hence to maximize the MANOVA between 
groups) as inclusion criterion, prognosis, distance, intake, and SA-SC 
were selected. Of the two discriminant functions the larger accounts 
for 95.41% of the explained variance, and separates decliners from 
terminators and continuers to a statistically significant degree, 
Lambda=.691, x2 (8)=25.358, £=.014. The second function seeks to iden-
tify terminators but is less powerful and nonsignificant, Lambda=.980, 
Table 23 
Association of Self-Consciousness Scores with Covariatcs of Premature Termination 
Self-Consciousness scales 
Variable Private Public Social anxiety Total 
Patient variables 
----------------------------------------------
Global dingnosis 
Personality type 
Prognosis 
Percent disability 
Referral source 
Prior therapy 
Experience 
Discipline 
Student or staff status 
Hotivation 
Patte,tt reaction to recommended 
treatment 
Actual t hernpy modality deli.vered 
SC~ml' lhernplst throur,hout tre.,tment 
Sessi•ms before the start 
<>[ tre<Jtment 
x2(l.2)=9.44,£.) .60 
x2(12)=7 .zo.£> .so 
f_(4,l03)=.842,r_> .50 
x2 (3)"'. 79,p >.au 
x2 (9)=6. 32 •£ >. 70 
!_(3, 130)=.488,£_ ') .60 
x
2 (12)=17 .01 ,_p_ > .10 
x
2 (l2)=18.02,p_ > .10 
!_(l•' 103) =. 758,£_.,.. 50 
x2(3),.9.36,_p_< .os 
x2{9)=8.tt8,_p_> .40 
_!<:(3,130)=.963,_£ ">.40 
------------------
Therapist and interaction variables 
x2(3)=3.24,_p_/ .30 
2 X (9)=t2.06,_p_'>.20 
x2(3)=2.94,_p_> .40 
f_(3,104)=1.32,_£) .20 
!_(2,114)=.438,£_> .60 
x2 (3)=3.99,£).21) 
x2 (9)=4.03,_p_ ).90 
x2o>=3.20,_p_ >.3o 
_!'_(3, 104)=1.69,£_) .10 
_!'_(2,114)=.388,p_ > .60 
Clinic variables 
x2 (12)=10. 77 •P.. >.so 
x2(12)=22. 9l,p_ < .os 
!:_(4,103)=. 721,E_) .so 
x2 (3)=4.73,p_'>.lO 
x2 (9)=8.14,_p__?.50 
x_(3,130)=1.560,E_ > .20 
x2 (3)=4.42,£"> .20 
x2{9)=7.13,£).60 
x2 (3) =5. 68,p_ >. 10 
!_(3, 104)=.151 ,_2. >. 90 
f{3,114)=.838,E_) .40 
x2 (l2)=l3.40,£>. JO 
x2(12)=18.67,E_< .to 
£(1;,103}=.103,2_>.90 
x2 (3)=2.2l,_p.> .so 
x2 (9)=3. 70,_p_ > .90 
£{3,130)=1 .021,£_> .10 
x2(3)=7. 73,£ < .10 
X 2 ( 9) =6. 7 1, .2.) . 60 
x2(3)=6.82,r_ < .10 
_!'_(3, 10'•)=1. 34 ,P._). :!0 
!_(3, 114)=.027 ·E.). 90 
·---·---------------------------------------------------------------------
x
2 (12)=l3. 27 ·E.). 30 
x2cn~r.97 .£.>.so 
x 2 (6)~s. 7l.p) .40 
------------
. x2oz)=ll.20,_p__>.so 
x 2(3)=4.37,p_).20 
x2(6)=4.18,p_> .60 
x2(12)=11.58,E_ "> .40 
XL ( 3) = 2 • 80 , £_) ·'• 0 
x2(6)=9.63,_r: > .10 
x2(lz)~lf •• 6t,_r:'> .20 
x2 (J)='•.6!l,p) .10 
x2(6)~5.6l,p ),t,o 
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2 X (3)=1. 36 7, .E.> .10. In combination, the two equations achieve 70% 
accuracy in identifying decliners (who have the higher scores based 
on the first set discriminant function coefficients replicated in 
Table 24). But terminators match their predicted group only 36.8% 
of the time, and continuers are correctly placed 36.2% of the time. 
The overall accuracy is 44.19%, less than 59.6% that would have re-
sulted from predicting that all cases are continuers. If total SC is 
used instead of subscale scores, it is not included in the discriminant 
function. The accuracy of prediction remains best for decliners and 
an inadequate 48.84% overall. 
When the discrimination was exclusively between terminators 
and continuers, two additional variables were added: the experience 
of the therapist and the number of days between referral and the begin-
ning of treatment. The resulting analysis included the variables pre-
sented in Table 25. Terminators had a group mean of -.69007, while 
continuers averaged .24772. This difference is not significant, Lambda 
=.849, x2 (5)=7.93, .E_> .10, and the resulting function is 61.84% accu-
rate. With 55 continuers of 78 cases, a uniform prediction of con-
tinuation would have been more effective, achieving 70.5% accuracy. 
Table 25 also shows the variables selected when total SC replaces sub-
scales in the analysis. Total SC is included in the discriminant func-
tion. But once again the function is nonsignificant statistically, 
2 Lambda=.83612, X (5)=8.860, .E_>.10, and unreliable practically, clas-
sifying cases with only 66.3% accuracy. 
As indicated in Hypothesis 7, self-consciousness is included 
Table 24 
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for 
Continuers, Terminators, and Decliners 
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Variable Coefficients with function 1 Coefficients with function 2 
Intake .580 -.161 
Distance .708 -.196 
Prognosis -.658 -.737 
Social anxiety .384 -.653 
Table 25 
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for Continuers and Terminators 
With Self-Consciousness subscales With Total Self-Consciousness 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Intake -.554 Intake -.846 
Begin therapy -.518 Pretherapy sessions -.599 
Age .682 Age .794 
Distance -.605 Distance -.577 
Social anxiety -.617 Total self- -.415 
consciousness 
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in the discriminant function for three of the four analyses. It does 
contribute in the prediction of continuation in treatment. But the 
contribution is in the context of a failing cause. The set of vari-
ables on which information has been collected are inadequate to re-
liably classify cases. This is surprising, in that at least some of 
the variables have been shown to be related to premature termination, 
albeit in the inconsistent fashion that typifies research in the area. 
Patient age and prognosis, and therapist experience have been signifi-
cantly associated in previous work. A number of variables included 
here related to the context of treatment, clinic policy and procedures. 
As such they tap a less researched area. Their importance is less 
clearly established, although the recurrent presence in the discrimi-
nant functions of variables such as days before intake, days before 
beginning therapy, number of visits before treatment, and distance 
between residence and clinic makes it clear that that context is as 
worthy of future research as are the more traditional patient, thera-
pist, and interaction variables. 
In the absense of a pattern of significant findings, it is 
difficult to interpret the relative importance of self-consciousness or 
to explain the absense of the hypothesized link between self-evaluative 
anxiety and flight from therapy. A clear possibility is that the hy-
pothesis is wrong, that anxiety is not a determining variable in length 
of stay, or, more specifically, that high levels of self-evaluative 
anxiety may increase reliance on the therapist for support and coun-
teract a tendency to avoid therapy. People enter treatment because 
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they are in pain in their daily life. They may be quite willing to 
tolerate whatever additional discomfort arises during the course of 
therapy because of sustained self-scrutiny. But the obtained results 
do not lead to this conclusion, they just fail to rule it out. 
Two alternative explanations can be briefly suggested. If 
self-consciousness is a determining variable in perseverance in treat-
ment, it is the operative degree of affect aroused that is critical, 
not just the level of self-focused attention. In measuring degree of 
self-consciousness, this research is tapping a precursor of the end 
state of interest. Level of self-consciousness may be a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for disruptive anxiety. Indeed, the factor 
structure which shows SA-SC to be separate from the other subscales 
suggests this. The impact of level of self-consciousness is mediated 
by a related but untapped variable: skill in handling self-focused 
attention. Highly self-conscious people may have related abilities to 
laugh at themselves, to maintain a meditative distance between the ob-
served and observing self, or to react with permissive acceptance to 
their own qualities. Any of these abilities, among many others, may 
permit high levels of self-observation without undesirable sequellae. 
Or, as Wicklund (1975) suggests, the person may like significant 
features of the self observed. The remarkable human capacity to re-
interpret events and their meaning is central to our extensive efforts 
to preserve self-esteem. Self-evaluation need not lead to self-
devaluation. While patients may be generally less happy than others, 
they nonetheless are motivated to justify and preserve the value of 
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their character (Rogers, 1961; Sullivan, 1954). Their skills in 
managing self-consciousness may be the critical element in determining 
their capacity to adapt to the requirements of verbal therapy, and it 
is an index of these skills that is missing from the present research. 
A second, and somewhat related, explanation of the nonsignificant 
results also is available. It is not only the patient's skills at 
managing self-consciousness that matters. Therapists also vary in 
the degree to which they consciously or unconsciously control the tone 
and intensity of the patient's self-exploration. A highly self-con-
scious patient, lacking skills to handle that self-scrutiny, might 
still do well if paired with a therapist whose permissiveness, warmth, 
patience, or ironic perspective on human failings helped to insulate 
the patient from excessive self-evaluation. As stated in the review, 
the thrust of the research on premature termination has shifted to 
interaction variables. To examine self-consciousness as a quality of 
the patient alone is somewhat anachronistic. It is justified in this 
first attempt to examine the impact of the variable. But a more sophis-
ticated investigation, with a higher probability of significant re-
sults, would consider the interaction of patient, therapist, and con-
text in measuring the operative level of self-consciousness. 
Other hypotheses about premature termination. In line with 
the skills approach to self-consciousness described above, it was 
hypothesized that previous exposure to psychotherapy would provide the 
patient with an education about handling self-exploration in psycho-
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therapy, and so reduce the rate of premature termination. Of the 134 
cases available, 92 had no previous referrals, 22 had failed to begin 
treatment on all previous contacts with the Mental Hygiene Clinic, 18 
had previously completed a course of six or more sessions, and only 
two had dropped out during the early sessions. So, the sample is too 
small for comparing former terminators and continuers specifically. 
The only apparent variations from expected frequencies are the con-
tinuation of previous patterns among those failing prior referrals 
(68.2% again failed, as opposed to a sample mean of 40.3%) and those 
continuing (55.6% remained after 6 sessions, compared to 41.8% sample-
wide). But these differences did not translate into significant Chi-
square valued. When the 24 cases terminating between sessions one and 
five were contrasted with those continuing, no difference in prior 
experience was evident, x2 (3)=1.28, .E_).70. The best test of Hypothe-
sis 6 sets two levels of experience by pooling former terminators with 
continuers, and decliners with those never previously referred. But 
again, there is no evident relationship with the length of the current 
2 
course of therapy, X (2)=1.71, .E_).30. The one test that might in-
timate the importance of self-consciousness management skills, or at 
least of previous therapy experience at the clinic, fails to find any 
differences in the current course as a function of previous treatment 
experience. 
Hypothesis 8 specifies that therapist skills and experience 
will be related to length of treatment. As mentioned previously, 
there is an effect attributable to therapists, since this does affect 
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the number of sessions attended. But the available indices of skill-
fulness are not significantly associated with perseverance in treat-
ment. Neither therapist discipline, x2 (3)=2.09, ~>.50, student versus 
staff status, x2 (2)=.104, £).90, nor experience, x2(16)=16.03, £ > 
.40, appeared to contribute. No support was provided for the potential 
explanation of self-consciousness management in the interaction of pa-
tient and therapist. 
An additional expectation (Hypothesis 5) was that the effects 
of public self-consciousness, specifically, would be more pronounced 
among those receiving group therapy. It is in this modality that at-
tention to the social aspects of this self is maximized. Of the 21 
patients referred for group treatment, 4 failed to begin, 5 dropped 
out, and 12 remained through the initial 6 sessions. The two cases 
quitting after the first session were 4.52 higher than the sample mean 
of 18.48 on the PU-SC subscale. But the other terminators were below 
average. The ANOVA was nonsignificant overall, F(4,16)=.524, ~> .70. 
There is no evidence of a special linkage between PU-SC and perseverance 
in treatment of those assigned to group therapy. 
To recapitulate, there was little support for any of the hypoth-
eses linking premature termination to self-consciousness. Terminators 
were not overrepresented among those highest or lowest in SC scores. 
The expected inverted U relationship between percent remaining and 
location in the SC distribution failed to appear. Nor did the inclu-
sion of decliners as an additional comparison group clarify the rela-
tionship. No differences in means were observed. While decliners 
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proved easiest of the three groups to discriminate, and SC scores 
contributed to that discriminant function, little accuracy was achieved 
in classifying patients as decliners, terminators, or discriminators. 
None of the variables examined as potential covariates of premature ter-
mination showed significant differences between groups. Similarly, 
there was no support for the special relationships hypothesized between 
patient's previous clinic contact and perseverance, therapist disci-
pline or experience and sessions attended, or PU-SC levels and the 
behavior of group therapy participants. 
Personality Type and Self-Consciousness Levels 
The analysis of five personality styles (see pp. 125-133) led to 
predictions of different self-consciousness levels and subscale pat-
terns for each type. This chapter will review findings which relate 
scores from the Self-Consciousness scale (SC) to ratings of typology 
obtained from the intake interviewer. Methodological issues arising 
from both scales must, however, be mentioned first. 
Methodological issues. As discussed at the beginning of this 
section, psychiatric patients failed to respond to the logical nega-
tive included in three items from the SC scale intended to counter-
balance the acquiescent response set. As such the items had reduced 
means and low correlations with the total scale score. These items 
are not evenly distributed across the subscales; two are from PR-SC 
and one from SA-SC. These scales have correspondingly diminished means 
for the average item. This presents a problem for evaluating the hy-
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pothesis that certain types will have differential elevation of sub-
scale averages. Additional statistical manipulation was required to 
correct this problem. Each subscale average was adjusted (for PR-SC, 
PU-SC, and SA-SC, respectively by .0122, -.3324, and .3101) to equate 
it with the grand mean for all SC items over the 116 cases involved. 
Despite this adjustment based on pooled results, subscale means for 
each personality type remain free to vary. Within type comparisons 
of subscale averages become meaningful since no scale retains a built-
in elevation samplewide. 
The second methodological issue pertains to the reliability of 
clinicians' use of the typology scale. With K=.374, for the reliabil-
ity study, there is a likelihood that many differences will be obscured 
by error variance. This will be a particular problem for obsessive 
and passive types, who proved to be the most difficult to classify. 
In reality, discrepancies will be more robust than indicated by dif-
ferences in means or by significance tests. 
Self-concsiousness levels for five global personality types. 
At the conclusion of the review, it was argued that types are inde-
pendent of degree of pathology. They are not, however, independent 
of global diagnosis, which must be considered a flawed index of inten-
sity of disturbance. Table 26 presents the data relating type to 
diagnosis. A Chi-Square analysis shows the two variables to be signif-
icantly related, x2 (16)=99.06, E< .001. Accordingly, SC levels will 
be evaluated separately for each variable. Table 27 summarizes the 
scale and subscale means used in these analyses. None of the com-
Table 26 
Global Diagnosis and Personality 
Personality type Diagnosis 
Psychotic Neurotic Personality 
disorder 
Hysteric 3 6 4 
Paranoid 35 3 3 
Obsessive 10 30 3 
Passive 16 20 6 
Sociopath 3 3 10 
N 67 62 26 
Type 
OBS Other 
1 9 
0 5 
3 17 
0 8 
0 1 
4 40 
N 
23 
46 
63 
50 
17 
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N 
0 
t-' 
202 
Table 27 
Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs) 
as a Function of Diagnosis and Personality Type 
Self-Consciousness subscales 
Diagnosis N Private Public Social Anxiety Total 
Global diagnosis 
Psychotic 38 23.74 18.81 12.42 55.50 
Neurotic 35 24.43 18.14 12.14 54.66 
Personality 18 23.56 21.94 14.66 60.17 
disorder 
OBS and other 27 22.93 18.59 11.77 53.30 
E_(3,114) .322,.E_) .80 2.325,£. < .10 1.27l,.E_> .20 1.157,.E_>.30 
Personality type 
Hysteric 11 23.28 17.91 10.73 51.91 
Paranoid 25 24.32 17.84 11.96 54.92 
Obsessive 44 24.39 19.38 11.64 55.36 
Passive 23 22.96 18.87 14.79 56.61 
Sociopath 14 24.65 22.21 14.22 61.72 
E_(4' 112) .303,.E_>.80 1.892,.E_>.10 2.275,.E_(.10 1.104,.E_>.30 
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parisons are statistically significant. When public self-conscious-
ness (PU-SC) is examined as a function of diagnosis, the higher scores 
of those with personality disorders result in a marginally signifi-
cant difference. While this is consistent with the extraverted pro-
file from Miller and Magaro's (1977) findings and is in the direc-
tion hypothesized, in the context of multiple tests, the probability 
of chance variation of this degree is too high to regard this as 
validating expectations. Similarly, the findings on SC as a function 
of personality type fall short of statistically reliable differences. 
The elevated Social Anxiety (SA-SC) scales for the passive, but not 
sociopathic, patients was anticipated from the literature review. 
But the differences among the five groups is insufficient to be 
clinically or statistically meaningful. Because somewhat different 
factors were found for this psychopathological sample than for the 
norm group, ANOVAS were also computed for the two major factors as 
a function of personality type. Although the sociopathic and passive 
types were above the mean on the anxiety factor, it proved non-
significant, !_(4,112)=1.725, .£.> .10. On the introspection factor, pas-
sive types were the on:Ly divergent group, obtaining lower scores. 
But, again, the total variability was nonsignificant, !_(4,112)=2.007, 
.£. > .05. 
Instructions did permit clinicians to rate a secondary type 
if this was felt to be necessary. While the matrix in Table 27 used 
only primary types, the function may have been confounded by the 
inclusion of mixed or unclear diagnoses. A series of ANOVAS was also 
computed for those patients described in terms of only one type. 
(See Table 28). Neither the relative ranking nor the magnitude of 
the differences were much effected. 
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To check the possibility that significant differences in the 
general distribution were disguised by the presence of extreme scores, 
a Chi-Square was computed for each SC scale after it had been re-
computed into frequency intervals of one standard deviation each. For 
private self-consciousness (PR-SC), the data were unremarkable and 
analysis was nonsignificant, x2(12)=7.20, ~> .80. Public self-con-
sciousness was also nonsignificant, x2(12)=18.02, ~ ).10. Hysterics 
and sociopaths, the smallest sample groups, were not represented in 
all sectors of the distribution. Sociopaths were consistently high 
scorers, with none more than a standard deviation below the mean and 
35.7% in the highest interval. Hysterics, who might also be expected 
to be elevated in PU-SC, were overrepresented in the interval im-
mediately above the mean but also had a disproportional number of 
extremely low scores. Paranoids, expected to be consistently low, did 
have a preponderance of low scorers but also had the widest scatter. 
Obsessives and passive types were, as hypothesized, intermediate. 
Frequency Distributions for the remaining Self-Consciousness 
scales are presented in Tables 29 and 30. As expected, hysterics and 
obsessives were low or moderate in anxiety. Passive types were usually 
above mean but had a restricted variability. In contrast, paranoids 
were below average in total but were overrepresented at the extremes. 
Sociopaths were likewise highly variable, but typically above the mean. 
Table 28 
Self-Consciousness Scale Means (with ANOVAs) as a Function of Unmixed Personality Type 
Self-Consciousness subscales 
Personality type N Private Public Social anxiety Total 
Hysteric 8 23.12 18.37 10.25 51.75 
Paranoid 22 25.41 18.23 12.04 56.59 
Obsessive 40 24.40 19.70 11.57 55.62 
Passive 20 22.75 18.65 14.80 56.20 
Sociopath 12 25.75 22.50 13.67 62.67 
!_(4,97) .767, .E_ >.50 1. 66 3' .E_ > . 10 1.832, .E_>.10 1.051, .E_ > .30 
N 
0 
Ul 
Personality type 
Hysteric 
Paranoid 
Obsessive 
Passive 
Sociopath 
Table 29 
Distribution of Social Anxiety Scores by Personality Type 
Intervals 
N More than one SD Less than one SD Less than one SD More than one SD 
below the mean below the mean above the mean above the mean 
11 18.2% 54.5% 18.2% 9.1% 
25 24.0% 24.0% 36.0% 16.0% 
44 11.4% 45.5% 34.1% 9.1% 
23 0.0% 21.7% 69.6% 8.7% 
14 14.3% 7.1% 57.1% 21.4% 
N 
0 
"' 
Table 30 
Distribution of Total Self-Consciousness Scale Scores by Personality Type 
Intervals 
More than one SD Less than one SD Less than one SD More than one SD 
Personality type N below the mean below the mean above the mean above the mean 
Hysteric 11 9.1% 63.6% 27.3% 0.0% 
Paranoid 25 24.0% 28.0% 20.0% 28.0% 
Obsessive 44 18.2% 36.4% 38.6% 6.8% 
Passive 23 8.7% 43.5% 39.1% 8.7% 
Sociopath 14 7.1% 21.4% 42.9% 28.6% 
N 
0 
-...J 
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The variability of the last two groups probably contributed to the 
failure of the ANOVA described above. In significance testing, based 
on distribution, personality style did relate to anxiety levels, 
2 X (12)=22.91, ~(.05. Table 30 shows a somewhat similar distribution 
for total Self-Consciousness scale scores, but without the above mean 
congregation of passive style scorers. With only the sociopathic 
types disproportionately high, the degree of association is only 
marginal, x2 (12)=18.67, £_(.10. 
The data provides some tenuous support for the hypothesized 
link between personality style and self-consciousness. It is most 
consistently, and least surprisingly, encountered in support of an 
association between passive and character disorder types and anxiety 
in response to self-focused attention. It is interesting to note 
this commonality between two groups whose symptomology is so divergent. 
These findings support an interpretation of the sociopath's perapatetic 
search for social interaction, stimulation, and excitement as an at-
tempt to use constant activity as a cover by means of which to avoid 
self-evaluation. Anxiety is much more evident in passive types, as 
their methods of escape into states of subjective self-awareness are 
more limited. But, for both groups, avoidance of a tendency toward 
critical self-evaluation seems central. 
The data in support of such an interpretation is, however, 
neither robust nor consistently apparent across significance tests. 
Two factors seem to contribute to this inconsistency. The reliability 
of the type rating scale, while adequate, is sufficiently low that 
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misclassifications seem certain to increase error variance. The 
consistency with which sociopaths were distributed in SC scores 
(Tables 29 and 30) is partially attributable to the relative reli-
ability of this subscale. The other subscales are not so well served. 
In addition, the variability that characterizes patients reduces the 
power of those statistical tests based on a regression model. As 
described previously, patients are more variable than college students. 
The power of ANOVA and t-tests is correspondingly diminished. 
Comparisons between specific personality types. Specific 
predictions were made regarding the rank order of the types. On the 
total SC score, obsessives and passive types were predicted to be 
similar, as indeed they are, and higher than hysterics and sociopaths. 
Likewise, obsessives were hypothesized to exceed hysterics and socio-
paths on PR-SC, but to have a lower mean on PU-SC. These planned 
comparisons are rendered inappropriate because of the dissimilarity 
of the scale scores of hysterics, lowest overall, and sociopaths, 
who proved the highest. Apparently, the primarily nonpsychotic hys-
terics in this sample were well enough defended that self-conscious-
ness of any type was minimized. Public self-consciousness as well as 
social anxiety were low. This is in keeping with the description of 
hysterics in terms of their characteristic naivete and la belle indif-
ference. Of the comparisons specified in Hypotheses 1 and 2, only 
that between combined obsessive and passive groups with paranoids re-
mains feasible. In this case, the difference is as expected, with 
paranoids scoring lower, but it falls short of statistical significance, 
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!_(90)=-.29, p> .70. 
Table 31 summarizes expected ranks (duplicated from p. 135) 
and contrasts them with those obtained. A series of pairwise com-
parisons, based on these hypothesized rankings were also completed. 
Significant differences between types were found for the Social 
Anxiety Subscale (SA-SC). Passive types exceeded both hysterics, !_(32) 
=3.08, .E_ < .01, and obsessives, !_(65)=2.86, .£ < .01, and were marginally 
greater than paranoid patients, !_(46)=1.88, .E_=.066. Rankings of other 
subtypes did not entirely conform with expectations. Obsessives, ex-
pected to be second highest in SA-SC, were not statistically different 
than hysterics or paranoids. Instead, sociopaths had the elevated 
scales. Although t-tests failed to show significant differences, the 
Mann-Whitney U-test revealed that sociopaths significantly exceeded 
obsessives, U =2.017, E._ ( .05, and marginally exceeded hysterics, !!_= 
-z 
43.5, n 1=11, .!!_2=14, ..E.< .10 in Social Anxiety. This represents the 
only instance in the set of pairwise comparisons for which nonpara-
metric tests showed greater sensitivity than !_-tests. Despite the 
partially unexpected ranking of the sociopaths, the essential feature 
of the hypothesis for the SA-SC subscale was confirmed in that passive 
types proved the most anxious. 
With the major exception of the rank of hysterics, hypothesized 
relationships were also observed for the Public Self-Consciousness (PU-
SC) subscale. Sociopaths obtained marginally higher scores than obses-
sives, ~(56)=1.80, r_=.078, and exceeded passive types, !_(35)=2.28, r_= 
.029, and paranoids !_(37)=2.46, _£=.019, to a statistically reliable 
Table 31 
Expected and Observed Rankings of Personality Types on Self-Consciousness Scores 
Self-Consciousness scales 
Expected Observed 
Social So.oial 
Personality type Private Public anxiety Total Private Public anxiety Total 
Hysteric 3 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 
Paranoid 5 5 3 5 3 5 3 4 
Obsessive 1 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 
Passive 1 3 1 1 5 3 1 2 
Sociopath 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 
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degree. Contrary to expectations, hysterics were ranked second lowest 
on PU-SC and varied significantly from sociopaths, ~(23)=2.67, z=.014. 
Parametric and nonparametric tests revealed no statistically reliable 
differences between personality types on private self-consciousness 
(PR-SC). The other trends toward significance occurred on the total 
score. Sociopaths were marginally higher than obsessives, ~(56)= 
1.76, z=.083, and significantly higher than hysterics, ~(23)=2.31, 
z=.030, on total scores. While sociopaths were the "unknown quantity", 
as revealed in the qualifying comments in the discussion of their 
anxiety level, their highest rank on both total SC and PR-SC is incon-
sistent with what was predicted. Neither was the consistently low 
score of hysterics hypothesized. While rationales for the observed 
results have been provided, results from both groups may be anomalous, 
a happenstance due to the relatively small sample size. It is this 
combination of small groups and high standard deviations that accounts 
for the dearth of significant differences. The means do differ. In 
the case of SA-SC particularly, they vary much in the manner that was 
predicted, confirming the observations from the previous section. Like-
wise, on PU-SC, the sociopaths achieved the highest rank in the manner 
predicted. But the mutual validation of the subscale and the distinc-
tion between types is marred by the unexpected low scores from the 
hysterics. Both PU-SC and PR-SC, less distinct and central for patho-
logical groups than for normals, show scant evidence of being related 
to personality style. For PR-SC especially, the results suggest little 
relevance to diagnosis and offer no support for the hypothetical link 
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of introspection and personality types. 
Subscale item averages and personality types. In the attempt 
to demonstrate a link between personality style and management of self-
focused attention, comparisons are possible within, as well as across 
personality types. Hypothesis 3 specified an expected pattern of 
scores over the three subscales for each type. Table 32 replicates 
those predictions, showing the expected rank order of the average sub-
scale item. Tests against these hypotheses would prove misleading if 
unrefined subscale item averages were used. For all types the average 
PU-SC item was highest. Except for passive types the average of the 
second greatest magnitude was PR-SC. Differences in the relative 
elevation of subscale averages across types are obscured by the uniform 
elevation of the PU-SC items. As previously discussed, a correction 
was made to eliminate subscale elevation sample-wide prior to further 
analysis. 
The observed rank for the revised item averages are presented 
in Table 32. Table 33 includes the means. Only for the passive types 
is there a significant difference. The average from the SA subscale 
is significantly higher than that from PR-SC, ~(23)=3.25, £<.01, or 
PU-SC, ~(28)=3.02, ~~.01. This is consistent with the expected high 
level of anxiety. Contrary to expectation, the passive types reported 
little attention to internal experience. A marginally significant 
difference was observed among sociopaths, for whom PU-SC exceeded PR-
SC items, ~(14)=2.06, £=.06, as expected. For the other personality 
types, differences are insufficient to interpret reliably. Hysterics 
Table 32 
Expected and Observed Subscale Ranks for Each Personality Type 
Self-Consciousness subscales 
Expected Observed 
Personality type Private Public Social anxiety Private Public Social anxiety 
Hysteric 2 1 2 1 2 3 
Paranoid 1 3 2 
Obsessive 1 2 1 2 3 
Passive 1 2 1 3 2 1* 
Sociopath 2 1 3 1 2 
* Significantly greater than lower ranking subscale averages,£ <.01~ 
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Table 33 
Self-Consciousness Subscale Item Means for Personality Types 
Self-Consciousness subscale 
Personality type Private Public Social anxiety 
Hysteric 2.34 2. 24 2.10 
Paranoid 2.44 2.22 2.30 
Obsessive 2.45 2.45 2.25 
Passive 2.31 2.37 2. 77 
Sociopath 2.48 2.85 2.68 
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failed to peak on public self-awareness as expected. For obsessives 
the difference between PR-SC and PU-SC items, expected to be signifi-
cant, failed to appear. In fact, when mixed types are excluded, the 
remaining 40 obsessives are minimally higher on Public Self-Conscious-
ness (mean item value of 2.47) than on Private Self-Consciousness 
(2.44). In all other respects, the exclusion of mixed types affected 
neither ranks or significance levels. In view of the results from 
the factor analysis, the distinction between PR-SC and PU-SC is aca-
demic. Table 34 compares the means of the Introspection and Anxiety 
Factors. As the former corresponds more closely with PR-SC, although 
with PU-SC elements, and the later is highly related to SA-SC, a 
comparison is possible using the hypothesized rankings as recapitulated 
in the above review section. Excluding the paranoids, for whom no 
relative rankings were suggested, and the sociopaths, for whom the 
anxiety level was problematic, the relative level of the two factor 
scores is in the direction expected. 
Comparisons among subscales offer some support for the hypoth-
esized link between self-consciousness and personality style. Pre-
dicted differences were found in which the anxiety scale was elevated 
among passive types. A marginal distinction between public and private 
self-consciousness was found for sociopaths. But, as with the preced-
ing sections of analysis, the results are neither so consistent with 
hypothesis nor so robust as might be hoped. The distinctions between 
personality types may have been too gross for sensitive testing. 
Further research might profitably use more thoroughly validated in-
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Table 34 
Self-Consciousness Scale Factor Score Means for Personality Types 
Personality type Anxiety factor 
Hysteric 
Paranoid 
Obsessive 
Passive 
Sociopath 
aHigher ranking factor score. 
-.41 
-.15 
-.02 
.1sa 
.41a 
Introspection factor 
.osa 
.o2a 
.04a 
-.44 
.08 
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struments such as the Millon Multiaxial Clinical Inventory (Millon, 
1977) or more intensive diagnostic assessments prior to rating per-
sonality style. Such steps would likely increase the frequency of 
statistically significant results. But, with the possible exception 
of the social anxiety in the absense of introspection that typifies 
passive types, the current research suggests that any distinctions 
that are eventually made will have more theoretical than applied im-
plications. Self-consciousness is not so closely linked to any 
specific diagnostic group or personality type as to be of particular 
use in assessment or to automatically present an issue to be addressed 
in psychotherapy. 
Discussion 
Implications for self-awareness theory. The results of this 
research provide additional information with which to evaluate the 
Self-Consciousness scale (SC) and self-awareness theory. Two poten-
tial problems with the SC scale have been identified: the lack of 
control of the acquiescence response set, and the impact of transient 
emotional states on a presumably dispositional measure. Since neither 
issue was directly tested, further research is needed. The SC scale 
has three items for which the maximum self-consciousness scores re-
quires a negative answer. These items were among the four with the 
lowest correlation with the total score, and none of these was im-
portantly loaded on the two major factors. It may be that patients 
failed to understand the double negative required or a pervasive 
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response set may be in operation. While there was no measure of the 
influence of acquiescence, the low degree of association between the 
three contrary items included to control it and the rest of the scale 
suggests that it is considerable. Three other items were rejected by 
fewer than 15% of the sample. This extreme skewness also undermines 
the sensitivity of the scale and may be taken as further evidence of 
an artifactual response set. The SC scale would perform better if 
revised to be better balanced for acquiescence. 
The 12 patients completing the scale immediately prior to 
their screening appointments were significantly higher in SC than other 
comparison groups. In the absense of any apparent differences from 
other outpatients seen at the clinic, the most plausible explanation 
is that the common feature in their situation, the imminent screening 
appointment, acted as a powerful manipulation increasing self-focused 
attention. The validation research of the scale has demonstrated that 
the scale taps a dispositional tendency comparable in effect to stimuli 
increasing objective self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Fenigstein, 
1979; Scheier & Carver, 1977). But perhaps, as is suggested in this 
study and in the results reported by Buss and Scheier (1976), the 
dispositional and situational elements of self-attention are indepen-
dent and additive. Further research is indicated on this topic. To 
the extent that the scale proves sensitive to state variables, the 
generalizability of its results decrease and the sensitivity of com-
parisons--at least in studies such as this, in which the influence of 
state variables accumulates as error variance--is proportionally de-
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creased. 
Some findings with normal subjects fail to generalize to a 
clinical population. The increased correlation between SA-SC and the 
remaining subscales is not the point. In fact, the anxiety factor, al-
though more central for patients, is quite similar to that obtained 
from students. The important difference is the disappearance of dis-
tinct public and private aspects of self-awareness. For a clinical 
population, these two subscales merge featurelessly into a secondary 
factor. This research suggests that little confidence be placed on 
the meaning of subscale scores. A two factor model of self-conscious-
ness--which is entirely adequate for Duval and Wicklund's (1972) 
formulations--may be more appropriate. In the absense of further con-
firmation, it is suggested that little importance be attached to the 
PR-SC and PU-SC scores, at least for clinical populations. This finding 
counters the trend in the research literature which treats the public-
private dichotomy as the fundamental contribution of self-consciousness 
research. Buss (1980) reports a range of experiments on normal sub-
jects in which the two dimensions have behavioral consequences which 
are either independent or opposing. He presents this research as: 
evidence demonstrating how different the two self-conscious-
ness traits are, despite their moderate positive correlation. 
People who. reflect about their psychological "insides" are very 
different from people who are concerned about themselves as social 
objects. (p. 61) 
Because the distinct behavioral implications of PR-SC and PU-SC have 
been replicated with normals, the current research does not challenge 
those findings. In fact, the absense of the distinction should be 
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replicated in future research. But the present results indicate that, 
for a clinical population at least, introspective behavior is too un-
differentiated for the dichotomy to be applicable to the population as 
a whole. A question for future researchers is whether it is the psy-
chiatric patient or the college student that is a more representative 
group on which to build a model of self-consciousness. 
This does not imply that the results of the current research are 
entirely discontinuous with previous studies. The social anxiety sub-
scale, specifically, generalizes quite well. The consistency in mean 
scores across samples, very different in life situations, suggests the 
broad applicability of the central dimension. The internal consistency 
of SA-SC items was retained. This research provided some needed vali-
dation for the subscale. It makes sense that anxiety accounts for a 
greater proportion of the explained variance among patients than 
normals. The significant and important inverse relationship with the 
Ego Strength scale was hypothesized and is consistent with clinical 
wisdom. The SA-SC appears to be a valid index of anxiety about evalua-
tion in a social context. 
This research also supports a central tenant of self-awareness 
theory in clarifying the relationship of self-consciousness and anxiety. 
Although never discussed in those terms specifically, the self-denigra-
tion, the heightened acitvity and conformity, and the attempted escape 
into subjective self-awareness all suggest that objective self-aware-
ness is a major source of anxiety. Yet, paradoxically, people regular-
ly and willingly maintain this state of consciousness. Self-denigra-
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tion cannot be an automatic consequence. The factor structure of the 
SC scale, for both normal and pathological samples, includes anxiety 
as one dimension among others. For patients, this aspect is more 
pronounced and self-consciousness is more likely to be expressed as 
anxiety. But neither patients nor normals need inevitably respond 
with evaluation. A non-affective response of self-observation, whether 
or not it is differentiated into public and private components, is also 
available. Wicklund (1975b) acknowledges that objective self-awareness 
may be acceptable or even enjoyable when behavior exceeds stands. Re-
search with the SC scale suggests that a non-evaluative self-awareness 
is also normative. The implication is clear that some intervention 
may shift the internal structure of self-consciousness to lessen the 
role of anxiety. With patients, for whom anxiety takes on a more cen-
tral role, this is a particularly relevant project. 
Implications for future research and clinical applications. 
Two clinical issues were examined in this study, incidence of premature 
termination and classification of personality type. Despite the ex-
pectation of significant association, self-consciousness had minimal 
practical impact on either variable. The attempt to understand this 
leads to several methodologicql issues and suggestions for future re-
search. Greater differences between types are probable if the type of 
rating scale was made more reliable or replaced with a more thoroughly 
validated scale. A replication with larger samples, especially of 
hysterics and sociopaths, would be of interest. In this study, signif-
icant differences were found on the SA-SC in comparison with passive 
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patients and sociopaths, and on PU-SC and total SC with sociopaths. 
More statistically reliable differences may be anticipated in replica-
tion studies. The absolute lack of significant findings in the pre-
diction of termination suggests that self-consciousness levels are not 
related. If the central assumption, that dropping out represents 
flight from excessive anxiety, has any value, then it refers to state 
anxiety aroused during the course of treatment. Rather than using a 
primarliy dispositional measure prior to therapy it would be profitable 
to examine variables more directly linked to the nature of interaction 
in treatment. These would include indices of patient skill in handling 
anxiety and therapist skills in modulating self-consciousness. How 
self-awareness is handled appears more critical than level of self-
consciousness. 
The findings in the present study suggest no particular modifi-
cations in the practice of psychotherapy. If anything, they offer the 
reassurance that the degree of self-consciousness on the part of the 
patient is unlikely to be associated with diagnosis or flight from 
therapy. More disturbed patients may be expected to display heightened 
anxiety as part of a generally excessive self-consciousness. Passive 
types should display social anxiety in the absense of evidence of much 
introspection. But patients as a group differ little from normals in 
self-consciousness levels. What differences do appear are not demon-
strably important in the process of therapy. 
The findings relevant to clinical practice are, then, essen-
tially negative. This is generally reassuring in that hypothetical 
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aversive consequences are not rE2gularly or inevitably associated with 
the very basic therapeutic proct2ss of insight. While self-conscious-
ness is functionally associated with concern about social evaluation, 
there is no evidence that this Elnxiety assumes a major role in the 
clinical setting. 
SUMMARY 
The Self-Consciousness scale (SC) was administered to 230 
veterans referred for outpatient psychotherapy. In the absense of 
previous published reports on the use of this scale with a clinical 
population, this study was in part a generalization study. It checked 
the external validity of results obtained from the college students 
sampled to date. Means from patients varied little from those pre-
viously reported. There is no evidence that gross level of self-
consciousness, for the total score or subscales, differs for patients 
or varies across age, education, social class background, or any of 
the other variables on which veterans are discrepant from students. 
However, definite limits to the generalizability of previous findings 
were encountered. Patients are significantly more variable in their 
scores than students. The subscale scores are also more highly cor-
related. The response to self-focused attention, with three identifi-
ably different components for students, was less differentiated for 
veterans. A factor analysis reveals only two major factors, with so-
cial anxiety assuming a more central role. This reaffirms a central 
assumption of self-awarenes-s theory: that self-consciousness is easily 
transformed into aversive self-evaluation. But it also indicates that 
caution should be exercised in applying the SC scale to non-student 
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populations. The total score, primarily as a result of the Social 
Anxiety subscale, is significantly and inversely related to the Ego 
Strength scale. The more pathological the sample, the higher the SC 
scores that may be expected. Those who admit to symptoms also report 
a dispositional tendency to examine themselves and to be made anxious 
by this evaluation. 
Self-consciousness was hypothesized to relate to perseverance 
in treatment. Highly self-evaluative patients were expected to flee 
the extremely focused attention engendered by therapy. No support was 
found for this hypothesis. Neither self-consciousness nor the other 
patient, therapist, or contextual features examined successfully dif-
ferentiated those terminating unilaterally within five sessions from 
those continuing in verbal therapy. While the Social Anxiety (SA-SC) 
subscale or the total SC score alternately contributed to discriminant 
functions, these functions were nonsignificant and unsuccessful in 
classifying continuers and terminators at better than chance levels. 
It appears that the relationship of patient and therapist may be a 
more powerful determinant of perseverance in treatment than is the 
patient's dispositional tendency toward self-scrutiny. 
Different levels of self-consciousness were expected to char-
acterize different personality types from among the patient sample. 
The tests of this hypothesis generated mixed results. An ANOVA re-
vealed no significant difference in total self-consciousness among 
hysterics, paranoids, obsessives, passive types, and sociopaths. But 
pairwise comparisons did indicate that sociopaths had relatively more 
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elevated scores, significantly so when contrasted with hysterics. 
Contrary to expectation, obsessives achieved the second highest, rather 
than the highest, mean score on private self-consciousness (PR-SC) and 
hysterics were next to lowest on public self-consciousness (PU-SC) when 
expected to be among the top two. As hypothesized, sociopaths were the 
highest of the personality styles on PU-SC and passive types had the 
highest mean for SA-SC, to a statistically reliable degree for two of 
the four comparisons. With the exception of hysterics, each type also 
had the hypothesized peak subscale score. In the face of the general 
variability of patient scores and the less than optimal reliability of 
the personality rating task, these results lend modest support to the 
hypothesized link between personality style and self-consciousness lev-
els. The degree of association obtained is, however, insufficient to 
be of practical use in diagnosis or anticipating issues in therapy. 
The self-consciousness generated in psychotherapy is related 
to self-evaluation. But the association is neither so consistent nor 
so strong as to constitute a threat to treatment in the typical case. 
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Following is a list of statements about personal and social behavior. Please read each statement, 
thinking about how true for you each statement is. If the statement is "extremely unlike" you, 
then circle the number- "1" next to that statement. If it is "somewhat unlike" you, then circle the 
number "2''. If you are uncertain or undecided, circle "3"; if the statement is "somewhat like" 
you, circle "4"; and circle "5" for those statements that are "extremely like" you. Take as 
much time as you like on each question. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. 
What matters is how you are, or how you see yourself to be. Please complete the questionnaire 
before leaving. When finished, turn it in to the secretary or the staff member that gave it to you. 
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1 2 
Extremely Somewhat 
Unlike Me Unlike Me 
3 4 
Undecided Somewhat 
or Unsure Like Me 
5 
Extremely 
Like Me 
1. I'm always trying to figure 
myself out 
2. I'm concerned about my style 
of doing things 
3. Generally I'm not very aware 
of myself 
4. It takes me time to overcome my 
shyness in new situations 
5. I ret1ect (or think carefully) about 
myself a lot 
6. I'm concerned about the way I 
present myself (or come across 
to others) 
7. I'm often the subject (or center) 
of my own fantasies 
s. I have trouble working when 
someone is watching me 
9. I never scrutinize myself (or 
examine or look at myself 
closely) 
10. I get embarrassed very easily 
11. I'm self-conscious about the way 
I look 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Extremely 
Unlike :Yle 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Continue on the next page. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Somewhat 
Unlike ~le 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Undecided 
or Unsure 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Somewhat 
Like :Yie 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Extremely 
Like Me 
5 
5 
5 
5 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Extremely Somewhat TJndecided Somewhat Extremely 
Unlike Me Unlike Me or Unsure Like Me Like Me 
I don't find it hard to t:llk. to 1 2 3 4 5 
str:mgers 
I'm generally attentive to (or 1 2 3 4 5 
aware of) my inner_feelings 
I usually worry about makin!$ 1 2 3 4 5 
a good impression 
I'm constantly examining my 1 2 3 4 5 
motives (or looking at my 
reasons for acting as I do) 
I feel anxious when I speak in 1 2 3 4 5 
front of a group 
One of the last things I do before 1 2 3 4 5 
I 1e ave my house is look in the 
mi.F!'or 
Extremely Somewhat Undecided Somewhat Extremely 
Unlike Me Unlike Me or Unsure Like iVIe Like Me 
I sometimes have the feeling 1 2 3 4 5 
that I'm off somewhere watching 
myself 
I'm concerned about what other 1 2 3 4 5 
people think of me 
I'm alert to changes in my mood 1 2 3 4 5 
I'm usually aware of my appearance 1 2 3 4 5 
I'm aware of the way my mind works 1 2 3 4 5 
- when I work through a problem 
Large groups make me nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
You may be contacted by telephone for a brief, follow up interview about your reactions to 
your treatment at Hines. If there are times of the day or days of the week that are 
particularly convenient, please indicate them below: 
days ________________________ _ 
times ----------------
Thank you for your cooperation 
This inventory consists of numbered statements. Read each statement and 
decide whether it is true as applied to you or false as applied to you. 
If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE, as applied to you, place a check mark V) 
in the column marked True. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE, as 
applied to you, place a ckeck mark in the column marked false. If a statement does 
not apply to you or if it is something that you don't know about, make no mark. 
Remember t~ give YOUR OWN opinion of yourself. Do not leave any blank spaces 
if you can avoid it. Blacken only one response for each statement. Erase completely 
any answer you wish ;o change. Remember, try to make~ answer to each 
statement. 
1. I have a good appetite. 
2. I have diarrhea once a month or more. 
3. At times I have fits of laughing and crying that I 
cannot control. 
4. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job. 
5. I have had very peculiar and strange experiences. 
6. I have a cough most of the time. 
7. I seldom worry about my health. 
8. My sleep is fitful and disturbed. 
9. When I am with people I am bothered by hearing 
very queer things. 
10. I am in just as good physical health as most of my 
friends. 
11. Everything is turning out just like the prophets in the 
Bible said it would. 
12. Parts of my body often have feelings like burning, 
tingling, crawling, or like "going to sleep." 
13. I am easily downed in an argument. 
1-L I do many things that I regret afterwards (I regret 
things more or more often than others seem to). 
15. I go to church almost every week. 
· 16. I have met problems so full of possibilities that I 
have been unable to make up my mind about them. 
17. Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the op-
posite of what they request, even though I know they 
are right. 
Continue on the other side. 
True False 
True False 
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2S3 
True False 
18. I like collecting flowers or growing house plants. 
19. I like to cook. 
20. During the past few years I have been well most of 
the time. 
21. I have never had a fainting spell. 
22. When I get bored I like to stir up some excitement. 
23. My hands have tiot become clumsy or awkward. 
24. I feel weak all over much of the. time. 
25. I have no difficulty in keeping my balance in walking. 
26. I like to flirt. 
27. I believe my sins are unpardonable. 
28. I frequently find myself worrying about something. 
29. I like science. 
30. I like to talk about sex. 
31. I get mad easily and then get over it soon. 
True False 
32. I brood a great deal. 
33. I dream frequently about things that are best kept to 
myself. 
34. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood 
by others. 
35. I have had blank spells in which my activities were 
interrupted and I did not know what was going on 
around me. 
36. I can be friendly with people who do things which 
I consider wrong. 
37. If I were an artist I would like to draw flowers. 
38. When I leave home I do not worry about whether 
the door is locked and the windows closed. 
39. At times I hear so well it bothers me. 
40. I often cross the street in order not to meet someone 
I see. 
H. I have strange and peculiar thoughts. 
Continue on the next page. 
42. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love. 
43. Sometimes some unimportant thought will run through 
my mind and bother me for days. 
44. I am not afraid of fire. 
45. I do not like to see women smoke. 
46. When someo.ne says silly or ignorant things about 
something I know about, I try to set him right. 
47. I feel unable to tell anyone all about myself. 
48. My plans have frequently seemed so full of difficulties 
that I have had to give them up. 
49. I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game. 
50. I have had some very unusual religious experiences. 
51. One or more members of my family is very nervous. 
52. I am attracted by members of the opposite sex. 
53. The man who had most to do with me when I was a 
child {such as my father, stepfather, etc.) was very 
strict with me. 
54. Christ performed miracles such as changing water 
into wine. 
55. I pray several times each week. 
56. I feel sympathetic towards people who tend to hang on 
to their griefs and troubles. 
57. I am afraid of finding myself in a closet or small 
closed space. 
58. Dirt frightens or disgusts me. 
59. I think Lincoln was greater than Washington. 
60. In my home we have always had the ordinary necessities 
(such as enough food, clothing, etc.). 
61. I am made nervous by certain animals. 
62. My skin seems to be unusually sensitive to touch. 
63. I feel tired a good deal of the time. 
64. I never attend a sexy show if I can avoid it. 
Continue on the next page. 
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True False 
True False 
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True False 
65. If I were an artist I would like to draw children. 
66. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces. 
67. I have often been frightened in the middle of the night. 
68. I very much like horseback riding. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Patient's Name -------------- Refused 
Dare _____________________________ __ Before Afrer 
Referred to MHC from ---------- Preresred 
Diagnostic Impression and Manifestations-------------------
Personality Organization (mark '1' next to the most appropriare description; place "2" 
next to the secondary care gory, if needed) 
Hysrerical: overuse of repression; likely presents with somatic concerns or 
the feeling of being used in personal relationships; exhibitionistic, dramatic; 
relares so that the therapist has a sense of engagement with the patient 
despire a focus on external events. 
Paranoid: projection prominent; presents with concerns about being isolated 
or deliberarely abused by other people; relares vaguely and guardedly; 
therapist feels a strong pull to confirm the patient's perspective or else 
be confronred with the patient's underlying anger. 
Obsessive: isolation and inrellectualization prominent; problems relared to 
feared loss of control or, if loss of control has been experienced, feelings 
of depression, anger, and guilt; high expectations for personal productivity 
or morality; insight into thoughts and motives without affect; patient is 
controlling, and the inrerview may be so wordy as to become boring. 
Passive: schizoid and avoidant; may present with multiple fears and feelings 
of helplessness; inward focus on fantasy; history suggests lack of social 
skills and contacts; therapist may still feel detached afrer the inrerview; 
include: passive dependent, passive aggressive, and narcissistic characters. 
Sociopathic: history of acting out rensions; minimizes problems, and likely 
attends the inrerview because of pressure from family, courts, or other 
outside source; may be problems with alcohol or drugs; appears socially 
skilled and comfortable, and yet the contact remains superficial and the 
relationship feels tenuous. 
Prognosis (choose among: excellent, good, fair, guarded, poor)----------
Patient's Motivation for Tr:eatment (excellent, good, fair, poor)----------
Treatment Modality 
Individual Therapy 
Group Therapy (individual or couples) 
lV1arital or Family Therapy 
Hypnotherapy 
lVIedication (exclusively) 
Discharge: with referral elsewhere 
Discharde: no treatment desired Other: _________ ____ 
Recommendation 
(rank order those 
considered) 
Patient's Preference 
(mark"+", lf0", or "-" 
for those recommended) 
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Checkliat for Intake Interviewers 
Dorothy and Dagmar will administer the questionnaire 
to all patients who have nor. been given the scale as 
inpatients or on screening. 
Ask all intakes to turn the questionnuire in at the 
beginning of your interview. 
They may have already completed the questionnaire 
and turned it in at the receptionists desk. 
If the'y have not finished it, remind them to complete 
it before leaving the clinic. They can turn the form 
in to Dorothy or Dagmar. 
If completed, the form can be turned in to you and 
included in the intake folder. 
Thank the patient for his cooperation on behalf of the 
research team. 
After the interview, complete the Intake Rating Sheet: 
copy from the intake sheet: name, date, referra 1 source, 
diagnosis, and prognosis; 
rank the relevant personality typologies (remembering 
that this is not to indicate degree of pathology, only 
personality structure), rate motivation for treatment, 
and rank recommendacions (noting the patient's reactions 
with+, 0, or -). 
Place the Inta~e Rating Form in the iutake folder. 
Thank you for your continued help. 
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CLINICAL RECORD or Report on ---------------------------
Continuation of s. F.-:-:-:--:----:---:--:---:--:-----
<Srrik• out on• lin•) (Sp~cJ!y tYP• ol•••m;n•tion or d•t•) 
(Sifln and date) 
INFORl\1ATION ABOUT: FACTORS L~FLUENCING THE DECISION TO BEGIN OR 
CONTINUE IN OUTPATIENT TREATI.IENT 
The purpose of this research is to better understand what factors a veteran 
considers in malting a decision about beginning or continuing in tre stmevt at the 
:O.lental Hygiene CUnic. We will be interested 1 n characteristics of the veteran and 
in hospital policies that affect this decision. You will be asked a sel·ies of questions 
on the following pa:;es about yourself and your experieuces. f.t some time in the 
next four months you may receive a follow up telephone call irom a research staff 
person, who will ask you some brief questions about your re~ctions to your treat-
ment in the Psychiatry Service at Hines. In addition, the intal;;e worker will 
auswer several qut:~stions about your interview. 
In this research, our goal is to discover facts about people and programs 
so r.hat the !VIental Hygiene Clinic can best meet veteran:;' r1eeds. In this kind of 
study, we are less interested in a particular person'3 score on the paper and pencil 
questionnaire than in the responses of veterans as a group. So no individttal case 
is ever identified. Your test results are stricti:• confidrmtial. While the forms 
you complete wi.ll remain in your clinical record during the coursA of the study, 
they will not be interpreted by staff. Your reSiJOnses to e1e q~,;astionnaire will not 
affect the type of treatment you receive at the ~rental Hygiene Clinic. So the 
be~1ifits of this research will help those who come after you, a3 your parth.:it:~ation 
will hopefully make it possible for veterans in the future to more efficiently get 
the help they desire from the r..Iental Hygiene Clinic. 
Our hope is that your participation m this re:;earch will be ::.. comfo1:table 
experience for ycu. Many others have filled out the CJUestionnail'e with no problema. 
!f you do have questions or concerns about this reseru:ch, you can feel free to 
discuss them with a ward psychologist or ;\!ental Hygiene Clinii.: staff member. If you 
sustain any physical injury related to your participation in this study you will be 
entitled to medical c&e and treatment. Compensation may also be payable under 
38 USC 351, or in some circumstances, undel' the Federal Tort Cl'lim~ Act. 
(Contin'!Je on :ereu~ !ic!e) 
TAi:i.::NT"S iDENTIFICATION (Fat' typ~:l or writreon lftttri~u AH•e: Nam-!:..s!, forst. 
rn1ddJc; ~r•d•; d;,jtr:; hospitttl or tn~du:.·li (tlc.ili~Ti I WAftDt«::. 
P~PO~T ON--- or COMTIH~A'fiOM I)F -----
~tunf.l.:\l"d .Form :urr 
a.t .. flt.-1. St.rvlC!S ·U'IIIUhtt••ttOiol ~ItO 
I!OITI:~.Io'~tlriiCT (:OIUIIITTtl C'l't WIO"t:Af. ltt:CIWIU 
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CLINICAL RECORD or Report on ---------------------------------------
Continuation of S. F •. -:-:;-;:-~----=-~::-.:---:--:------
<Stn'k .. out one/ine) (SpfiCdy rype ol••;,m;tutio" or d•t.•) 
(Sitn and dat~) 
INFORlV!ATION ABOUT: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION TO BEGIN OR 
CONTINUE IN OUTPATIE:t\T TREATMENT 
Your participation in this testing project is strictly voluntary. You may 
withdraw your consent' at any time by stating tha~ you will not complete t!m 
questionnaire. Your decision to participate or not will not affe::t the treatment 
that rou wculd normally receive at the Mental Hygiene Clinic now or in the 
future. Your veteran's benefits will not be affe·:;ted by yC'ur test results or 
your decision to particif)&te or not. 
I • .mderstand that this questionnaire is for reseaJ.•ch purposes. I agree 
to fill out this form and, perhaps, to have a short telephone interview in the 
future. I uncte1·stand that the reults will not affect my curreut treatment at 
Hiue~ and thc>t tl:wse results will be kept stl·ictly confidential by the research 
staff aad by all other staff at Hines Veterans Administratic::n 1Heclical Centc:·. 
FJ'incipal Investigator's Signature Patient's 'Signature 
Responsible Therapist's Signature \Vitness 
Date Time 
Continue on the next page. 
(Cor tlnue on r~vorae tu'd,} 
~A ;.~NT'S ICZNT:I"~ICATION (ror ryp~d or written •nt'i~s ~rv.ft: •'"'f'!'O I•H. first. 
tnid.J,"e; 'radt~: date: hc~pital or f'r.r!!d•~allacility) I RF.:QiST:!R NO. I WAI!l)NQ. I 
RE?OHT 011 ----- or Cvh"Tllltl.\T!O!t OF -----
&t)ttiJ.Il 5i•v•.:u •o .. '"t.sr.u,p,., A~~ro 
,._;r"•C~>tCT co••rnrt ()..,. '~r~iCAt. •t:c•~:s 
,.., 'tl It' ·I; :.~I t 
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~~~2~~~3~~4-,~5~~6-,~7~~8_,~9~~10~,_1~1~~1~2~~1~3~~14 ~1=5-,-:.1~6~~17~~1~8~~1~9~~2~0-
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VARIMP...X RC'!'ATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR AU_, FACTORS WITH AN EIGENV .ALUE GREATER THAN ONE 
VARIABLE FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 F.ACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7 
1 .125 .709 .llO ~- .062 .121 .025 .280 
2 .171 .353 .085 -.021 .153 .018 .083 
3 -.113 -.027 -.017 .381 -.286 .351 .207 
4 .643 .234 .083 -.005 -.149 -.548 .234 
5 .186 .545 -.075 .265 .121 -.056 .112 
6 .112 .416 .245 .139 .102 -.052 -.076 
7 .268 .275 .224 .036 .359 .083 .011 
8 .606 .164 .118 -.053 .229 -.004 -.017 
9 .060 .089 -.041 .196 -.039 .486 -.018 
10 .526 .231 .282 -.073 .212 -.160 .053 
11 .153 .123 660 .079 .146 -.073 .145 
12 .100 .027 .047 -.221 -.058 -.025 .1+39 
13 .104 ,141 .036 .525 -o068 .054 -.093 
14 .303 .325 .508 .011 -.148 -.044 -.243 
15 .152 .593 .195 .085 .070 .124 -.104 
16 .391 .182 .151 -.045 -"015 .068 -.053 
17 .139 .158 .194 .087 .2l7 -.067 .000 
18 .185 .253 .::>31 .063 .553 .008 -.060 
19 .311 ,338 .454 .023 -.008 .094 .066 
20 .025 .042 .101 .545 .267 .132 .030 
21 -.099 --. 026 .381 .382 .199 -.019 -.042 
22 -.096 .041 .023 .549 .011 .089 -.182 
23 .730 .116 .003 .llO • 2.02 .069 .172 
"PERCENT OF 
VARIANCE 
INCORPORATED 9,79 8,97 6.10 6.10 4,20 3.40 2 • .50 N 0\ 
.P-
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Code 
290.00 
291.50 
295.00 
295.30 
295.40 
295.60 
295.70 
295.90 
295.99 
296.00 
296.20 
296.30 
297.00 
298.00 
300.00 
300.10 
300.20 
300.40 
300.70 
301.00 
301.10 
301.20 
301.30 
301.40 
301.70 
301.89 
302.80 
303.10 
303.20 
304.80 
305.50 
307.30 
307.40 
309.20 
309.90 
316.00 
318.00 
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DSM II DIAGNOSES OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
Diagnosis Frequency 
Senile dementia 1 
Alcoholic deterioration 1 
Simple schizophrenia 1 
Paranoid schizophrenia 31 
Acute schizophrenic episode 7 
Residual schizophrenia 2 
Schizo-affective schizophrenia 3 
Chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia 3 
Other schizophrenia 2 
Involutional melancholia 5 
Manic-depressive illness, depressed 1 
Manic-depressive illness, circular 11 
Paranoia 2 
Psychotic depressive reaction 1 
Anxiety neurosis 20 
Hysterical neurosis 1 
Phobic neurosis 3 
Depressive neurosis 43 
Hypochondriacal neurosis 1 
Paranoid personality 2 
Cyclothymic personality 1 
Schizoid personality 2 
Explosive personality 5 
Obsessive compulsive personality 1 
Antisocial personality 1 
Borderline personality 1 
Sexual deviation 1 
Habitual excessive drinking 1 
Alcohol addiction 7 
Other drug dependence 1 
Gastro-intestinal psychophysiologic disorder 2 
Adjustment reaction to adult life 25 
Adjustment reaction to late life 9 
Non-psychotic organic brain syndrome due to trauma 1 
Non-psychotic organic brain syndrome due to 
other physical condition 
Marital maladjustment 4 
No mental disorder 1 
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Card Columns 
1 1- 3 
1 4 
1 6-28 
1 30-31 
1 33-34 
1 36-37 
1 39-41 
1 43 
2 1- 3 
2 4 
2 6- 8 
2 9-11 
2 12 
2 13 
2 14 
2 16-18 
2 18-20 
2 21-23 
2 24 
2 25 
2 26-27 
2 28 
2 29 
2 30-31 
3 1- 3 
3 4 
3 6-11 
3 12 
FORMAT OF RAW DATA 
Content 
Patient identification number (Inpatients 000-106, 
outpatients 300-417, screenings 500-510, other out-
patients 600-611, ratings only 700-795) 
Card number 
Self-Consciousness scale items (on a scale of 1-5)a 
Private self-consciousness 
Public self-consciousness 
Social anxiety 
Total self-consciousness score 
268 
Data combination available (Self-Consciousness scale 
only 1, all instruments 8, etc.) 
Patient identification number 
Card number 
Days between referral and scheduled intake appointment 
Days between referral and first therapy appointment 
Number of sessions before beginning therapy 
Same therapist for treatment as for intake (no 1, yes 2) 
Same therapist throughout first six therapy sessions 
(no 1, yes 2) 
Patient age (as of January 1, 1980) 
Distance between residence and clinic 
Percent disabilitya 
Previous therapy at the clinic (yes, all of 5 or less 
sessions 1; never began, although referred 2; never 
referred 3; one or more episodes of at least 6 sessions 
4) 
Sessions attended (6 represents 6 or more sessions) 
Therapist 
Therapist discipline (psychologist 1, scoial worker 2, 
nurse 3, physician 4) 
Staff/student status (staff 1, student 2) 
Years of experience of the therapist 
Patient identification number 
Card number 
Date of intake (year, month, day) 
When the Self-Consciousness scale was completed (before 
interview 1, after interview 2, in waiting room prior 
to interview 3) 
Note. Blanks or zeros are typically considered to be missing data. 
aBlanks or nines are considered to be missing data. 
Card Columns 
3 13 
3 15-19 
3 20 
3 21 
3 22 
3 23 
3 24 
3 25 
3 26 
3 27 
3 28 
4 1- 3 
4 4 
4 5 
4 6-73 
4 75-76 
4 77 
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Content 
Referral source (Admitting 1, Screening/Admitting 2, 
Inpatient Psychiatry Units 3-7, Inpatient General 
Medicine 8, Outpatient General Medicine 9) 
Diagnosis (DSM II) 
Global diagnosis (psychotic 1, neurotic 2, personality 
disorder 3, organic brain syndrome 4, other 5) 
Personality type (hysteric 1, paranoid 2, obsessive 3, 
passive 4, sociopath 5) 
Personality type (secondary) 
Prognosis (poor 1, guarded 2, fair 3, good 4, excel-
lent 5) 
Motivation for treatment (poor 1, fair 2, good 3, 
excellent 4) 
Recommended modality of treatment (individual therapy 1, 
group therapy 2, family therapy 3, hypnotherapy 4, 
medication only 5, referral 6, discharge without re-
ferral 7, other 8) 
Recommended modality of treatment (secondary) 
Actual therapy modality delivered 
Patient's reaction to the actual modality of therapy 
(negative 1, neutral or no response 2, positive 3) 
Patient identification number 
Card number 
Inpatient unit 
Ego Strength scale items (evidence of ego strength 1) 
Total Ego Strength scale score 
Test administered first (Ego Strength scale 1, Self-
Consciousness scale 2) 
COOl ~~~~~512~252254522~22~~ 3! 27 ~9 077 4 
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